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EDITOR’S NOTE
EDITOR’S NOTE
Annually, the ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law publishes
three Issues. The Journal strives to publish relevant articles that address
Annually,
the law
ILSA topics
Journaland
of International
& Comparative
publishes
international
issues of significant
globalLaw
importance.
three
Issues.
The
Journal
strives
to
publish
relevant
articles
that
address
Volume 27 Issue 1 focuses on the broad impact the COVID-19 pandemic
international
law
topics
and
issues
of
significant
global
importance.
has had on the global population—ranging from students, to asylum
Volume
27everyday
Issue 1 focuses
thelastly,
broadbut
impact
COVID-19
pandemic
seekers, to
citizens,onand
neverthe
forgotten,
to those
upon
has
had
on
the
global
population—ranging
from
students,
to
asylum
death.
seekers, to everyday citizens, and lastly, but never forgotten, to those upon
death.
This Issue begins with Fatemah Albader and Fotouh Al-Raqom’s article,

titled “The Right to Online Education in Kuwait, Revisited in Light of
This
Issue begins
Fatemah
and Fotouh
Al-Raqom’s
article,
COVID-19.”
Ms.with
Albader
and Albader
Ms. Al-Raqom
explain
how, although
titled
“The
Right
to
Online
Education
in
Kuwait,
Revisited
in
Light
of
online education in the United States is not a new phenomenon, the
COVID-19.”
Ms.
Albader
and
Ms.
Al-Raqom
explain
how,
although
transition to online education for many Arab countries, specifically Kuwait,
online
education
in theand
United
States is narrative
not a new
phenomenon,
the
sets forth
a challenging
unprecedented
for its
students. This
transition
to online education
for many
Arabright
countries,
specifically
Kuwait,
article re-examines
the international
human
to education
in light
of the
sets
forth
a
challenging
and
unprecedented
narrative
for
its
students.
global pandemic, and why Arab States, such as Kuwait, must protect This
this
article
re-examines
international
human right
to education in light
of the
fundamental
humanthe
right
by expanding—not
restricting—avenues
of online
global
pandemic,
and why
Arabstudying
States, such
Kuwait,
must
protect
this
education
for Kuwaiti
students
insideasand
outside
of the
country.
fundamental
human
right
by
expanding—not
restricting—avenues
of
online
Ms. Albader and Ms. Al-Raqom suggest that Kuwait’s attempts to address
education
Kuwaiti
studentsinstudying
and outside
the country.
the currentfor
state
of education
responseinside
to COVID-19
areofmisguided,
as
Ms.
Al-Raqombut
suggest
Kuwait’s
attempts
to address
they Albader
are not and
onlyMs.
inconsistent,
also that
impose
additional
restrictions
to
the
current
state ofFull
education
in response
to COVID-19
are right
misguided,
as
Kuwaiti
students.
protection
of the international
human
to online
they
are not
inconsistent,
but also
impose
additional
education
mayonly
be achieved
in Kuwait
by both
preserving
its restrictions
availability to
to
Kuwaiti
students.
Full
protection
of
the
international
human
right
to online
students after the crisis subsides and lifting the restrictions that negatively
education
may be
achieved
in Kuwait
by both
availability
to
impact Kuwaiti
students
studying
abroad.
Ms. preserving
Albader anditsMs.
Al-Raqom
students
after
the
crisis
subsides
and
lifting
the
restrictions
that
negatively
state that the time is now and well thereafter for Kuwait and other Arab
impact
Kuwaiti
Ms. Albader
and Ms.
Al-Raqom
States to
move students
past the studying
distrust abroad.
and skepticism
of online
education
and
state
that
the
time
is
now
and
well
thereafter
for
Kuwait
and
other
Arab
toward a new culture that fosters growth and meaningful academic
States
to move past the distrust and skepticism of online education and
opportunities.
toward a new culture that fosters growth and meaningful academic
opportunities.
The second piece is authored by a fellow student, Marta Crebelli.

Crebelli’s article, “COVID-19 and Its Impact in the United States and
The
second
pieceA Tool
is authored
by a Refugee
fellow student,
Martaemphasizes
Crebelli.
European
Union:
to Circumvent
Protection?,”
Crebelli’s
article,
“COVID-19
and
Its
Impact
in
the
United
States
and
why the core principles of refugee protection must be safeguarded in light
European
Union:
A
Tool
to
Circumvent
Refugee
Protection?,”
emphasizes
of the border closures and restrictions implemented to stop the spread of
why
the coreAlthough
principlesit of
protection
mustthat
be asylum
safeguarded
in have
light
COVID-19.
hasrefugee
been long
recognized
seekers
of
the
border
closures
and
restrictions
implemented
to
stop
the
spread
of
a right to seek protection and not be returned to a country of persecution,
COVID-19.
Although
it
has
been
long
recognized
that
asylum
seekers
have
Ms. Crebelli analyzes the limitations to this international principle of nonarefoulement
right to seek
protection
and health
not be emergency.
returned to a Ms.
country
of persecution,
during
a global
Crebelli
compares
Ms.
Crebelli
analyzes
the
limitations
to
this
international
principle
of nonrecent orders and directives issued by the United States and the European
refoulement
during
a
global
health
emergency.
Ms.
Crebelli
compares
Union in response to the emergency, and how these closures and
recent
ordershave
and directives
by thethose
UnitedinStates
European
restrictions
negativelyissued
impacted
need and
of the
international
Union in response to the emergency, and how these closures and
restrictions have negatively impacted those in need of international

vii
vii
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protection. Ms. Crebelli concludes by questioning whether these measures
constitute a violation of human rights and whether these governments are
misusing their powers to reduce migrant flow in their respective countries.
protection.
Ms. Crebelli
concludes by
questioning
whether
these
measures
In
our next article,
“A Comparative
Analysis
of Data
Privacy
Impacted
by
constitute
violationTracing
of human
rights
and whether
governments
are
COVID-19a Contact
in the
European
Union, these
the United
States, and
misusing
their powers
to reduce
migrant
their respective
countries.
Israel: Sacrificing
Civil
Liberties
for a flow
Publicin Health
Emergency,”
fellow
student Rachel Trotogott analyzes how governments are turning to modern
In
our next
“A Comparative
of Data
Privacypandemic
Impactedand
by
methods
of article,
digital contact
tracing to Analysis
combat the
COVID-19
COVID-19
Tracing
in the
European
Union,
the United
and
the privacy Contact
issues that
follow
closely
in their
shadows.
Ms.States,
Trotogott
Israel:
Civiland
Liberties
for a between
Public Health
Emergency,”
fellow
exploresSacrificing
the similarities
differences
privacy
laws in the United
student
Rachel Trotogott
hownotably
governments
are turning
modern
States, European
Union, analyzes
and Israel,
in relation
to thetousage
of
methods
of digital
contact
tracing to combat
the COVID-19
pandemic
and
digital contact
tracing
applications.
Although
these methods
provide
the
privacy
issues
that follow
in their shadows.
Ms. increasing
Trotogott
benefits,
such
as reducing
costsclosely
and interpersonal
contact and
explores
similarities
and
laws in the
United
speed andtheefficacy,
there
aredifferences
significantbetween
gaps inprivacy
the protections
afforded,
States,
European
Israel, notably
in privacy
relationand
to the ability
usage of
including
concernsUnion,
over anand
individual’s
right to
to
digital
contact
tracing
applications.
Although
methods
provide
safeguard
personal
health
data information.
Ms. these
Trotogott
concludes
by
benefits,
such
as reducing
costslegislation
and interpersonal
contact
and increasing
stating that
preemptive
federal
is necessary
and perhaps
critical
speed
and efficacy,
there are
significant
gaps in the protections
to encouraging
the public
trust,
so that governments
may reachafforded,
into the
including
individual’s of
rightthese
to privacy
the ability
to
untapped concerns
potential over
and aneffectiveness
digitaland
contact
tracing
safeguard
personal
health
dataemergency.
information. Ms. Trotogott concludes by
applications
in a public
health
stating that preemptive federal legislation is necessary and perhaps critical
to
the and
public
that governments
mayThere
reachisinto
the
Mr.encouraging
Naman Anand
Ms. trust,
DikshisoArora’s
article, “Where
a Will,
untapped
and effectiveness
digital contact
tracing
There is Nopotential
Way: COVID-19
and a Caseofforthese
the Recognition
of E-Wills
in
applications
in a public
health
emergency.
India and Other
Common
Law
Jurisdiction,” notes the ease of traditional
legal formalities in the execution of wills as a result of the global pandemic.
Mr.
Anand and Ms.
Dikshi
Arora’sreliance
article, on,
“Where
There wills
is a Will,
Due Naman
to the importance
of, and
necessary
electronic
in a
There
No Way:
COVID-19
a Case
the Arora
Recognition
E-Willsand
in
public ishealth
emergency,
Mr. and
Anand
andforMs.
analyzeof recent
India
and Other
Common Law
Jurisdiction,”
the ease
of traditional
meaningful
developments
in electronic
willsnotes
across
six common
law
legal
formalities in the
execution
of wills
as aAfrica,
result ofCanada,
the globalthe
pandemic.
jurisdictions—the
United
States,
South
United
Due
to the New
importance
of,and
andAustralia.
necessary reliance
wills inthea
Kingdom,
Zealand,
Further, on,
thiselectronic
article presents
public
emergency,
Mr. Anand
and Ms.
analyze
recent
and
ongoinghealth
challenges
to data
protection
and Arora
privacy
rights,
mainly
meaningful
in electronic
across six common law
emphasizing developments
the immediate concerns
arisingwills
in India.
jurisdictions—the United States, South Africa, Canada, the United
Kingdom,
Zealand,
Australia.memorial
Further,briefs,
this article
presents the
This Issue New
concludes
with and
the winning
each receiving
ongoing
challenges
to
data
protection
and
privacy
rights,
mainly
Richard R. Baxter Award, from the 2020 Philip C. Jessup International
emphasizing
immediate concerns
arising
in India. of law students from
Moot Court the
Competition.
Each year,
thousands
around the world participate in regional qualifying competitions to
This
Issue concludes
withinthethe
winning
memorialRounds,
briefs, each
receiving
potentially
earn a spot
International
annually
held the
in
Richard
R. Baxter
Washington,
D.C. Award, from the 2020 Philip C. Jessup International
Moot Court Competition. Each year, thousands of law students from
around
theof the
world
participate
regional
qualifying
competitions
to
On behalf
Journal,
I want in
to thank
the authors
for providing
us with
potentially
earn a spotwork
in the
International
Rounds,
annually
in
noteworthy publishable
on unique
topics of
international
law held
and for
Washington,
working withD.C.
us throughout this process, the Junior and Senior Staff
On behalf of the Journal, I want to thank the authors for providing us with
noteworthy publishable work on unique topics of international law and for
working with us throughout this process, the Junior and Senior Staff
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In response to the growing apprehension concerning the coronavirus
disease, formally known as COVID-19, the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has reported that 185
countries have closed their schools and universities, affecting eighty-nine

*
Fatemah Albader is an Assistant Professor of International Law at Kuwait International Law
School. She is also Co-Chair of the Young Lawyers Interest Network and Vice-Chair of Publications of
the Middle East Committee of the American Bar Association International Law Section. She would like
to thank the editors of the ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law for exemplary work during
the entire process and Natalie Mousa for her invaluable research assistance.

Fotouh Al-Raqom serves as Energy Efficiency Technologies program manager at the
Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research and is President-Elect of the Association of Energy Engineers.
She is the recipient of several national, regional, and international awards; serves on professional national
and international committees; and holds a shared patent.
**

Editor’s Note: This article was written in the summer of 2020. All references to community
standards and legislation are reflective of the ones in existence at that time.
***
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percent of the worldwide student population.1 In response to UNESCO’s call
to continue facilitating education, particularly to students from vulnerable
and disadvantaged groups, many countries that are members of UNESCO,
referred to as UNESCO Member States (States), have had to begin an
unprecedented move towards distance learning.2 In the United States, online
learning is not a new phenomenon, at least with respect to higher education.3
However, for many of the Arab countries, including Kuwait, the move to
online education has not been taken lightly.4 While the government of
Kuwait has ultimately decided to temporarily allow remote learning, this has
not been without restrictions.5 This affects not only the education of students
in all stages of education, including primary, secondary, and tertiary levels,
but these restrictions will also have a negative impact on Kuwaiti students
studying abroad.6 Students studying abroad are required to adhere to
additional regulations set forth by the Kuwaiti government should they
choose to take online summer classes.7 Thus, where students in the United
States, for example, are moving classes online for the upcoming fall
semester, the Kuwait Ministry of Higher Education’s (MOHE) regulations
restrict students to only taking a certain number of credits online.8 These
regulations thereby disadvantage Kuwaiti students studying abroad as

1.
Stefania Giannini, Covid-19 school closures around the world will hit girls hardest, U.N.
EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. [UNESCO] (Mar. 3, 2020), https://en.unesco.org/news/covid-19-schoolclosures-around-world-will-hit-girls-hardest.
2.
Education: From disruption to recovery, UNESCO, https://en.unesco.org/covid19/
educationresponse (last visited Sept. 27, 2020); see UNESCO, Constitution of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), arts. I–V, VII–VIII, X; see also UNESCO,
Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in
BASIC TEXTS Q (2020), https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000372956/PDF/372956eng.pdf.multi.
3.

RICHARD GARRETT, ONLINE HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES – EXPLAINING
3 (2013).

MARKET SUCCESS AND DIAGNOSING MARKET FRICTION

4.
Rasha Faek, Coronavirus Outbreak Forces Arab Countries to Consider Long-Ignored
Online Educ., AL-FANAR MEDIA (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.al-fanarmedia.org/2020/03/coronavirusoutbreak-forces-arab-countries-to-consider-long-ignored-online-education/.
5.
See id.; Dalal Al-Taweel et al., Multidisciplinary academic perspectives during the COVID19
pandemic,
INT’L
J.
HEALTH
PLAN.
MGMT.
1,
3
(2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7436209; see also Ahmed Al-Hunaiyyan et al.,
Perceptions and Challenges of Mobile Learning in Kuwait, 30 J. KING SAUD UNIV. – COMPUT. & INFO.
SCI. 279, 281–82 (2018) (discussing the restrictions Kuwait government has added to online learning).
6.
Faek, supra note 4; see MINISTRY HIGHER EDUC., SCHOLARSHIP RULES AND REGULATIONS
(2013) art. 4, §§ 9–13 (KW).
7.

SCHOLARSHIP RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 6, art. 4, §§ 9–13 (2013) (KW).

8.
SCHOLARSHIP RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 6, art. 4, §§ 9–13 (2013) (KW); see
also Benjamin Herold, The Scramble to Move America’s School Online, EDUC. WEEK (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2020/03/26/the-scramble-to-move-americas-schools-online.html.
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compared to their non-Kuwaiti counterparts.9 Moreover, the MOHE has
made online learning optional, such that students—at all levels of
education—are not required to continue their spring semester classes online,
but may instead opt to return to classes once the situation warrants a return
to in-class education.10
These restrictions on online education will undoubtedly disadvantage
Kuwaiti students.11 Scholars have found that a return to learning, after a halt,
hinders learning and takes years to recover the knowledge that was lost.12
Moreover, UNESCO predicts that based on lessons learned from the Ebola
crisis, women and girls worldwide will face the biggest risk of being
disadvantaged by closures.13 UNESCO predicts that many of these girls will
drop out after a return to in-class education.14 Thus, UNESCO has called on
States that do not have adequate access to technology to provide educational
materials to individuals at home and allow for self-paced learning so that
education is not halted at this time.15
The right to education, at all levels, is one that is recognized as a
fundamental human right and one that is protected through various
international instruments.16 Thus, it could be argued that the right to remote
education during times of a national emergency is vital to the full realization
of this right.17 Nonetheless, to guarantee proper education for all and to
warrant that in times of emergency governments are equipped with the proper
resources to facilitate a move toward remote learning, countries like Kuwait

9.
See Abdullah Alelyan, The Problem with Kuwait’s Higher Education, ARABIA HIGHER
EDUC. (Oct. 29, 2016), http://www.arabiahighered.com/index.php/home-news/all-news/139-kuwait/657the-problem-with-kuwait-s-higher-education.
10.
See Distance Education Optional, Fees Must Be Paid at End of School Year, Says MOE,
ARAB TIMES (Apr. 2, 2020), http://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/distance-education-optional-feesmust-be-paid-at-end-of-school-year-says-moe.
11.
See Anya Kamenetz, 9 Out Of 10 Children Are Out Of School Worldwide. What Now?, NPR
(Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/02/824964864/nine-out-of-10-of-the-world-s-children-areout-of-school-what-now.
12.
Press Release, World Bank, COVID-19 Could Lead to Permanent Loss in Learning and
Trillion of Dollars in Lost Earnings (June 18, 2020) (on file with author).
13.

Giannini, supra note 1.

14.

Id.

15.

Id.

16.
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 26(2) (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR].
17.
See U.N. SUSTAINABLE DEV. GROUP [UNSDG], POLICY BRIEF: EDUCATION DURING
COVID-19 AND BEYOND 3 (2020), https://unsdg.un.org/resources/policy-brief-education-during-covid19-and-beyond [hereinafter EDUCATION DURING COVID-19].
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must reconsider blanket bans on online education.18 Only then may the full
implementation of the right to education be achieved.19 UNESCO has called
on States, especially in the Arab region, to cooperate with others to mitigate
the inequity resulting from unequal access to technology and resources.20
The obligation to cooperate is iterated by General Comment No. 13 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR).21 States should therefore not only preserve the availability of
online learning, but are also under obligations to guarantee that all States
have the capacity to provide the right to basic education, encompassing “a
minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least,
minimum essential levels.”22 This capacity may only be found where States,
such as Kuwait, are equipped to deal with online education before, during,
and after a pandemic.23
As such, the time is ripe for Kuwait to depart from the status quo and
begin to approve distance learning, even after the crisis is over. In arguing
for such, this paper is divided into four parts. Section II will examine the
right to education in international human rights law, specifically the right to
online education. Section III will discuss the effects of the state of the current
pandemic on the right to online education and provides examples of
international organizations’ responses that have been undertaken in response
to COVID-19. Section IV will address the situation of online learning in
Kuwait and examine the current and regular regulations governing Kuwaiti
students studying inside and outside of Kuwait. Lastly, Section V will
conclude with a discussion on the challenges that pertain to online learning
in the Arab States, with an emphasis on justifications that are often cited as
to why countries in the region, including Kuwait, are fearful of moving
toward online education.

18.
Education Ministry Faces Crisis Due to Ban on 31 Countries, ARAB TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020),
https://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/education-ministry-faces-crisis-due-to-ban-on-31-countries.
19.

See id.

20.
See Alternative Solutions to School Closures in Arab Countries to Ensuring that Learning
Never Stops: Covid-19 Education Response, UNESCO 1, 3 (2020), https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/
files/alternative_solutions_to_school_closure_in_arab_countries_-_final.pdf.
21.
See UNESCO, General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education, at ¶ 13, U.N. Doc E/C/
12/1999/10 (1999) [hereinafter General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education].
22.

Id. at ¶ 57.

23.
Call for Participation: Rethinking Social Transformations: Inequalities in the Arab Region
in Light of COVID-19, UNESCO (Sept. 4, 2020), https://en.unesco.org/news/call-participationrethinking-social-transformations-inequalities-arab-region-light-covid-19.
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THE RIGHT TO ONLINE EDUCATION

The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
has established education as a fundamental human right,24 one that is
indispensable for the achievement of interrelated human rights, such as the
right to freedom of expression and opinion,25 and the right to be able to
participate effectively in a free society.26 While the UDHR is not binding,
the right to education is affirmed in several binding international treaties,
including the ICESCR,27 the Convention Against Discrimination in
Education,28 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child29—all binding on
Kuwait as a State party.30 In General Comment No. 13, the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) obliges State parties to
ensure that education is available to all, citing specifically distance learning
as one way of ensuring accessibility.31 The CESCR specifically states that
“[i]f higher education is to respond to the needs of students in different social
and cultural settings, it must have flexible curricula and varied delivery
systems, such as distance learning” (emphasis added).32 Therefore, the
CESCR requires State parties to make education as flexible as possible, so as
to make it easier to adapt in times of societal changes, requiring that, in both
secondary and higher education, education be available “in different
forms.”33 Establishing a culture of remote learning becomes integral to the
achievement of this goal.34 This was recognized in 1997, when the General
Conference, consisting of representatives of the States, established the
UNESCO Institute for Information Technologies in Education (IITE),

24.

UDHR, supra note 16, art. 26(1).

25.
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art.
19(2) (Dec. 16, 1966).
26.
See, e.g., General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education, supra note 21, at ¶ 13; see,
e.g., G.A. Res. 61/106, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 24 (1)(a), (c) (Dec. 13,
2006).
27.

General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education, supra note 21, at ¶¶ 2, 4.

28.
See generally Convention against Discrimination in Education 1960, Dec. 15, 1969, 429
U.N.T.S. 93.
29.

See G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter

CRC].
30.
See G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, art. 13 (Dec. 16, 1966); see Convention Against Discrimination in Education, supra note 28; see
also CRC, supra note 29, art. 28.
31.

See General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education, supra note 21, at ¶ 6(b).

32.

Id. at ¶ 18.

33.

Id. at ¶¶ 6(d), 18.

34.

See id. at ¶ 18.
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encouraging the use and implementation of distance learning programs, and
providing support for these programs, especially as it pertains to developing
countries.35 More recently, the Incheon Declaration of 2015 reaffirmed its
commitment to education.36 With respect to online education, the declaration
calls for “[a] well-established, properly regulated tertiary education system
supported by technology, open educational resources and distance
education” to “increase access, equity, quality and relevance.”37 The Incheon
Declaration has now become the grounding framework for Sustainable
Development Goal 4 (SDG 4), which has the objective of ensuring education
for all by 2030.38 A proper manner in which to ensure education for all is to
provide resources “to facilitate a learning environment at home,” and to
“[d]evelop policies and [programs] for the provision of quality distance
learning in tertiary education, with appropriate financing and use of
technology, including the internet, massive open online courses and other
modalities that meet accepted quality standards to improve access.”39 This,
therefore, lends more credibility to the proposition that the right to education
has naturally expanded to cover online education as well.40
In addition, the fundamental right to education is deemed so necessary
in times of armed conflict that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War has called on parties to the
conflict to ensure that children under the age of fifteen continue to have
access to education “in all circumstances.”41 Thus, the existence of a major
crisis is not an excuse to hinder access to education, but instead, must be
recognized as a priority in such situations.42

35.
See generally Statutes of the UNESCO Institute for Information Technologies in Education
(ITTE) art. 2, Dec. 6, 2013.
36.
UNESCO, INCHEON DECLARATION AND FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL 4, 10, 31 U.N. DOC. ED-2016/WS/28 (2016),
http://uis.unesco.org/sites/default/files/documents/education-2030-incheon-framework-for-actionimplementation-of-sdg4-2016-en_2.pdf [hereinafter INCHEON DECLARATION].
37.

Id. at 41.

38.
See generally UNESCO, UNPACKING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL 4 EDUCATION
2030, at 1, 3, ED-16 / ESC-PCR / GD / 1 REV. (2017); see The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
UNSDG, https://sdg4education2030.org/the-goal (last visited Oct. 20, 2020).
39.

INCHEON DECLARATION, supra note 36, at 46.

40.

See generally id.

41.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 24,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
42.

See id.
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The right to education is confirmed in applicable regional documents as
well.
In 2000, the participants of the Arab Regional Conference on
Education for All recommended that Arab States keep “pace with
technological advancements,” including the use of “distance education to get
access to populations in geographically remote areas.”44 Moreover, the Arab
Charter on Human Rights (Arab Charter), to which Kuwait is a party,
stipulates that “[t]he States parties shall guarantee the establishment of the
mechanisms necessary to provide ongoing education for every citizen.”45
Accordingly, online education may be necessary to provide ongoing
education, especially during a global crisis.46 Thus, in times of public
emergency, whether in peacetime or wartime, the right to access education
should not stop.47 One way to ensure this is to move education online.48
The need for distance learning has also been expressly iterated in Africa
by the African Youth Charter, which calls for African Union States parties to
diversify the forms of education available to youth, with explicit mention of
distance learning as one method, so as “to meet the diverse needs of young
people.”49 With respect to higher education, the African Youth Charter
mandates that State parties “[m]ake higher education equally accessible to all
including establishing distance learning centres of excellence.”50
Still, technological disparities exist among States, such that many States
lack the tools required to begin the process of e-learning.51 Not every student
has equal access to computers and internet data plans.52 To combat this
discrepancy, countries with inadequate access to the internet and laptops,
43

43.
See UNESCO, DAKAR FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 51, U.N. Doc. ED-2000/WS/27 (2000)
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/1681Dakar%20Framework%20for%20Action
.pdf. [hereinafter DAKAR FRAMEWORK]; see League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights art.
41 para. 6 (2004) translated in Dr. Mohammed Amin Al-Midani & Mathilde Cabanettes, Arab Charter
on Human Rights 2004, 24 B.U. INT’L. J. 147, 160.
44.

See DAKAR FRAMEWORK, supra note 43, at 61.

45.

See Arab Charter on Human Rights, at art. 41 para. 6.

46.
Cathy Li & Farah Lalani, The COVID-19 Pandemic has Changed Education Forever. This
is how, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/coronaviruseducation-global-covid19-online-digital-learning.
47.
Rebecca Winthrop & Mary Mendenhall, Education in Emergencies: a critical Factor in
Achieving the Millennium Development Goals, in THE COMMONWEALTH MINISTERS REFERENCE BOOK
2006 2 (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006).
48.

See generally Li & Lalani, supra note 46.

49.
African Youth Charter, 2 July 2006, art. XIII(II) available at https://www.un.org/en/dev
elopment/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_70_1_E.pdf.
50.

Id. art. XIII(IV)(f).

51.

EDUCATION DURING COVID-19, supra note 17, at 7.

52.

Id. at 8.
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such as Mongolia, Kenya, and India, have turned to education through the
use of television programming.53 In addition, certain education platforms are
created so that they are able to be opened on phones rather than on laptops.54
All of these examples point to the importance of ensuring that
students—at all levels of education—are able to continue their education.
Disruptions in education are harmful to students’ learning capabilities.55
Thus, State and international organization responses are critical to guarantee
that the right to education is not hindered by COVID-19.
III. THE EFFECT OF COVID-19 ON THE RIGHT TO ONLINE EDUCATION
COVID-19 took the world by surprise.56 Countries were forced to
deploy resources to sustain the situation with the focus being on health and
virus spread containment.57 This has led many States to adopt measures such
as shelter-in-place and stay-at-home directives, as well as partial or total
lockdown and social distancing orders.58 These measures have impacted the
operation of learning institutions including schools, colleges, and
universities.59 The disruption of education has been taken seriously by the
The U.N. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
United Nations (U.N.).60
Development has seventeen goals.61 It requires education to empower people
53.
Sharon Zacharia & Alex Twinomugisha, Educational television during COVID-19: How
to start and what to consider, WORLD BANK (Apr. 24, 2020), https://blogs.worldbank.org/education/
educational-television-during-covid-19-how-start-and-what-consider.
54.
More on UNESCO’s COVID-19 Education Response, UNESCO, https://en.un esco.org/
covid19/educationresponse/solutions (last visited Sept. 2, 2020).
55.
Simon Burgess & Hans Henrik Slevertsen, Schools, Skills, and Learning: The Impact of
COVID-19 on Education, VOXEU (Apr. 1, 2020), https://voxeu.org/article/impact-covid-19-education.
56.
See Margaret MacMillan, Making history: How a pandemic took the world by surprise,
GLOBE AND MAIL (May 8, 2020), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-making-historyhow-a-pandemic-took-the-world-by-surprise.
57.
See id.; see Dorothèe Allain-Duprè et al., The Territorial Impact of Covid-19: Managing
the Crisis Across Levels of Government, OECD 1, 2, 14, 17, 44 (June 16, 2020), https://read.oecdilibrary.org/view/?ref=128_128287-5agkkojaaa&title=The-territorial-impact-of-covid-19-managing-thecrisis-across-levels-of-government.
58.
Katie Canales, Here are the do's and don’ts for going outside under the different lockdown
or shelter- in-place restrictions as countries across the world battle the coronavirus, BUS. INSIDER (Mar.
25, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-lockdown-shelter-in-place-stay-at-home-order2020-3?IR=T.
59.

See generally Li & Lalani, supra note 46.

60.
See generally Dept. of Glob. Comm., U.N. Working to Fight COVID-19 and Achieve Global
Goals, UNITED NATIONS (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.un.org/en/un-coronavirus-communicationsteam/un-working-fight-covid-19-and-achieve-global-goals.
61.
G.A Res. 70/1, Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,
pmbl. (Sept. 25, 2015).
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and achieve the defined goals.62 “Education is a human right and a force for
sustainable development and peace.”63 Accordingly, the U.N. dedicated the
fourth sustainable development goal to education.64 The goal of SDG 4 is
“to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong
learning opportunities for all” by 2030.65 The U.N. has issued statements that
education should never stop, not even under a pandemic that disrupts the
learning experience of about 1.6 billion children and youth.66 For many State
governments, before COVID-19, online and distance learning was a secondrate option, which was met with very strong skepticism.67 Now, it is the main
platform relied upon for learning under the COVID-19 lockdown and stayat-home orders.68
The U.N., through UNESCO, devised several initiatives to safeguard
the continuation of learning and education.69 On March 10, 2020, during
UNESCO’s global videoconference, consisting of higher education officials,
UNESCO’s Assistant Director-General for Education emphasized the
importance of continuing education during the current pandemic and
minimizing learning interruptions worldwide.70 She urged, “[w]e need to
come together not only to address the immediate educational consequences
of this unprecedented crisis, but to build up the longer-term resilience of
education systems.”71

62.
Leading SDG 4 – Education 2030, UNESCO, https://en.unesco.org/themes/education2030sdg4 (last visited Sept. 2, 2020).
63.

Id.

64.

G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 61, ¶ 59.

65.

Id.

66.
See 4 Quality Education, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/
education/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2020).
67.
See generally Paul Fain, Takedown of Online Education, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://www.insidehighered.com/digital-learning/article/2019/01/16/online-learning-fails-deliver-findsreport-aimed-discouraging.
68.

EDUCATION DURING COVID-19, supra note 17, at 2.

69.
With one in five learners kept out of school, UNESCO mobilizes education ministers to face
the COVID-19 crisis, UNESCO (Mar. 10, 2020), https://en.unesco.org/news/one-five-learners-kept-outschool-unesco-mobilizes-education-ministers-face-covid-19-crisis [hereinafter UNESCO Mobilizes
Education]; see also UNESCO Rallies International Organizations, Civil Society and Private Sector
Partners in a Broad Coalition to Ensure #LearningNeverStops, UNESCO (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://en.unesco.org/news/unesco-rallies-international-organizations-civil-society-and-private-sectorpartners-broad [hereinafter UNESCO Coalition].
70.

UNESCO Mobilizes Education, supra note 69.

71.

Id.
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Subsequently, UNESCO launched the COVID-19 Global Education
Coalition.72 The U.N. family, civil society organizations, media, and
multilateral partners joined this coalition to share best practices and measures
to tackle content and connectivity gaps.73 This coalition aims to help
countries design and deploy innovative and content-sensitive solutions that
leave no one behind, so as to ensure compliance with the international human
rights law framework of safeguarding equal access to education for all.74
Another initiative was launched by the UNESCO IITE.75 The UNESCO
IITE, along with its global partners, joined in action to ensure the
continuation of education during the current pandemic by providing “a
communication platform for government officials, teachers, students at
schools and universities, as well as education and technology specialists to
share experience in responding to this new emergency, provide
recommendations and technical support.”76 The initiative is known as
“Combat COVID-19: Keep learning.”77 As an example, the Hamdan Bin
Mohammad Smart University in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), one of the
global partners and one of the few universities in the Arab region with fully
online courses, launched an online course for teaching and academic
personnel to learn how to become online tutors in twenty-four hours.78 The
course has been made available in several languages, which include “English,
Arabic, Russian, Spanish and French.”79 The university also offers another
course on how to design an online course that focuses on developing online
classrooms and planning and designing online lessons by using modern and
advanced educational tools.80 For countries, like Kuwait, that have the tools
to move forward with online learning, these practices should be utilized so

72.

See UNESCO Coalition, supra note 69.

73.

See id.

74.

Id.

75.
UNESCO: Combat COVID-19: Keep learning. Together we are on the move!, UNESCO,
https://iite.unesco.org/combating-covid-19-together-we-are-on-the-move/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2020).
[hereinafter UNESCO: Combat COVID-19].
76.

Id.

77.

Id.

78.
Launching the Crash Course on Online Tutoring for Teachers, UNESCO INST. FOR INFO.
TECH. EDUC. (Apr. 3, 2020), https://iite.unesco.org/news/launching-the-crash-course-on-online-tutoringfor-teachers/; Emma Procter, Hamdan Bin Mohammed Smart University offers first fully online degree
programmes, GULF NEWS (Aug. 30, 2020), https://gulfnews.com/uae/education/hamdan-bin-mohammedsmart-university-offers-first-fully-online-degree-programmes-1.1598446454665.
79.

Emma Procter, supra note 78; UNESCO: Combat COVID-19, supra note 75.

80.

UNESCO: Combat COVID-19, supra note 75.
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that all students are able to continue their education online, now and after the
pandemic is over.81
IV. ONLINE LEARNING IN KUWAIT
In Kuwait, colleges and universities, both public and private, are
administered by the MOHE.82 The public institutions include Kuwait
University (KU)—the main public university—and the Public Authority for
Applied Education and Training (PAAET), which supervises vocational
training and hosts one of the 250 International Centers for Technical and
Vocational Education and Training (UNEVOC) of UNESCO.83 The private
higher education institutions began in 2002 and now consist of eight colleges
and four universities.84 The higher education institutions in Kuwait adopt
formal training, encompassing traditional in-class education.85 Some
universities, in both the public and private sectors in Kuwait, have adopted
e-learning, but only to supplement in-class education and/or provide online
training.86 With that said, truly remote learning has never been viewed
favorably in the Arab region, and Kuwait is no exception.87
A.

Before COVID-19

Many of the Arab States, including Kuwait, view online learning with
skepticism, significantly distrusting the system of online learning.88
Therefore, many of the schools and universities in Kuwait, with very few
exceptions, did not have the capacity to engage in online learning, prior to
COVID-19.89 In addition, due to the distrust that exists, the Kuwaiti
government restricts students who are studying abroad from taking online
classes during their higher education studies. 90 For example, Kuwait
81.

See Li & Lalani, supra note 46.

82.
OXFORD BUS. GROUP, Costs a Concern as Demand Expands in Kuwaiti Education, in THE
REPORT: KUWAIT 2015 (2015), https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/head-start-demand-projectedcontinue-increasing-bringing-down-costs-key-concern [hereinafter Kuwaiti Education].
83.
SALAH AL-SHARHAN, Kuwait, in E-LEARNING IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(MENA) REGION 196-97 (Alan S. Weber & Sihem Hamlaoui eds. 2018).
84.

Kuwaiti Education, supra note 82.

85.

Faek, supra note 4; AL-SHARHAN, supra note 83, at 205.

86.

See Faek, supra note 4.

87.

Id.

88.

Id.

89.

See AL-SHARHAN, supra note 83, at 209.

90.
See Faek, supra note 4; see SCHOLARSHIP RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 6, art. 4,
§ 2, ¶ 9 (2013) (KW).
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currently allows students to enroll in a maximum of four courses or twelve
credits of independent study and/or online classes.91 This arrangement is
subject to the approval of the Kuwaiti Cultural Office, which is set up to
oversee students who are studying abroad.92 In addition, other forms of nontraditional education are viewed more than favorably in the United States but
prohibited by the Kuwaiti government.93 If a student enrolls in an
educational program that is prohibited by the government, then his or her
degree will not be accredited by the government upon his or her return to
Kuwait.94 For example, in choosing a university, Kuwaiti students studying
abroad, whether or not they are sponsored by the government, must be
enrolled in “a full time regular program offered in the main campus.”95
Therefore, online and other forms of distance learning are not approved for
accreditation.96 In addition, full-time enrollment must be through traditional
means only.97 This means that universities offering the same versions of their
traditional programs through hybrid or summer-only programs, despite the
fact that students will do the same coursework that will lead to the same
degree, will result in the student’s degree not being authenticated by the
government, no matter how highly ranked the university or globally
recognized the program.98 This accreditation is important for students who

91.

SCHOLARSHIP RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 6, art. 4, § 2, ¶ 9 (2013) (KW).

92.
SCHOLARSHIP RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 6, art. 4, § 2, ¶ 9 (2013) (KW);
Ministry of Higher Education Department:
Overview, KUWAIT CULTURE OFF.,
http://www.kuwaitculture.com/mohe/home (last visited Sept. 4, 2020).
93.
See Alison K. Varty & Susannah B. Johnson-Fulton, Why Teach Natural History Through
Hybrid and Online Courses?, 11 J. NAT. HIST. EDUC. & EXPERIENCE 5, 5–6, 11–12 (2017); see also
U.N.C. CHAPEL HILL, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON ONLINE LEARNING TO IMPROVE ACCESS AND
SUCCESS, 3–4 (2014), https://beta.provost.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Online-Task-Force2014-Report.pdf; see generally Information for Students, Graduate Program, U. ARIZ.,
https://ais.arizona.edu/graduate-program (last visited Sept. 13, 2020) (examples of interdisciplinary
degrees offered by the University of Arizona, which is also providing online sessions during the COVID19 pandemic); University Search, KUWAIT CULTURAL OFF., https://sis.kuwaitculturedc.org/
kc_university/ext_mcpf_list.php?orderby=aCOLNAM;aMajorSpcl;aSpecialtySpcl (last visited Sept. 4,
2020); University Selection Process, KUWAIT CULTURAL OFF., http://www.kuwaitculture.com/
university-listings/university-selection-process (last visited Sept. 4, 2020).
94.

University Search, supra note 93.

95.

University Selection Process, supra note 93.

96.

University Search, supra note 93; University Selection Process, supra note 93.

97.

University Search, supra note 93; University Selection Process, supra note 93.

98.
SCHOLARSHIP RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 6, art. 1, art. 4, § 2, ¶ 13 (2013) (KW);
University Search, supra note 93; University Selection Process, supra note 93.
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wish to work using their degrees in the State of Kuwait.99 These restrictions
thereby disadvantage professionals who are unable to take off during the
regular academic year.100 Kuwaiti students will be disadvantaged due to the
government’s choices, along with restrictions on online learning, by
deterring students from enrolling in internationally renowned programs.101 If
countries like Kuwait are to be competitive in the field of education, Kuwait
must allow students to enroll in the same highly regarded programs as
others.102 Thus, by allowing more students to enroll, Kuwait will remain
competitive in the education field by increasing options available to
students.103
99.
See generally OXFORD BUS. GROUP, Government Reforms to Change Kuwait's Education
Sector, in THE REPORT: KUWAIT 2017 (2017), https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/ timetransition-extensive-government-reforms-signal-change-kuwait%E2%80%99s-education-sector
(obtaining certifications with international accreditations has significant value for Kuwaiti graduates
seeking employment). For example, the University of California-Berkeley offers a professional LL.M.
track program designed for lawyers who are interested in studying at Berkeley Law but cannot leave their
employment during the regular academic year. The course load and the degree are exactly similar to that
offered during the regular academic year, except that students enroll in two consecutive summer semesters
rather than a fall and spring semester.
LL.M. Executive Track, BERKELEY L.,
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/academics/llm/exec-track/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2020); see also LL.M.
Program Response to COVID-19, BERKELEY L., https://www.law.berkeley.edu/academics/llm/covid-19response/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2020) (Berkeley Law’s professional track and hybrid LL.M. programs were
collectively rebranded in 2020 as the “Executive Track”). Despite the fact that Berkeley Law is one of
the top law schools in the world, Kuwaiti students would normally be deterred from enrolling in the
professional track program, due to the fact that the government will not authenticate their degrees upon
their return to Kuwait. QS World University Rankings by Subject 2020: Law, QS TOP U.,
https://www.topuniversities.com/university-rankings/university-subject-rankings/2020/law-legal-studies
(last visited Sept. 4, 2020); see also LL.M. Program Response to COVID-19, BERKELEY L.,
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/academics/llm/covid-19-response/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2020) (Berkeley
Law’s Executive Track LL.M. program in 2020 is a completely remote summer online-learning program);
see also S CHOLARSHIP RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 6, art. 4, § 2, ¶ 13 (2013) (KW) (the
MOHE’s scholarship regulations require that Kuwaiti students attending educational programs abroad do
not exceed two summer courses); see also University Selection Process, supra note 93 (the Kuwaiti
government requires its citizens studying abroad to attend full-time “regular” or “traditional” in-person
programs).
100. See LL.M. Executive Track, supra note 99 (Berkeley Law’s Executive Track LL.M. program
is designed for professionals who are unable to leave existing commitments to attend a regular academic
year).
101. See SAMAR FARAH & SORAYA BENCHIBA, ONLINE LEARNING IN THE ARAB WORLD: AN
EDUCATIONAL MODEL THAT NEEDS SUPPORT 1, 6 (2020), https://connectedlearning4refugees.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/AGFE-Policy-Brief-English.pdf.
102. See generally id. at 1–2, 8. This article does not argue that Kuwait must authenticate all
online or other forms of non-traditional degrees, but the questions about whether to authenticate nontraditional degrees should be considered on a case-by-case basis, considering factors such as the reputation
of the university, the location of the university, and the reputation of the program. Id.
103.

See generally id. at 8–9.

348092-ILSA_International_27-1_Text.indd 25

12/11/20 1:36 PM

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 27.1

14

As for Kuwaiti students studying in Kuwait, prior to COVID-19, both
the MOHE and the universities in Kuwait have worked on integrating
technology into education, such that, as described above, some universities
had an e-learning system that students were able to access.104 However, this
system was not meant to replace in-class learning, but to supplement it.105
One of these universities recognized the benefit and necessity of e-learning:
“[i]n the era of technological information, it goes without saying that
academic institutions should prepare new generations for what is waiting
outside: a sharp and competitive world where globalization has made it
difficult to remain isolated.”106 Nonetheless, with restrictions placed on
online learning by the Kuwaiti government, it becomes much harder to
achieve the goal of fostering a culture of education that is open and ready to
prepare for advances in technology.107
B.

During COVID-19

With the emergence of the coronavirus, additional obstacles have
emerged with the move toward online education.108 First, for students
studying abroad, only full-time undergraduate university students are
allowed to enroll in online classes in the summer.109 Thus, students in
community colleges are not allowed to register for online classes, no matter
the circumstances.110 Yet, the MOHE offers no explanation as to why
community college students are excluded and thereby disadvantaged.111
Second, even for undergraduate students who are allowed to take summer
courses online, a maximum of three courses (or nine credits) are allowed for
transfers and four courses (or twelve credits) for those who are graduating in
summer 2020.112 Thus, while the MOHE has somewhat tried to address the
104.

AL-SHARHAN, supra note 83, at 205, 207.

105.

Id.

106. What is eLearning?, GUST E-LEARNING CTR. EXCELLENCE, https://mygust.gust.edu.kw/
ece.php (last visited June 1, 2020).
107. Nidal Al Haj Sleiman, Inequity and Inaccessibility: What COVID-19 Reveals About the
Gulf Education Systems, GULF INT’L F. (June 26, 2020), https://www.printfriendly.com/p/g/AnLFZf.
108. See Letter from Mohammed AlRashidi, Cultural Counselor/Director, Consulate General of
the State of Kuwait, to Kuwaiti Undergraduate Students, (Apr. 21, 2020) (on file with Kuwait Cultural
Off. L. A., http://kuwaitculturela.org/Downloads/2020/Summer%20Courses%20Guideline%20Final%
20E.pdf).
109.

See id.

110.

Id. ¶ 2.

111.

Id.

112. Id. ¶ 3. The MOHE has noted that the courses taken online in the summer will not count
toward the four-course limit allowed under normal circumstances. See AlRashidi, supra note 108.
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current state of education in accordance with these exceptional
circumstances, imposing additional restrictions on students during this
heightened time of anxiety is not the proper response.113 Moreover, the
current state has shed light on whether the MOHE’s regular restrictions, such
as the four-course limit or prohibiting all types of education unless it is in
traditional form, are the proper ways to effectuate the learning of students
abroad.114 Surely, approving only one form of conducting education should
no longer stand, especially in the era of advancing technology.115 These
restrictions would, therefore, hinder students as they are sent to learn abroad,
alongside colleagues who are able to study without these restrictions.116
As for students who are studying in Kuwait, irrespective of the level of
education, the government has made distance learning optional for students
studying in private universities and private schools.117 Students who do not
wish to enroll in online courses must be allowed to return to in-class learning
to complete the semester.118 The government has pushed forward the next
academic year, such that students who will return to complete the spring
semester are due to come back in August 2020.119 Students who have
continued the spring semester online will join them and come back for the
next academic year, beginning in December 2020.120 Students in public
schools and universities do not have the option of attending online courses,
and the semester has been canceled entirely until August 2020.121 This
creates a divide, furthering inequality among public and private school
students, one that is prohibited by international law.122 Moreover, mandating
113.

Id.

114. See FARAH & BENCHIBA, supra note 101, at 6; see also Al Haj Sleiman, supra note 107;
see also AlRashidi, supra note 108 ¶ 3.
115. See FARAH & BENCHIBA, supra note 101, at 8–9; see also Al Haj Sleiman, supra note 107;
see also AlRashidi, supra note 108 ¶ 3.
116. See FARAH & BENCHIBA, supra note 101, at 8–9; see also Al Haj Sleiman, supra note 107;
see also AlRashidi, supra note 108 ¶ 3.
117. A Saleh, MoE: E-learning optional, classes to resume in Aug, KUWAIT TIMES (Apr. 6,
2020), https://www.pressreader.com/kuwait/kuwait-times/20200406/281539408069775.
118.

Id.

119. Khitam Al Amir, Coronavirus: Kuwait extends suspension of schools and other
educational institutions until August 4, GULF NEWS (Mar. 19, 2020), https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/
kuwait/coronavirus-kuwait-extends-suspension-of-schools-and-other-educational-institutions-untilaugust-4-1.70505788.
120.

Id.

121. See MOE WARNS OF ‘DISTANCE LEARNING’ TECH, ARAB TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020),
https://www.arabtimesonline.com/news/moe-warns-of-distance-learning-tech.
122. UNESCO, THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION: LAW AND POLICY REVIEW GUIDELINES, UNESCO
U.N. Doc. ED.2014/WS/18 (2014), https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000228491 [hereinafter
LAW AND POLICY REVIEW].
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students to continue their spring semesters online would have allowed for an
easier return to normalcy once the situation is under control.123 Yet, due to
Kuwait’s distrust of online classes, the government has preferred to instead
make the online system voluntary, so as not to disturb the status quo.124
Let us now turn to the reasons pertaining to why Kuwait, and Arab
countries in general, continue to hesitate to open up to other forms of
learning, that would allow Kuwait to offer the same advantages other
countries have offered for decades.125
V.

CHALLENGES TO ONLINE LEARNING IN THE ARAB STATES

E-learning provides challenges to educators worldwide, due to the
complexity of its environment requiring both pedagogical and technical
capacities.126 The availability of internet access and computers can prevent
those that are seeking to enroll in digital learning.127 A resource gap exists
between students of some countries and even between students within the
same country.128 As an example, ninety-five percent of students in Austria,
Norway, and Switzerland have a computer, but only thirty-four percent of
students in Indonesia do.129 Some governments, such as New South Wales,
Australia, are able to provide digital equipment to those who need it, yet, in
other countries such as in the United States, nearly twenty-five percent of
disadvantaged students do not have a computer.130 Thus, if States are to
comply with their international law obligations to ensure equal access to

123. See generally Yasmena Al Mulla, COVID-19: Kuwait government to end 2019–2020 public
school year, GULF NEWS (July 15, 2020), https://gulfnews.com/world/gulf/kuwait/covid-19-kuwaitgovernment-to-end-2019-2020-public-school-year-1.72606389. In addition, the MOHE, in making elearning optional, has not provided explanations on how students are expected to retain information that
was learned in the early months of spring (January and February) upon their return to the classroom in
August. Id.
124.

See Saleh, supra note 117; see FARAH & BENCHIBA, supra note 101, at 3, 6, 9.

125. See Chrysi Rapanta et al., Online University Teaching During and After the Covid-19
Crisis: Refocusing Teacher Presence and Learning Activity, POSTDIGITAL SCI. EDUC. (2020),
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s42438-020-00155-y.pdf; see also Suzanne Woolley et al.,
U.S. Schools Trying to Teach Online Highlight a Digital Divide, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 26, 2020),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-26/covid-19-school-closures-reveal-disparity-inaccess-to-internet; see Li & Lalani, supra note 46.
126.

Rapanta et al., supra note 125.

127.

Woolley et al., supra note 125.

128.

See Li & Lalani, supra note 46.

129.

Id.

130.

Id.
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education for all, cooperation among States becomes ever-so necessary,
especially during a state of emergency.131
In addition to worldwide challenges, e-learning provides region-specific
challenges as well.132 The Arab States have traditionally viewed online
education as being inherently western, such that there is much distrust with
respect to e-learning.133 In Qatar, for example, one of the most advanced
Arab countries with respect to technology, the Qatari culture was slow to
endorse technological advances because of the fear “of the dissemination of
pornography and anti-Islamic and anti-government views.”134 This attitude
changed, however, with the advent of social media, bringing along with it an
increase in online learning management systems in both the secondary and
tertiary levels of education.135 This is due in pertinent part to the arrival of
the American branch campuses to Qatar, which include Georgetown School
of Foreign Service, Qatar, and Northwestern University, Qatar, that brought
with them a culture of online learning.136 This helped to speed the process of
e-learning in Qatar.137 Still, like most Arab States in the region, Qatar does
not have a fully online degree or certificate program in the university system,
due to government regulations.138
Faculty at Kuwait University are divided between those who are with
and those who are against adopting online education in the current state of
emergency.139 Some professors have argued that the system of e-learning is
not suitable for implementation because it lacks organization, official
regulations, and a framework for monitoring and evaluation.140 These
professors have argued that engaging in online education in the current state
of emergency will pose threats to some faculty members because of the added
131.

See generally LAW AND POLICY REVIEW, supra note 122.

132. See ALAN S. WEBER, Qatar, in E-LEARNING IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
(MENA) REGION, supra note 83, at 338–39; see also AL-SHARHAN, supra note 83, at 210.
133.

See WEBER, supra note 132, at 338.

134. Omar Faridi, Yousuf Mohamed al-Jaida, the Chief Executive at Qatar Financial Center,
Says Country Aims to Leverage Potential of Fintech Sector in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, CROWDFUND
INSIDER (July 17, 2020), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2020/07/164158-yousuf-mohamed-al-jaidathe-chief-executive-at-qatar-financial-center-says-country-aims-to-leverage-potential-of-fintech-sectorin-bangladesh-india-pakistan; WEBER, supra note 132, at 338.
135.

WEBER, supra note 132, at 338.

136.

Id. at 339–40.

137.

Id.

138.

Id. at 349.

139.

Faek, supra note 4.

140. Dr. Ibrahim Al-Hamoud: Distance Education and E-Learning are in Breach of the
Educational System at Kuwait University, ACADEMIA NEWSPAPER KUWAIT (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://acakuw.com/والتع-بُعد-عن- التعليم-الحمود-إبراهيم- د/ (translated).
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risk that they may violate local laws (including the laws of public universities
and audiovisual and cybercrime laws), alleging that those who teach in the
College of Law and the College of Political Science are especially at risk.141
These laws impose criminal responsibility on individuals who provide
political comment, which is deemed as insulting to public officials.142 Thus,
for professors of law and political science, there is the added risk of violating
laws prohibiting certain types of political comments based on the nature of
the specialization, as the open environment of online learning naturally
produces a greater risk for prosecution.143
In 2015, Kuwait’s Parliamentary Committee of Education, Culture and
Guidance conducted a panel discussion to evaluate the legality of the audiovisual law.144 The committee members agreed to invite higher education and
research institutions in the nation in order to seek their views and discuss the
implications of implementing the audio-visual law.145 Even though
discussions were opened five years ago, to date no major steps have been
taken to review these laws and their implications in the higher education
context.146
From another perspective, former Minister of Education and Higher
Education Ahmed Al-Mulaifi stated that online education is complementary
to traditional education, and that it will not replace it.147 Ahmed Al-Mulaifi
stressed the importance of not stopping education during this time and that
there is no provision in the law stipulating that online learning is prohibited;
he goes on to further suggest that the current Minister of Education form four
teams, consisting of experts from various countries, to develop e-learning
policies for higher education.148
The lack of consistency with respect to views on e-learning can be
traced back to the skepticism with which Arab States view e-learning.149
141. See generally Alaa Khalifa, Al-Hammoud for finding a mechanism that protects the faculty
members who will use the educational platforms from electronic laws, ALANBA NEWS (June 20, 2020),
https://www.alanba.com.kw/ar/kuwait-news/education/975806/20-06-2020 (translated).
142. Kuwait: Draft Law Threatens Free Speech, HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 15, 2013),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/15/kuwait-draft-law-threatens-free-speech.
143.

See generally id.

144. Educational decides to hold a panel discussion to discuss the modifications of the audiovisual and electronic media, ALANBA NEWS (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.alanba.com.kw/ar/kuwaitnews/parliament/535845/10-02-2015.
145.

Id.

146.

See generally id.

147. Hamad Al-Abdali, Ahmed Al-Mulaifi: E-learning is supportive, not an alternative,
ALJARIDA (May 12, 2020), https://www.aljarida.com/articles/1589213789792854500/ (translated).
148.

Id.

149.

Id.
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Arab State governments distrust the online learning system for many
reasons.150 One of these is the high degree of fraud associated with the
conferral of degrees, whether obtained online or traditionally.151 In Kuwait
the government has rightfully cracked down on degree-related fraud in recent
years that individuals have forged their diplomas—from bachelor’s degrees
to PhDs152—to obtain prestigious positions in both public and private
sectors.153 This has been a persistent problem, and the Kuwaiti government
has taken a stance to ensure that all individuals with forged degrees are held
accountable and prosecuted.154 Thus, to provide an example, in July 2018,
Kuwait uncovered 400 fake university degrees, most ironically in the field of
law.155 In July 2016, 270 cases of forged certificates came from the fields of
medicine and engineering.156 Most worrisome, it is speculated that “the
degrees of more than 1,400 faculty members in Kuwait” are forged.157 If this
is the case, then the country must impose strict restrictions to deal with this
matter of urgency.158 However, one way the government has decided to
counter this fraud is to place strict restrictions on non-traditional programs,
such as summer-only programs—even if such programs are offered by highly
ranked universities—and online learning programs, since these programs
make it much easier for fraudulent conduct to take place.159
After a student graduates from an online degree program or from a
traditional program with which the student has taken some online courses or
from a summer-only program, the government can easily validate the degree
by requesting a certificate of authentication or validation from the university
itself.160 This would help to counter such fraud without going to the extreme
150. Investigations reveal millions spent on fake degrees, KUWAIT TIMES (June 1, 2019),
https://www.timeskuwait.com/news/investigations-reveal-millions-spent-on-fake-degrees/ [hereinafter
Investigations].
151.

Id.

152.

Id.

153. Robert Anderson, Kuwait cracks down on fake degrees, GULF BUS. (July 31, 2018),
https://gulfbusiness.com/kuwait-cracks-fake-degrees/.
154.

Id.

155. Kuwait uncovers 400 fake university degrees, MIDDLE E. MONITOR (July 23, 2018),
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180723-kuwait-uncovers-400-fake-university-degrees/.
156.

Id.

157. Aisha Elgayar, In Kuwait, a War Against Fake University Degrees, AL-FANAR MEDIA
(Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.al-fanarmedia.org/2016/03/in-kuwait-a-war-against-fake-universitydegrees/.
158.

Id.

159.

See Investigations, supra note 150; see also University Selection Process, supra note 93.

160. See generally Elgayar, supra note 157; see Anderson, supra note 152; see also
Investigations, supra note 150.
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extent of banning all online programs or online courses or all summer-only
programs. By imposing such strict measures, the Kuwaiti government is
punishing not only those who deserve punishment for their fraudulent
conduct, but also innocent individuals.161 For example, students who have
chosen to obtain an authentic degree from a reputable university, but failed
to adhere to the regulations with respect to the number of online courses
allowed or which semesters to obtain their degrees, would be unfairly
penalized.162 A balance must be reached in this case to ensure that
individuals are not forging their degrees but are also able to study in the way
most suited for them, whether that means online, in-person, or through
summer-only programs.163 The UAE model would better facilitate this
goal.164
As previously mentioned, the UAE already has a university that is
immersed fully in online learning, the Hamdan Bin Mohammad Smart
University.165 It is accredited by the UAE Ministry of Higher Education and
Scientific Research (MOHESR), and teaches classes across a variety of
disciplines, resulting in undergraduate, master’s, and doctorate degrees.166
Other universities in the UAE are also accredited to teach online.167 More
relevant to this discussion, however, is the fact that “MOHESR has released
a list of 105 accredited foreign online universities recommended for UAE
students.”168 This list includes universities in the United Kingdom, the
United States, Australia, and New Zealand.169 Thus, UAE residents wishing
to complete their degree online are able to do so, but only as long as the
university is accredited by the MOHESR.170 This is a great method that
Kuwait could incorporate to combat degree fraud. Instead of banning online
education entirely, Kuwait should look at each university on a case-by-case
basis and decide on accreditation using a similar process to that which has
been implemented in the UAE.171

161.

See Investigations, supra note 150.

162.

See University Selection Process, supra note 93.

163. See Elgayar, supra note 157; see generally Alelyan, supra note 9 (Kuwaiti students pursuing
degrees have limited options available).
164. JENNIE LAVINE & RICHARD CROOME, United Arab Emirates, in E-LEARNING IN THE
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (MENA) REGION, supra note 83, at 437.
165.

Id.

166.

Id. at 438.

167.

See id. at 440.

168.

Id.

169.

LAVINE & CROOME, supra note 164, at 440.

170.

Id.

171.

Id.
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Another challenge to e-learning, which is perhaps more difficult to
change, pertains to cultural resistance, especially with respect to privacy
concerns in conducting student learning assessments online.172 The president
of Emirates College of Technology has elaborated that “the biggest challenge
was the assessment, especially through synchronous camera proctored
exams, as they are seen to be intrusive.”173 For generally private societies,
online assessments that intrude into the homes of individuals are seen as
significantly invasive.174 Thus, the president of Applied Science University
in Bahrain, who is emphatic about the viability of online examinations, said
“[w]e just need a different mindset . . . [m]any techniques are being
developed to address the issue of authenticity through image and voice
recognition.”175 Changing mindsets, however, is hard to achieve.176
Nonetheless, a good starting point would be to foster a culture of
understanding that education is an important right, one that should continue
even during crises.177
Finally, faculty acceptance of technologies pertaining to e-learning is
yet another interrelated challenge.178 Studies have found that “many
academics are slow to embrace new technologies.”179 This resistance is a
result of many issues including risk of potential failure, perceived value, lack
of confidence, general anxiety associated with technology, workload and
time constraints, and lack of support.180 With better training and support,
faculty mindsets could also change to embrace the advantage of e-learning.181
These challenges that are brought about by e-learning are anticipated
but not fatal.182 To combat these challenges, States must ensure that concerns
raised are adequately addressed, including privacy concerns, faculty and
student training concerns, and cultural concerns.183 To foster these changes,
172. Senthil Nathan, Where Does Higher Education Go from Here?, AL-FANAR MEDIA (May
11, 2020), https://www.al-fanarmedia.org/2020/05/future-higher-education-go-from-here/.
173.

Id.

174.

Id.

175.

Id.

176. Marco Nink, To Be Agile, You Need Fewer Processes and Policies, GALLUP (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://www.gallup.com/workplace/246074/agile-need-fewer-processes-policies.aspx.
177.

General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education, supra note 21, at ¶ 1.

178. Helen Flavell et al., Empowering Academics to Be Adaptive with eLearning Technologies:
An Exploratory Case Study, 35 AUSTRALASIAN J. EDUC. TECH. 1, 2 (2019).
179.

Id.

180.

Id.

181.

See id.

182.

See Li & Lalani, supra note 46.

183. Kamal Abouchedid & George M. Eid, E‐learning challenges in the Arab world: revelations
from a case study profile, 12 QUALITY ASSURANCE EDUC. 15, 16–17 (2004).
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one could look to the suitability of e-learning during past emergencies.184
Such measures took place in 2005 when Hurricane Katrina hit the city of
New Orleans in the United States and physically damaged twenty-seven
colleges in the Gulf of Mexico region and the State of Texas.185 Again, in
2009, face-to-face classes were substituted with online classes due to the
spread of swine flu (H1N1).186 Recently, with the COVID-19 pandemic,
most universities around the world responded by transitioning from face-toface classes to virtual instruction.187
Unfortunately, that was not the case for Kuwait, where Kuwait’s public
higher education institutions (KU and PAAET) closed until in-class teaching
could resume later in the year, and online learning has been made optional
for private universities and schools, to the detriment of the future of education
in Kuwait.188
VI. CONCLUSION
Education is not only a human right in and of itself, but it is a means to
the realization of other fundamental rights as well.189 Thus, the right to
education must be respected at all times, whether in a state of emergency or
not.190 Learning, whether conventional or unconventional, is essential for the
development of human capacity and ensuring the well-being of individuals,
communities, and nations.191 The current COVID-19 pandemic is a
worldwide challenge that affects the lives of everyone.192 Such a major world
event is often an inflection point for rapid innovation.193 In today’s current
fast-paced societies, everything seems to revolve around technology

184. See Katrina A. Meyer & Jeffery L. Wilson, The Role of Online Learning in the Emergency
Plans of Flagship Institutions, 14 ONLINE J. DISTANCE LEARNING ADMIN. 1, 7 (2011).
185.

Id.

186.

Id.

187. Andrew Smalley, Higher Education Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19), NAT’L CONF.
ST. LEG. (July 27, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/education/higher-education-responses-tocoronavirus-covid-19.aspx.
188.

AL-SHARHAN, supra note 83, at 205.

189.

General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education, supra note 21, at ¶ 1.

190. MARY PIGOZZI, EDUC. IN EMERGENCIES AND FOR RECONSTRUCTION: A DEVELOPMENTAL
APPROACH 2, U.N. Doc. UNICEF/PD/ED/99-1 (1999).
191. See Elizabeth King, Education is Fundamental to Development and Growth, WORLD BANK
BLOGS
(Jan.
28,
2011),
https://blogs.worldbank.org/education/education-is-fundamental-todevelopment-and-growth.
192. Everyone Included:
Social Impact of COVID-19, UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/everyone-included-covid-19.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
193.

See Li & Lalani, supra note 46.
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adaptation.194 One of the biggest risks nations face is to act slowly in
response to existing challenges while others forge ahead. Governments need
to be transparent and agile to realize appropriate solutions. These solutions
need not necessarily be optimum, especially in times of crisis. It is incumbent
upon all to be more adaptive, especially during emergency situations, as
extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures.
The COVID-19 pandemic required rapid state response in many areas
including health, economy, security, and education.195 While the Kuwaiti
government’s efforts are proactive in terms of virus spread containment, its
efforts in public higher education are lagging.196 Developing countries, like
Kuwait, can seek guidance from UNESCO or other bodies to not reinvent the
wheel and capitalize on the existing knowledge and experience. E-learning
may only be successful in times of emergency when States already have the
system in place prior to any such emergencies.197
The current crisis will eventually accelerate the integration of
technology in education.198 Due to the massive offerings of free online
educational courses that were provided, governments have increased the
general acceptance of e-learning modalities.199 This will speed up the
inclusion of e-learning as an integral component of education.200
E-learning will contribute strongly to higher education in the years
ahead.201 Looking beyond the COVID-19 pandemic, one wonders if once
educational institutions acquire the needed experience and develop the ability
194. DJ Wardynski, Technology and Society: How Technology Changed Our Lives, BRAINSPIRE
(Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.brainspire.com/blog/technology-and-society-how-technology-changed-ourlives.
195.

See Everyone Included: Social Impact of COVID-19, supra note 192.

196. See generally Kuwait schools and universities to close until August, ARAB NEWS,
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1644186/middle-east (last visited Sept. 12, 2020); see generally Hannah
Ritchie et al., Kuwait: Coronavirus Pandemic Country Profile, https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus/
country/kuwait?country=~KWT (last visited Sept. 12, 2020) (highlighting the progress Kuwait has made
in controlling the spread of COVID-19).
See Shivangi Dhawan, Online Learning: A Panacea in the Time of COVID-19 Crisis, 49 J.
5, 5 (2020); 6 Challenges to Distance Learning During the COVID-19 Outbreak and
Tips to Overcome Them, KAJEET (Sept. 13, 2020), https://www.kajeet.net/6-challenges-to-distancelearning-during-the-covid-19-outbreak-and-tips-to-overcome-them/.
197.

EDUC. TECH. SYS.

198.

See generally Dhawan, supra note 197, at 5.

199. See Li & Lalani, supra note 46; see also Michael P.A. Murphy, COVID-19 and Emergency
eLearning: Consequences of the Securitization of Higher Education for Post-pandemic Pedagogy, 41
CONTEMP. SECURITY POL’Y 492, 501 (2020).
200.

See Li & Lalani, supra note 46.

201. See Vijay Govindarajan & Anup Srivastava, What the Shift to Virtual Learning Could Mean
for the Future of Higher Ed, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/03/what-the-shift-tovirtual-learning-could-mean-for-the-future-of-higher-ed.
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to use technology to serve their students, will they abandon e-learning? In
the future, there might not be any distinction between online and traditional
in-class learning, as governments capitalize on the opportunity to serve
students at all times, in good times and in times of crisis.202
The emergency e-learning protocols that evolved in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic will expedite the transition of face-to-face classes
to online learning systems when necessary and the adoption of e-learning to
complement the conventional face-to-face education system.203 We envision
that traditional in-class learning and e-learning can go hand in hand and a
new hybrid model of education will emerge.204
Governments need to rethink the future of education and the role of
technology to make paradigm shifts. Governments that will be successful
are the ones that understand that it takes a systematic approach to technologymediated learning and teaching.205 To that end, the international human
rights law framework remains an essential tool to ensure that the right to
education is respected at all times.206 Specifically, the right to online
education must be included in that framework to achieve the full realization
of the right of education.207 States must respect the right to education, even
during states of emergency.208 COVID-19 may have exposed inequality
within the system of education and may have forced States to rapidly evolve
their education systems. This unprecedented move toward online education
must ensure equal education for all—well after the pandemic is over—and in
line with international human rights law.209 Thus, while education is a
domain that was traditionally ignored, the Arab States, including Kuwait,
must ensure that the right to education remains intact, both during and after
the current crisis.210 The situation created by COVID-19 has provided an
opportunity that has forcefully expanded the culture of online learning to the
Arab States.211 This necessary transformation is the best possible avenue to

202.

See id.

203.

See Li & Lalani, supra note 46.

204.

Id.

205. See Curtis R. Henrie, Measuring Student Engagement in Technology-Mediated Learning:
A Review, 90 COMPUT. EDUC. 36, 36 (2015).
206. See U.N. EDUC. SCI. & CULTURAL ORG., A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO
EDUCATION FOR ALL, at 1, U.N. Sales No. E.08.XX.2 (2007).
207.

See General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education, supra note 21, at ¶ 6(d).

208.

Pigozzi, supra note 190, at 2.

209. See Michael Power, The Emergence of a Blended Online Learning Environment, 4 MERLOT
J. OF ONLINE LEARNING AND TEACHING 503, 503–04 (2008).
210.

See Faek, supra note 4.

211.

See id.
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ensure that States are better equipped to deal with emergencies in the future
and to ensure respect for human rights at all times.212
With that said, the Kuwaiti government should remove any further
barriers that would make e-learning difficult. For example, the government
of Kuwait should reconsider regulations requiring undergraduate university
students studying abroad to take a limited set of online courses and banning
community college students from online courses.213
Kuwait’s Parliamentary Committee of Education, Culture and Guidance
should revisit its plans concerning the addition of online education in higher
education. Kuwait should evaluate available national laws that potentially
hinder the adoption of online education, assess available collaborative
opportunities such as the ones provided by UNESCO, and learn from
examples in the region and the world at large.214 The committee should then
propose a law to the government concerning online education to address both
the current situation and the future of online education in the country.
The time is ripe for online courses to be considered just as effective as
traditional learning and is necessary for equality among all students.215
Moreover, for Kuwaiti students studying within Kuwait, the government
should opt for a mandatory online system, at least while the state of
emergency persists.216 After COVID-19 is no longer a threat, Kuwait should
reconsider its general rules prohibiting or limiting online education, both
within and outside of Kuwait.217 Now is the perfect time to adopt new
regulations and ensure that e-learning may be utilized, not only in times of
emergency but also well thereafter.

212.

See generally id.

213. See SCHOLARSHIP RULES AND REGULATIONS, supra note 6, art. 4, § 2, ¶ 9 (2013) (KW);
see generally MINISTRY OF HIGHER EDUCATION (MOHE) SCHOLARSHIP APPLICATION
REQUIREMENTS AND CHECKLIST FOR STUDENTS CURRENTLY ATTENDING A COMMUNITY
COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY, KUWAIT CULTURAL OFF., http://www.kuwaitculture.com/mohe/mohescholarship-application-requirements/mohe-scholarship-application-requirements-and-checklist-students
(last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
214. See generally COVID-19: 10 Recommendations to Plan Distance Learning Solutions,
UNESCO (Mar. 6, 2020), https://en.unesco.org/news/covid-19-10-recommendations-plan-distancelearning-solutions; see Faek, supra note 4.
215.

See generally Dhawan, supra note 197, at 11, 13.

216. See generally Mubarak M. Alkharang & George Ghinea, E-learning in Higher Educational
Institutions in Kuwait: Experiences and Challenges, 4 INT’L J. ADVANCED COMPUTER SCI. AND
APPLICATIONS 1, 2 (2013) (discussing the benefits of shifting to online learning).
217.

See generally Al Mulla, supra note 123.
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I.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic is a global health crisis, which has also
created an international protection crisis.1
The virus does not
discriminate among its victims, but the impact of the virus is
disproportionately affecting the poorest and the most vulnerable people
in the world.2
This pandemic has brought States to implement exceptional
measures to stem the spread of the virus: The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in April estimated that 167
countries around the world had taken safety measures by partially or fully
closing their borders—fifty-seven of those made no exception for asylum

*
Marta Crebelli is a May 2021 J.D. Candidate at Nova Southeastern University’s
Shepard Broad College of Law. Marta graduated from the Department of Law at Roma Tre
University in Rome, Italy.
1.
COVID-19 fast becoming protection crisis, Guterres warns Security Council, UN
NEWS (July 2, 2020), https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/07/1067632.
2.
See Audrey Wilson, The Corona Virus Threatens Some More Than Others, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Apr. 14, 2020) https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/14/coronavirus-pandemic-humanitariancrisis-world-most-vulnerable-refugees-migrant-workers-global-poor.
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seekers.3 These extraordinary measures, in many cases, have been
adopted by executive branches of governments through the exercise of
public emergency powers.4 Even though border restrictions may be
justified, these powers may be misused5: forced returns6 and push-back,
especially at sea,7 have been reported worldwide. With these border
closures and denial of entry comes the restriction of access to asylum
procedures.8
It has long been recognized that asylum seekers have a right to seek
protection at these borders, and that they may not be returned or refouled
to a country of persecution and danger.9 Basic rights of refugees and
asylum seekers should be safeguarded from forcible return.10 “The core
principles of refugee protection are being put to the test – but people who
are forced to flee conflict and persecution should not be denied safety and
protection on the pretext, or even as a side effect, of responding to the
virus[.]” 11
After this short introduction of the topic, an elucidation of the
purpose of the article will follow. The first part of this article will discuss
basic concepts, such as the definition of “refugee,” who is entitled to that
status, and an analysis on the principle of non-refoulement. The second
part will discuss the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on asylum

3.
Beware Long-Term Damage to Human Rights and Refugee Rights from the
Coronavirus Pandemic: UNHCR, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/4/5ea035ba4/beware-long-term-damage-human-rightsrefugee-rights-coronavirus-pandemic.html [hereinafter Beware Long-Term Damage].
4.
Autocrats see opportunity in disaster, ECONOMIST (Apr. 23,
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/04/23/autocrats-see-opportunity-in-disaster.
5.

2020),

See id.

6.
See generally Danger awaits migrant children returned to Mexico and Central
America
during
pandemic,
UN
NEWS
(May
21,
2020),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/05/1064652.
7.
See, e.g., UNHCR calls on Greece to investigate pushbacks at sea and land borders
with
Turkey,
UNHCR
(June
12,
2020),
https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2020/6/5ee33a6f4/unhcr-calls-greece-investigate-pushbackssea-land-borders-turkey.html.
8.
See, e.g., Greece: Grant Asylum Access to New Arrivals, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar.
20, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/20/greece-grant-asylum-access-new-arrivals.
9.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33(1), July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
1659, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. “No Contracting State shall expel or return
(“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.” Id.
10.
UNHCR, The Principle of Non-Refoulement as a Norm of Customary International
Law. Response to the Questions Posed to UNHCR by the Federal Constitutional Court of the
Federal Republic of Germany in Cases 2 BvR 1938/93, 2 BvR 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93, ¶ 2 (Jan. 31,
1994) https://www.refworld.org/docid/437b6db64.html [hereinafter Principle of Non-Refoulment].
11.
Beware Long-Term Damage, supra note 3 (quoting Filippo Grandi, the current U.N.
High Comm’r for Refugees).
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seekers in both Europe and the United States (U.S.). The third section of
this article will discuss the most recent orders, as of this publishing, and
directives issued in those two countries as a response to the pandemic
emergency and the impact on migrants. A legal comparative analysis
will follow. This article will conclude by discussing whether those
measures constitute a violation of human rights and whether
governments are using this health emergency as a tool to circumvent
international refugee obligations.
In order to fight the virus, many States have implemented border
closures, which prevent non-citizens from entering their national
territories.12 While the United States has stopped its asylum processing,13
Italy has closed its ports to migrant vessels.14 Those measures constitute
obstacles to people in need of international protection.15 Asylum seekers
cannot claim refugee protection if they remain in their country of origin.16
Whether those measures constitute a violation of human rights and
whether governments are using the COVID-19 emergency as an excuse
to reduce the migrant flow in their countries are crucial questions that
must be examined in light of the legal framework regulating the right to
seek asylum and the limitations to that right during a state of
emergency.17

12.
Andrea Salcedo et al., Coronavirus Travel Restrictions Across the Globe, N.Y. TIMES
(July 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-travel-restrictions.html.
13.
See JORGE LOWEREE ET AL., THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON NONCITIZENS AND
ACROSS
THE
U.S.
IMMIGRATION
SYSTEM
1,
18
(2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_impact_of_covid19_on_noncitizens_and_across_the_us_immigration_system.pdf.
14.
See Italy closes ports to refugee ships because of coronavirus, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 8,
2020),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/italy-closes-ports-refugee-ships-coronavirus200408091754757.html [hereinafter Italy closes ports].
15.
Cf. UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of NonRefoulement Obligations Under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol, ¶ 8 (Jan. 26, 2007), https://www.refworld.org/docid/45f17a1a4.html [hereinafter UNHCR
Advisory Opinion].
16.

1951 Convention, supra note 9, art. 1(A)(2).
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

Id.
17.

See generally LOWEREE, supra note 13; see also Italy closes ports, supra note 14.
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A. Refugee Status and the Principle of Non-refoulement
The first effort to define refugees was made by the international
community after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and World War I, which
left a legacy of one to two million refugees.18 In 1933, the League of
Nations created the Convention on the International Status of Refugees,
which was ratified by only nine states and did not provide a clear
definition of “refugee,”19 but had introduced the concept of nonrefoulement for the first time in the international scenario.20
The modern refugee law traces its roots in the aftermath of World
War II, when there was a need for a new legally binding international
instrument defining the status of refugee.21 The Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention) was adopted on July 28, 1951
and entered into force on April 21, 1954.22 As a post-World War II
instrument, the Convention was limited in scope to persons who had
become refugees “[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January
1951.”23

18.
Gilbert Jaeger, On the History of the International Protection of Refugees, 83 INT’L
REV.
RED
CROSS,
727,
727
(2001)
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/727_738_jaeger.pdf.
19.
Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, Oct. 28, 1993, CLIX
3663, 159 L.N.T.S. 3663, ch. 1, art. 1. The Convention of 28 October 1933 applied only “to Russian,
Armenian and assimilated refugees . . . .” Id.
20.

Id. art. 3(1).
Each of the contracting Parties undertakes not to remove or keep from its
territory by application of police measures, such as expulsions or nonadmittance at the frontier (refoulment), refugees who have been [authorized]
to reside there regularly, unless the said measures are dictated by reasons of
national security or public order.

Id.
21.
UNHCR, HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, p. 5, U.N. Doc., HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.3 (2011)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK].
22.

Id.

23.

1951 Convention, supra note 9, art. 1(A)(2).
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

Id.
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With the passage of time and emergence of new refugee situations
unrelated to pre-1951 events, the 1967 Optional Protocol relating to the
Status of Refugees (1967 Optional Protocol) amended the 1951
Convention by removing geographical and temporal restrictions on
refugee classifications, while simultaneously incorporating the
obligations and definitions of the Convention.24
The 1951 Convention indicated to whom the term “refugee” shall
apply and defined the principle of non-refoulement, and the rights
afforded to those granted the refugee status.25
Thus, it is crucial to discern the difference between an asylum seeker
and a refugee.26
The term “refugee” refers to an individual fleeing his country
because of an armed conflict or persecution.27 A refugee has a “wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion . . . .” and
because of those reasons is unable or afraid to return to the country of his
nationality.28 An individual is granted the refugee status when the criteria
set forth in the above definition are satisfied.29
On the other side, the term “asylum seeker” refers to an individual
who claims to be a refugee, but whose claim has not been evaluated yet.30
Thus, an individual is an asylum seeker as long as his application is
pending; every refugee is initially an asylum seeker, but not every asylum
seeker will obtain the status of refugee.31
Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention indicates to whom the term
“refugee” shall apply, and very peculiarly in its formulation is the phrase
“well-founded fear of being persecuted[,]”32 which involves a subjective
element: fear.33 This means that, to determine the refugee status, an
evaluation of the applicant’s statements will be primarily required, even
though it is supported by an objective situation.34 An assessment of

24.
HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at p. 6; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1,
¶ 3, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
25.

HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at p. 6.

Compare 1951 Convention, supra note 9, art. 1(A), with UNHCR, PROTECTION
TRAINING MANUAL FOR EUROPEAN BORDER AND ENTRY OFFICIALS, p. 4 (Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter
TRAINING MANUAL].
26.

27.

See 1951 Convention, supra note 9, art. 1(A).

28.

Id.

29.

HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at p. 9.

30.

TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 26, at p. 4.

31.

Id.

32.

1951 Convention, supra note 9, art. 1(A)(2).

33.

HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at p. 11.

34.
Id. at p. 11. “This implies that it is not only the frame of mind of the person concerned
that determines his refugee status, but that this frame of mind must be supported by an objective
situation.” Id.
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credibility is thus necessary, and all the circumstances must be taken into
account in order to understand the applicant’s situation—his personal
background, membership of a particular religion, racial or political
group, and personal experience.35 The determination of whether an
applicant’s fear is “well-founded” requires determining if there is a
reasonable possibility, and not only a mere chance or remote possibility,
that he would face persecution in the country of origin.36
In the text of the 1951 Convention, there is no specific provision
relating to minors and it must be applied to all individuals regardless of
their age.37 Some difficulties may thus arise when determining if the
minor has a “well-founded fear,” especially in the case of an
unaccompanied minor.38 This issue will have to be determined by taking
into account “the degree of his mental development and maturity,” and
in order to do so, it may be necessary to enroll “experts conversant with
child mentality.”39 When determining the minor’s mental maturity,
circumstances including the situation in the country of origin and family
and cultural background must be taken into account.40 Sometimes, the
inability or difficulty of the child to communicate fear is sidestepped by
imputing the fear of the parents to the child.41 Where this is not an option,
to establish the child’s well-founded fear, all the known circumstances
have to be taken into account.42 The decision-makers should also give
the child’s testimony the benefit of the doubt with respect to evaluating
whether the evidence satisfies the elements of the refugee definition.43
B. The Principle of Non-refoulement Under International Refugee Law
A fundamental concept of international protection lies in the
principle of non-refoulement, which can be found in Article 33 of the
1951 Convention and binds all States party to the 1967 Protocol.44

35.

Id. at p. 12.

36.

Id.

37.

HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at p. 41.

38.
Id. “If a minor is accompanied by one (or both) of his parents, or another family
member on whom he is dependent, who request refugee status, the minor’s own refugee status will
be determined according to the principle of family unity.” Id.
39.

Id.

40.

Id.

41.

HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at p. 41.

42.

See id.

43.

Id. at 35, ¶ 219.

44.
1951 Convention, supra note 9, art. 33. Article 1(1) of the 1967 Protocol provides that
the States party to the Protocol undertake to apply Articles 2–34 of the 1951 Convention. Id. art. 1,
¶ 1; UNHCR, States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967
Protocol 1–5 (July 28, 1951) https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf)
[hereinafter States Parties] (stating that the Protocol is binding on all States parties).
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Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention states, “[n]o Contracting State
shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion.”45 This provision applies to any alien
who meets the inclusion criteria of the refugee definition of Article
1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention and does not meet any exclusion
provisions.46 Thus, the refugee recognition is declaratory and not
constitutive.47 An individual does not become a refugee because he is
recognized as one; instead, he is granted this status because he is a
refugee.48 This principle applies not only to recognized refugees, but also
to those who have not been formally recognized as refugees yet.49
The 1951 Convention does not imply a right of the alien to be
granted asylum in a certain State, but it applies “not only in respect of the
country of origin but to any country where a person has a reason to fear
persecution.”50
There are few restrictions to the principle of non-refoulement listed
in Article 33(2):
The benefit of the present provision [i.e., Article 33(1) referred
to above] may not however be claimed by a refugee whom
there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime,
constitutes a danger to the community of that country.51

This provision, however, does not affect the States’ obligations
under international human rights law, which does not allow any

45.

1951 Convention, supra note 9, art. 33, ¶ 1.

46.
UNHCR Advisory Opinion, supra note 15, ¶ 6. Exclusion clauses are enumerated
circumstances under which a person is excluded from application of the 1951 Convention even
though the positive criteria of the inclusion clauses are met. HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 7, ¶ 31.
47.

UNHCR Advisory Opinion, supra note 15, ¶ 6.

48.

HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 7, ¶ 28.

49.
UNHCR, Non-Refoulement No. 6 (XXVIII) - 1977, ¶ (c), U.N. DOC. A/32/12/Add.1
(Oct. 12, 1977).
Reaffirms the fundamental importance of the observance of the principle of
non-refoulement - both at the border and within the territory of a State of
persons who may be subjected to persecution if returned to their country of
origin irrespective of whether or not they have been formally recognized as
refugees.
Id.
50.
UNHCR, Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the High Comm’r), U.N. DOC
EC/SCP/2, ¶ 4 (Aug. 23, 1977).
51.

Id.; 1951 Convention, supra note 9, art. 33, ¶ 2.
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exception: the host State will be barred from removing a refugee from
its territory if this would have as a consequence exposing him to a
substantial risk of torture or other forms of irreparable harm.52
The principle of non-refoulement has an absolute and non-derogable
character.53 The principle is reflected in Article 7(1) of the 1967
Protocol,54 regarding the provision as one which prohibits any
reservations or exclusions, and by the U.N. General Assembly which has
compelled States “to respect scrupulously the fundamental principle of
non-refoulement, which is not subject to derogation.”55
Lastly, the principle of non-refoulement has been recognized by the
UNHCR as a rule of customary international law.56 Article 38(1)(b) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists “international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”57 For a rule
to be crystallized into customary law, two forms of evidence are required:
(1) the conduct of States consistent with such rule and (2) the States’
opinio juris, which is the recognition of its normative character.58 This
is noticeable from the incorporation of the non-refoulement principle in
several international treaties.59 As a rule of customary international law,
it is binding on all States, including those that are not party to the 1951
Convention or to the 1967 Protocol.60 There is either an express or a tacit
recognition that the principle has a normative character.61

52.
See OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. (OHCHR), The Principle of NonRefoulement
Under
International
Human
Rights
Law,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/GlobalCompactMigration/ThePrincipleNonRefoulementUnderInternationalHumanRightsLaw.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2020).
53.

UNHCR Advisory Opinion, supra note 15, at 5.

54.

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 24, art. 7(1).

At the time of accession, any State may make reservations in respect of article
IV of the present Protocol and in respect of the application in accordance with
article I of the present Protocol of any provisions of the Convention other than
those contained in articles 1, 3, 4, 16(1) and 33 thereof, provided that in the
case of a State Party to the Convention reservations made under this article
shall not extend to refugees in respect of whom the Convention applies.
Id. art. 7(1).
55.

G.A. Res. 51/75, ¶ 3 (Feb. 12, 1997).

56.

See Principle of Non-Refoulement, supra note 10, ¶ 3.

57.

U.N. Charter art. 38, ¶ 1(b).

58.
Niels Peterson, Customary Law Without Custom? Rules, Principles, and the Role of
State Practice in International Norm Creation, 23 AM. U. INT’L LAW REV. 275, 278 (2007).
59.

Principle of Non-Refoulement, supra note 10, ¶ 3.

60.

Id. ¶ 5.

61.

Id. ¶ 6.
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In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court
deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in
general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of
State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally
have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications
of the recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima
facie incompatible with a recognized rule, but defends its
conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained
within the rule itself, then whether or not the State's conduct
is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that
attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule.62

II.

THE UNITED STATES

A. Background
The United States is a federal republic whose chief of state and head
of government has been Donald Trump since January 2017.63
At the base of the American constitutional system is separation of
the legislative, executive, and judicial powers among distinct and
independent bodies.64 The system of checks and balances was created in
order to ease the concern that no part of government should acquire too
much power, and to ensure that the President, the Supreme Court, and
each house of the Congress do not have exclusive control over certain
government functions.65
The United States is a nation which was built partly by
immigrants;66 however, the U.S. immigration policy has changed over
time between more permissive and more restrictive systems.67
With the ratification of the 1967 Protocol to the 1951 Convention,
the United States has joined the international refugee regime taking on

62.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 186 (June 27).
63.
Wilbur
Zelinsky
et
al.,
United
States,
ENCYC.
https://www.britannica.com/place/United-States (last updated Sept. 27, 2020).

BRITANNICA,

64.
The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, Separation of Powers, ENCYC. BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/separation-of-powers (last updated Apr. 10, 2020).
65.
The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, Checks and Balances, ENCYC. BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/checks-and-balances (last updated Aug. 26, 2019).
66.
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/immigrants_in_the_unite
d_states.pdf.
67.
History of U.S. Immigration Laws, FAIR, https://www.fairus.org/legislation/reportsand-analysis/history-of-us-immigration-laws (last visited Sept. 4, 2020).
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the Convention’s obligations,68 and since then has successfully integrated
more than three million refugees from all the corners of the world.69
With the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress has incorporated the
definition of “refugee” given by the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, into national law as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
outside any country in which such person last habitually
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection
of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, political opinion.70

Though not a part of the 1951 Convention concerning the Status of
Refugees,71 the United States is a party of three treaties pertinent to the
principle of non-refoulement:
1) the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees;72
2) the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT);73 and
3) the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).74

The principles of the 1967 Refugee Protocol, including the nonrefoulement obligation, were implemented into the Refugee Act of 1980
and codified in several sections of Title 8 of the U.S. Code.75 The
Supreme Court of the United States stated that “one of Congress’ primary
purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”76

68.

States Parties, supra note 44, at 4.

69.
Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, Fulfilling U.S. Commitment to
Refugee Resettlement: Protecting Refugees, Preserving National Security, & Building the U.S.
Economy Through Refugee Admissions, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 155, 158 (2018).
70.

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).

71.

1951 Convention, supra note 9, at 6; States Parties, supra note 44, at 1.

72.

See generally Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 24, art. 7(1).

73.
See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S 85 [hereinafter UNCAT].
74.
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec.
16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
75.
See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101, 66 Stat. 163, 167
(1952), amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1980); See generally Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, supra note 24.
76.

Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1987).
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The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952,77 despite the
U.S. accession to the 1967 Protocol, did not include any obligation
regarding the principle of non-refoulement until the Refugee Act of 1980
was enacted.78
Before the Refugee Act of 1980 was enacted, the INA
“authorize[d]” the Attorney General to withhold deportation of any alien
within the United States,79 but this amendment substituted the
discretionary authority of the Attorney General to withhold deportation
of a foreign individual with mandatory language, stating that he “may not
remove an alien.”80
[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country
if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom
would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.81

The protection from deportation is also available to aliens who are
likely to be tortured in the country of removal under the CAT.82 Article
3 of the CAT states that “[n]o State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”)
or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”83
Torture is defined as:
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . when such
pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.84

77.
(1980)).

See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101 (codified as amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1101

78.
See United States Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as
amended in the INA).
79.
See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 167
(1952), amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1980). (“The Attorney General is authorized to withhold
deportation of any alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien
would be subject to physical persecution and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for
such reason.”). Id.
80.
I.N.A. § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.S. § 1231(b)(3)(A), (“Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and
(2), the Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that
the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”). Id.
81.

Id.

82.

UNCAT, supra note 73, art. 3, ¶ 1.

83.

Id. art. 3, ¶ 1.

84.

8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) (1999).
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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has set procedures in
order to handle situations in which an alien, who is about to be removed,
expresses a fear of torture.85 The alien in those circumstances will be
interviewed by an officer in order to determine if he has a “credible fear
of persecution or torture.”86 If the alien is found to have a credible fear
of torture, the officer will inform an immigration judge for full
consideration of his claim.87 This protection will be granted “if the
immigration judge determines that the alien is more likely than not to be
tortured in the country of removal, the alien is entitled to protection under
the Convention Against Torture.”88
The ICCPR is different from the previously cited Conventions since
it refers to expulsion in the context of regular immigration proceedings.89
Article 13 of the ICCPR states:
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present
Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a
decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except
where compelling reasons of national security otherwise
require, be allowed to submit the reasons against his expulsion
and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the
purpose before, the competent authority or a person or persons
especially designated by the competent authority.90

Even though the United States ratified this treaty in 1992, attached
to the ratification is a reservation declaring that the provisions of Articles
1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.91

85.

8 C.F.R. §235.3 (b)(4) (1998).
If an alien subject to the expedited removal provisions indicates an intention
to apply for asylum, or expresses a fear of persecution or torture, or a fear of
return to his or her country, the inspecting officer shall not proceed further
with removal of the alien until the alien has been referred for an interview by
an asylum officer in accordance [with 8 C.F.R. § 208.30]. The examining
immigration officer shall record sufficient information in the sworn statement
to establish and record that the alien has indicated such intention, fear, or
concern, and to establish the alien’s inadmissibility.

Id.
86.
8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d). “The purpose of the interview shall be to elicit all relevant and
useful information bearing on whether the applicant has a credible fear of persecution or torture . . .
.” Id.
87.

Id. § 208.30(f).

88.

§ 208.30.16(c)(4).

89.

See ICCPR, supra note 74, art. 13.

90.

Id. art. 13.

91.
FAQ: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL & POLITICAL RIGHTS (ICCPR), ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/faq-covenant-civil-political-rights-iccpr (last updated Apr. 2019).
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U.S. and Asylum Seekers Nowadays: A Changing Trend

The protection of asylum seekers is a complex area of immigration
law, which has recently been a subject of debate, especially regarding the
efforts of the Trump administration to tighten the asylum seekers.92
Until recently, the United States has been a “global leader in the
resettlement of refugees,” whose numbers have grown enormously over
the past decade.93 However, in 2017 for the first time since the adoption
of the 1980 Refugee Act, the United States settled fewer refugees than
the rest of the world.94
The number of refugees the United States admits each year is
determined by the President in “appropriate consultation” with
Congress.95 In the fiscal year of 2017, the number of refugees admitted
was lowered from 110,000 (set under Obama Administration)96 to 50,000
and lowered once again to 45,000 in 2018, to 30,000 in 2019, and finally
to 18,000 for the fiscal year of 2020.97
C.

COVID-19 and Emergency Powers

On March 20, 2020, as COVID-19 was spreading all around the
globe, the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) issued an Emergency Interim Final Order (EIFO), an order
temporarily suspending the entry of non-citizens without valid
documents travelling from Mexico or Canada to the United States.98

92.
See generally Yeganeh Torbati & Mica Rosenberg, Trump Directs Officials to
Toughen Asylum Rules, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-asylum/trump-directsofficials-to-toughen-asylum-rules-idUSKCN1S603M (last updated Apr. 29, 2019).
93.
AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1 (Jan. 8,
2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/an_overview_of_us_refu
gee_law_and_policy.pdf [hereinafter OVERVIEW].
94.
Phillip Connor & Jens Manuel Krogstad, For the First Time, U.S. Resettles Fewer
Refugees than rest of the World, PEW RES. CTR. (July 5, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/07/05/for-the-first-time-u-s-resettles-fewer-refugees-than-the-rest-of-the-world.
95.
Annual Admission of Refugees and Admission of Emergency Situation Refugees, 8
U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2) (2011).
96.

See OVERVIEW, supra note 93, at 3.

97.
ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RES. SERV., IN 11196, FY2020 REFUGEE CEILING AND
ALLOCATIONS 1 (Nov. 7, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/IN11196.pdf.
98.
See Control of Communicable Diseases; Foreign Quarantine: Suspension of
Introduction of Persons into United States from Designated Foreign Countries or Places for Public
Health Purposes, 85 Fed. Reg. 16,559, 16,559, 42 C.F.R. 71 (Mar. 24, 2020) [hereinafter Suspension
of Persons into the United States].
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Following this CDC Order, the DHS started summarily deporting
thousands of aliens arriving at the borders.99
Borders closure and restrictions on the entry of non-nationals are
measures that have been adopted by a multitude of States in response to
the COVID-19 pandemic.100
The EIFO was issued under Title 42 Section 265 of the U.S. Code,
which authorizes the Surgeon General to suspend introduction of persons
or goods into the United States on public health grounds.101 An
amendment and extension of the original order was issued that applied
directly to land travel from Mexico and Canada, and “covered aliens,”102
typically aliens who lack valid documentation for entry in the United
States.
The EIFO issued on March 20, 2020 broadly defines introduction of
persons in the United States as a “movement of a person from a foreign
country” into the United States in a manner that “present[s] a risk of
transmission of the communicable disease to persons or property, even if
the communicable disease has already been introduced, transmitted, or is
spreading within the United States.”103 It is not necessary that the person
actually be diagnosed with a COVID-19 infection; furthermore, the rule
authorizes the suspension of introduction of “persons or class of persons”
into the United States.104
Since the rule specifically refers to aliens arriving at U.S. borders
without documentation, the rule mostly affects individuals seeking

99.
See Nationwide Enforcement Encounters: Title 8 Enforcement Actions and Title 42
CUSTOMS
AND
BORDER
PROT.
(July
9,
2020),
Expulsions,
U.S.
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics/title-8-and-title-42-statistics (last
modified Sept. 4, 2020).
100.

Salcedo et al., supra note 12.

101. See Suspension of Persons into the United States, supra note 98, at 16,563; see also
42 U.S.C. § 265.
If the Secretary determines that by reason of the existence of any
communicable disease in a foreign country there is serious danger of the
introduction of such disease into the United States, and that this danger is so
increased by the introduction of persons or property from such country that a
suspension of the right to introduce such persons and property is required in
the interest of the public health, the Surgeon General, in accordance with
regulations approved by the President, shall have the power to prohibit, in
whole or in part, the introduction of persons and property from such countries
or places as he shall designate in order to avert such danger, and for such
period of time as he may deem necessary for such purpose.
Id.
102. Amendment and Extension of Order Suspending Introduction of Certain Persons from
Countries where a Communicable Disease Exists, 85 Fed. Reg. 31,503, 31,503 (Mar. 20, 2020).
103.

See Suspension of Persons into the United States, supra note 98, at 16,563.

104.

See id. at 16,567.

348092-ILSA_International_27-1_Text.indd 52

12/11/20 1:36 PM

Crebelli

2020]

41

protection from persecution at the southern borders of the United
States.105 The notice of EIFO explicitly states that “the immediate
suspension of the introduction of these aliens requires the movement of
all such aliens to the country from which they entered into the United
States, or their country of origin, or another location as practicable, as
rapidly as possible.”106 The measures taken by the DHS as a result of the
EIFO effectively deny the possibility of seeking asylum at U.S.
borders.107
The only reference to protection is contained in a leaked Custom
and Border Protection memorandum, known as COVID-19 CAPIO,
which stated that, if aliens make “an affirmative, spontaneous and
reasonably believable claim that they fear being tortured in the country
they are being sent back to, [they] will be taken to the designated station
and referred to USCIS.”108
An aspect of the EIFO that deserves to be analyzed is the treatment
of unaccompanied children. The United States Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) is a federal law that imposes
enhanced requirements for the processing of unaccompanied children
arriving at the U.S. border.109 The TVPRA requires that, within fortyeight hours of apprehension of an unaccompanied child, a determination
be made that he or she:
1) has not been a victim or are at risk of being trafficked;
2) does not have a fear to return to his or her country of origin;
and
3) can independently decide to withdraw his or her application
for admission to the United States and return voluntarily to his
country of origin.110

105.

See Torbati & Rosenberg, supra note 92.

106. Notice of Order Under Sections 362 and 365 of the Public Health Service Act
Suspending Introduction of Certain Persons from Countries Where a Communicable Disease Exists,
85 Fed. Reg. 17,060, 17,067 (Mar. 20, 2020) [hereinafter Suspending Introduction of Certain
Persons].
107.

See id. at 17,067.

108. U.S CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL (CBP), COVID-19 CAPIO Memorandum 4,
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6824221/COVID-19-CAPIO.pdf (last visited Sept. 5,
2020); Dara Lind, Leaked Border Patrol Memo Tells Agents to Send Migrants Back Immediately —
Ignoring Asylum Law, PROPUBLICA (April 2, 6:30 p.m.), https://www.propublica.org/article/leakedborder-patrol-memo-tells-agents-to-send-migrants-back-immediately-ignoring-asylum-law.
109.
(2011).
110.

Enhancing Efforts to Combat the Trafficking of Children, 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(1)
Id. at (a)(2)(A).
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Instead, the COVID-19 CAPIO notes that, “a minor under the age
of 18 and not accompanied by a relative” makes him “amenable to
immediate expulsion.”111
While before unaccompanied minors would be transferred to the
Department of Health and Human Services for a review of their situation,
now they are expelled within hours from arriving on American soil.112
The EIFO operates outside the normal immigration removal process
and “renders asylum rights de facto impossible to exercise.”113 The EIFO
disregards the protections and procedures settled by the 1980 Refugee
Act and the special measures for unaccompanied minors under the
TVPRA.114 It precludes non-refoulement protection and asylum.115 The
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has recently stated
that a public health emergency cannot justify “blanket measure[s] to
preclude the admission of refugees or asylum-seekers.”116
The principle of non-refoulement cannot be derogated: the principle
is absolute and neither the 1951 Convention nor its 1967 Protocol contain
any derogation clauses.117
The United States federal law states that “[a]ny alien who is
physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United
States” may apply for asylum.118 The ICCPR in Article 4(1) contains a
specific provision authorizing derogation of the principle of nonrefoulment in states of emergency.119 United States federal law

111.

See COVID-19 CAPIO Memorandum 4, supra note 108.

112. See Caitlin Dickerson, 10 Years Old, Tearful and Confused After a Sudden
Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/20/us/coronavirus-migrant-childrenunaccompanied-minors.html (last updated May 21, 2020).
113. Junteng Zheng, Pandemic, Emergency Power, and Implications on the Right to Seek
Asylum,
24
AM.
SOC’Y
OF
INT’L
L.
13,
(May
28,
2020),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/24/issue/13/pandemic-emergency-power-and-implicationsright-seek-asylum.
114. See generally Suspension of Persons into the United States, supra note 98; see also 8
U.S.C. § 1232(a)(1).
115.

See Suspension of Persons into the United States, supra note 98 at 17,067.

116. UNHCR, Key Legal Considerations on Access to Territory for Persons in Need of
International Protection in the Context of the COVID-19 Response, ¶ 6, (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/75349 [hereinafter Key Legal Considerations].
117.
note 44.

Id.; see 1951 Convention, supra note 9, art. 33, ¶ 1; see generally States Parties, supra

118.

8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1).

119.

ICCPR, supra note 74, art. 4, ¶ 1.
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authorizes the President to declare a national emergency by means of an
executive order which must be transmitted to the Congress.120 However,
the EIFO was issued under Title 42 of the U.S. Code, which does not
allow derogation from human rights obligations.121 Furthermore, the
emergency measures must be proportionate and “limited to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.”122 The EIFO refers
to the limited space and medical resources in the facilities where aliens
are taken into “congregate settings” as a reason for the suspension,
claiming that doing otherwise “would increase the already serious danger
to the public health.”123 It is unclear whether less extreme measures could
have been adopted in order to combat the virus.124 On March 31, 2020,
the UNHCR issued “Key Protection Messages” that stated “a country can
both secure public health and the rights of asylum seekers to
protection.”125 For example, States can impose measures at the border,
such as health screening, testing, quarantine and self-isolation to manage
health risk, while also respecting the principle of non-refoulement.126
Even if the purpose of the EIFO is to deal with the COVID-19
pandemic, it cannot contravene human rights. The EIFO must be
consistent with both U.S. federal and international law, and even during
a world crisis, the right to seek asylum, principle of non-refoulement, and
protection of unaccompanied children cannot be put aside.127 Fighting a
crisis by infringing fundamental human rights can only lead to a bigger
crisis.128

In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the
present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other
obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely
on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.
Id.
120.

50 U.S.C. §1631.

121.

See 42 U.S.C §§ 265, 268; see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008).

122. OHCHR, General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during a State of
Emergency,
¶
4
(Aug.
31,
2001),
U.N.
Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/451555?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header.
123.

See Suspending Introduction of Certain Persons, supra note 106, at 17,061.

124.

See id. at 17,061.

125. Press Release, UNHCR, The COVID-19 Crisis: Key Protection Messages 1 (Mar. 31,
2020), https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/75555 [hereinafter Press Release].
126.

Id.

127.

See generally id. at 1.

128. See U.N., COVID-19 AND HUMAN RIGHTS WE ARE ALL IN THIS TOGETHER 2 (Apr.
2020), https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/COVID-19-and-Human-Rights.pdf.
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III. EUROPE
A.

Background

The European Union is a political and economic union of twentyseven Member States which was established when the Treaty of
Maastricht entered into force in 1993.129 The treaty is comprised of three
pillars: the European Community, the common foreign and security
policy, and cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs.130 It was
meant—amongst several objectives—to enhance economic and political
integration between the Member States and to advance cooperation in the
fields of immigration and asylum.131 The elimination of border controls
and the consequent freedom of movement of people across national
borders pushed for new Europe-wide asylum policies.132
Two subsequent treaties revised the asylum policies of the European
Union.133 The Treaty of Amsterdam, entered into effect in 1999, granted
EU institutions new legislative powers in the field of asylum and set a
timeline of five years before the European Council was required to set
and enforce criteria and mechanisms regarding the application for
asylum.134 “The decree of legal integration, supranational political
authority, and economic integration in the EU greatly surpasses that of
other international organizations.”135
The Treaty of Amsterdam was followed by the Treaty of Lisbon in
2009, which made uniform status and co-decision as the standard
procedure.136
Between 2011 and 2014, following an increasing number of
immigrants arriving at the European borders, the European Union
reformed its legislation on asylum, namely the Common European

129. INA SOKOLSKA, THE MAASTRICHT AND AMSTERDAM TREATIES, EUR. PARL. DOC., 1–
2 (Nov. 2019), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_1.1.3.pdf (last visited July 3, 2020).
130.

Id. at 1–2.

131. William H. Buiter et. al., Excessive Deficits: Sense and Nonsense in the Treaty of
Maastricht, 8 ECON. POL. 57, 58 (1993); see also Gisbert Brinkmann, The Immigration and Asylum
Agenda, 10 EUR. L. J. 182, 183, (2004).
132. Julia Gelatt, Schengen Free Movement People Across Europe, MIGRATION POLICY
INST. (2005) https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/schengen-and-free-movement-people-acrosseurope.
133. Migration and Asylum: A Challenge for Europe, EUR. PARL. Doc. P.E. 600.414 at 1
(Jun.
2018)
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/PERI/2017/600414/IPOL_PERI(2017)60
0414_EN.pdf [hereinafter Migration and Asylum].
134.

Id. at 3.

135. MATTHEW J. GABEL, EUROPEAN UNION (Encyc. Britannica, Jan. 31, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Union.
136.

Migration and Asylum, supra note 133, at 4.
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Asylum System (CEAS), moving from minimum standards137 to a
common procedure for assessing asylum application.138 CEAS is made
of several directives and regulations and states a set of common standards
to ensure that asylum seekers are treated equally everywhere in the EU
territory.139 CEAS is based on the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol,140 and thus affirms the principle of
non-refoulement under which Member States are prohibited from
returning refugees or asylum seekers back to “territories where [their] . .
. life or freedom would be threatened on account of [their] . . . race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.”141
The right to asylum is enshrined in Article 18 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Article 19 prohibits
returning a person to a country “where there is a serious risk that he or
she would be subjected to . . . torture or other inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”142
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has a supranational legal
authority, interpreting community law and rules on proceeding against
Member States that have not fulfilled their obligations under EU law.143
European law, which includes treaty provisions, is directly binding on
citizens and overrides national laws in case of conflicts.144 Thus, the ECJ
ensures the correct application of asylum law and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union,145 which establishes—other
than the rights to asylum and protection in case of removal, expulsion,
or extradition—the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment (Article 4), rights of the child (Article 24) and
the right to an effective remedy and fair trial (Article 47).146
When asylum seekers arrive at the European land and water borders,
they are submitted to rules which must adhere to EU asylum

137. Id. at 5.
138. Id.; Theresa Papademetriou, Refugee Law Policy: European Union, LIBR. CONG.,
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/refugee-law/europeanunion.php (last updated June 21, 2016).
139. Papademetriou, supra note 138.
140.

Id.

141.

1951 Convention, supra note 9, art. 33.

142. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 18–19, 2000 O.J. (C 364)
1 [hereinafter CFR].
143. Jonas Tallberg, Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What
Consequences?, 25 W. EUR. POL. 23, 23 (2002).
144. Sinisa Rodin, Constitutional Restraints of Supranational Judicial Activism — a
Challenge to European Integration, 34 CROATIAN POL. SCI. REV. 104, 105 (1997).
145.

CFR, supra note 142, at art. 1.

146.

Id. arts. 4, 24, 47.
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legislation.147 Member States can adopt more favorable standards to
qualify an alien in need of international protection, but only as long as
they comply with EU rules.148
The Dublin Regulation lays out the criteria for examining an asylum
application and determines which Member State is responsible.149 If the
Member State determining the responsibility finds that the Member State
that would be responsible due to this regulation brings a risk of “inhuman
or degrading treatment,” and the applicant cannot be transferred to any
other Member State that would usually be responsible on the basis of the
Regulation’s criteria, then under Article 3(2), the determining Member
State is responsible.150 The criteria that are applied are the presence of
family, the possession of a visa residence permit, and the entry into a
Member State.151 According to Articles 9 and 10, if the applicant has a
family member in a Member State, either benefiting from the refugee
protection or awaiting for a decision on his application, then the Member
State where the family member is located bears the burden of
responsibility for the asylee.152 Article 11 of the Dublin Regulation tries
to ensure that family members that apply for asylum in the same Member
State are not split up.153 According to Article 12, if a Member State has
issued a residence document, then it will be the State responsible for
application of the asylee.154 The application must be examined by a sole
Member State which the criteria designate as the responsible one.155 If
by applying the previous criteria, no Member State can be designated as
the responsible one, it will be the first State in which the application for
international protection was lodged.156
In any case, it must be determined on a case-by-case basis whether
an individual applying for international protection is a refugee within the
meaning of Article 1(a) of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees.157

147. Directive 2013/32, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on
Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International Protection (recast), 2013 O.J. (L
180) 60, 83.
148.

Id. at 67.

149. Regulation 604/2013 of Jun. 26, 2013, Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for
Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Application for International
Protection Lodged in one of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person
(recast), 2013 O.J. (L 180) 31, 37 [hereinafter Criteria and Mechanisms].
150.

Id.

151.

Id. at 9–13.

152.

See id.

153.

See id.

154.

Criteria and Mechanisms, supra note 149.

155.

See id. at 37.

156.

See id.

157.

Papademetriou, supra note 138.
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The European Response to COVID-19 Crisis

In the attempt to restrain the advancement of COVID-19, the
European Union has closed its external borders and restricted freedom of
movement between its internal borders.158 Several Member States have
also adopted emergency measures in order to curb the spread of
coronavirus by closing their ports to asylum seekers159 and imposing
mandatory confinement in asylum reception centers.160 Thus, there is an
actual risk that those measures will have a negative impact on the asylum
seekers.161
Under European law, Member States have not only a right to protect
their borders162 and safeguard public health, but also a duty to protect
fundamental rights.163 Member States must also ensure that restrictions
of mobility across borders are not discriminatory and do not prevent
people from seeking international protection.164 Member States, thus,
have to respect the right to asylum stated by Article 18 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the principle of nonrefoulement.165
On March 27, 2020, the Council of Europe published a note
regarding the rights applicable at the external borders, for the purpose of
providing guidance to Member States when adopting measures to contain
the COVID-19 outbreak.166
Migrant arrivals in Greece and Italy have been decreasing, but
Greek hotspots are overflowing with people.167 Taking into account the
severity of the situation and the fact that unaccompanied minors are the
most vulnerable, on March 4, 2020, the EU Commission called on
Member States to show solidarity to Greece by finding a solution for at
least 1600 unaccompanied minors.168 The Commission also proposed

158. See Nasar Meer & Leslie Villegas, The Impact of Covid-19 on Global Migration 4
(Governance Loc. Integration Migrants Eur. Refugees, Working Paper No. 69344, 2020) [hereinafter
Meer & Villegas].
159.

See id. at 10.

160.

See id. at 25.

161. Anja Radjenovic, Tackling the Corona Virus Outbreak: Impact on Asylum-Seekers in
the EU, EUR. PARL. Doc. P.E. 649.390 at 1, (Apr. 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civilprotection/mechanism_en.
162. Regulation 2016/399 of Mar. 9, 2016, On Union Code on Rules Governing Movement
Persons Across Borders (Schengen Border Code), 2016 O.J. (L 77) 1, 2.
163.

See Radjenovic, supra note 161, at 2.

164.

See id. at 3.

165. See Alexandra Popescu, The EU “Costs” of the Refugee Crisis, 10 EUROPOLITY 105,
110 (2016).
166.
167.
168.

Radjenovic, supra note 161, at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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measures to help Greece, which, from an EU Civil Protection
Mechanism, range from its purpose “to strengthen cooperation between
the EU Member States . . . in the field of civil protection, with a view to
improve prevention, preparedness and response to disasters[,]” to a big
increase in funding to build other reception and identification centers in
Greek islands.169
With Member States closing their borders and ports to migrants,
suspending asylum procedures and introducing mandatory confinement
in asylum reception centers, the EU Commission issued guidance on the
implementation of relevant EU rules on asylum and return policies.170
It must be underlined that, even though some intern and regional
human rights instruments allow States to derogate from their
international obligations in certain circumstances, certain human rights,
such as freedom from torture, are absolute and cannot be limited—even
in cases of public health emergencies.171
“Protective measures must never result in inhuman or degrading
treatment of person deprived of their liberty.”172
IV. COVID-19 PANDEMIC AS AN UNLAWFUL EXCEPTION TO THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT?
This world-wide pandemic has brought many States to enact border
closures and restrictions on the entry of non-nationals in their
territories.173 Even if the measures appear necessary to combat a global
threat, they often constitute an obstacle to individuals seeking
international protection.174 States have an absolute right to regulate the
entry of aliens at their borders, but still have a positive obligation to
ensure protection to individuals claiming to be a risk or persecution175 by
means of an individual determination,176 and by ensuring they are not
refouled or denied entry at the borders.177

169. EU Civil Protection Mechanism, EUR. COMM’N., https://ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civilprotection/mechanism_en (last updated Apr. 5, 2020); Assistance to Greece in Response Increased
Migration Pressure Immediate Measures Context COVID-19 Outbreak Support Post-Earthquake
reconstruction Albania Other Adjustments, at 3–4, COM (2020) 145 final (Mar. 27, 2020).
170. Radjenovic, supra note 161, at 5.
171.

Id.

172. Statement of Principles Relating to the Treatment of Persons Deprived of Their Liberty
in the Context of the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Pandemic, EUR. COMM. FOR THE
PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMANE OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (Mar. 20,
2020), https://rm.coe.int/16809cfa4b (last visited Sept. 10, 2020).
173. Meer & Villegas, supra note 158, at 4.
174.

Id. at 23–24.

175.
176.
177.

Key Legal Considerations, supra note 116, at 1.
HANDBOOK, supra note 21, at 12.
Key Legal Considerations, supra note 116, at 1.
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International treaties allow States to derogate their international
obligations in certain circumstances. Article 33(2) of the 1951
Convention provides an exception to the principle of non-refoulement if
the refugee is deemed to be a danger for the security of the host State or
if he has committed a serious crime.178 Article 4(1) of the ICCPR179 and
Article 15(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 180
provide the opportunity for a State to derogate from some of its
international obligations if the measures implemented are nondiscriminatory and consistent with other obligations under international
law. Commenting on Article 4 of the ICCPR, the UN Human Rights
Committee stated that “[m]easures derogating from the provisions of the
Covenant must be of an exceptional and temporary nature”181 and that
“the situation must amount to a public emergency which threatens the
life of the nation.”182 However, even if the principle of non-refoulement
does not appear to be absolute, the European Court of Human Rights has
considered the principle a component of the prohibition or torture stating
the absolute nature of non-refoulement under human rights law, even in

178.

Id.

1951 Convention, supra note 9, art. 33, ¶ 2.

The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a
refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a
final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the
community of that country.

179.

ICCPR, supra note 74, art. 4.

In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the
present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other
obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely
on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.
Id.
180. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any
High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations
under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other
obligations under international law.
Id.
181. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm. (HRC), Comment 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), at 2,
U.N. Doc. CCP/.C/21/Rev.1/add.11 (2001).
182. Id.
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cases of public health emergencies.183 The principle of non-refoulement
is also considered jus cogens under customary law and as such not subject
to any derogation.184
From the United States to Europe, during the COVID-19 pandemic
the right of asylum has been basically suspended.185 Forced returns and
push backs, including at sea, have been reported worldwide.186
In the United States, since March 20, 2020 when the EIFO was
issued, thousands of migrants seeking international protection have been
expelled within few hours from their arrival at the border.187 Human
Rights First published a report in May, stating that more than 1000
unaccompanied minors were forcibly returned to Mexico where they will
likely face persecution.188
In June, several non-profit organizations filed a suit against the
United States federal government on behalf of a thirteen-year-old migrant
girl from El Salvador who was expelled without proper process.189 The
suit represents a challenge to the government’s unprecedent order for
restricting immigration along the Canadian and Mexican borders in the
name of public health.190 Notwithstanding her clear declaration of fear
of returning to El Salvador and lack of any putative symptoms of
COVID-19, the girl was not afforded due process.191 The EIFO not only
violates international law but is also arbitrary from a public health
standpoint.192
In Greece, asylum procedures were suspended for a month, starting
March 1, 2020 as a consequence of tensions with Turkey, due to a rapid
increase in people trying to cross the border.193 The decree suspending
access to asylum for people who irregularly entered the country urged for
new arrivals to be immediately deported either to country of origin or
transit (Turkey).194 This suspension was consequently extended until

183.

Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 70/1995/576/662, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 79-80 (1996).

184.

Principle of Non-Refoulment, supra note 10, ¶ 3.

185.

Meer & Villegas, supra note 158, at 2.

186.

Id. at 3–4, 10; see also Greece: Grants Asylum Access to New Arrivals, supra note 8.

187. Meer & Villegas, supra note 158, at 7–8.
188. See Kennji Kizuka, Eleanor Acer & Rebecca Gendelman, Pandemic as a Pretext:
Trump Administration Exploits COVID-19, Expels Asylum Seekers and Children to Escalating
Danger, HUM. RTS. FIRST, at 2 (May 2020), https: www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/pandemicpretext-trump-administration-exploits-covid-19-expels-asylum-seekers-and-children
(discussing
that over 1000 persons have been kidnapped, raped or assaulted after they returned).
189. Lorenzo Zazueta-Castro, Civil rights orgs sue Trump administration over public
health code expulsions, MONITOR (June 11, 2020), https://www.themonitor.com/2020/06/11/civilrights-orgs-sue-trump-administration-public-health-code-expulsions.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Greece: Grant Asylum Access to New Arrivals, supra note 8.
194. Id.
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May 15, 2020.195 During this period, no asylum applications were
registered.196 Ylva Johansson of the European Commission for Home
Affairs notes that, although Greece has the right to secure its borders, the
right to apply for asylum and the principle of non-refoulement should
always be respected.197 However, reports indicate that since the start of
March several group of people have been summarily rejected by Greek
authorities at its borders, including pushbacks at sea.198 In the context of
a public health emergency, it must be remembered that restriction on
rights must always been “[l]awful, necessary and proportionate as well
as nondiscriminatory.”199
In Italy, the process of asylum has been put on hold as well.200 In
April of 2020, after a ship operated by a German non-governmental
organization (NGO) headed towards Italy, the government issued a
decree declaring its ports unsafe: “[f]or the entire duration of the national
health emergency caused by the spread of the COVID-19 virus, Italian
ports cannot guarantee the requisites needed to be classified and defined
as a place of safety.”201 This decree basically had the effect of closing
Italy’s borders to sea-rescue ships.202 This decision was taken after a ship
operated by a German NGO rescued 150 people and headed towards
Italy.203
Those exceptional measures, implemented by States to curb the
spread of the virus, are impacting asylum seekers heavily—often in
violation of binding treaty obligations. Immigration policies have often
hardened in times of crisis.204 Charanya Krishnaswami, Amnesty
International Advocacy Director for the Americas, writes that “[c]risis
produces an instinct to close the border and keep people out,”205 but
COVID-19 and public health concerns could be used to mask

195. HELLENIC REP. MINISTRY OF MIGR. AND ASYLUM, IMPORTANT ANNOUNCEMENT
SUSPENSION OF ALL ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES TO THE PUBLIC BY THE ASYLUM SERVICE 15TH
WILL CONTINUE UNTIL MAY (2020), http://asylo.gov.gr/en/?p=5303.
196.
197.

See Greece: Grant Asylum Access to New Arrivals, supra note 8.
Id.

198. UNHCR Calls on Greece to Investigate Pushbacks at Sea and Land Borders with
Turkey, UNHCR (June 12, 2020), https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2020/6/5ee33a6f4/unhcrcalls-greece-investigate-pushbacks-sea-land-borders-turkey.html.
199.

Greece: Grant Asylum Access to New Arrivals, supra note 8.

Italy closes ports, supra note 14.
Id.
Lorenzo Tondo, Italy declares own ports ‘unsafe’ to stop migrants arriving,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/08/italy-declares-ownports-unsafe-to-stop-migrants-disembarking.
203. Id.
204. Jack Herrera & Quito Tsui, Could Covid-19 Mean the End of Asylum Law in the US?
NATION (June 3, 2020), https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/coronavirus-refugee-asylumlaw.
205. Id.
200.
201.
202.
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xenophobia.206 Historically, concerns relating to health and threat of
containment have already been used to justify the enforcement of new
restrictive immigrations policies.207 The bubonic plague in San Francisco
led to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, while medical checks held in
Ellis Island were a tool to summarily deport those considered diseased or
disabled.208 Since the start of the pandemic, politicians in Europe and
North America have taken parallel action between migrants and disease,
painting irregular immigrants as threats to the containment of the virus.209
There is the suspect that those restrictive measures are not truly intended
to protect public health, but are part of a recent trend of governments all
around the world of trying to limit immigration and asylum.210
“The fear is these measures will be in place long after pandemic
ends.”211
V.

CONCLUSION

The borders’ exceptional measures, adopted by the United States
and many countries in the European Union, constitute a violation of
domestic and international law by repudiating the commitment to the
crucial principle of non-refoulement.212
“States can and should ensure access to asylum while also protecting
public health” is the first and probably most fundamental “key protection
message” diffused by the UNHCR.213 Countries all around the world
should respond to the pandemic by including provisions which take into
consideration all those looking for international protection.214 The
UNHCR also prescribes the observance of the criteria of proportionality
with regard to the principle of non-refoulement.215 This means that the
measures adopted to manage risk to public health that could arise with
the arrival of individual looking for protection must be necessary,
legitimate, and non-discriminatory, so as not to target particular
vulnerable groups of people.216 States, for example, may adopt health
screenings and testing upon entry, measures that may not result in a
denial of the right of asylum or in refoulement.217 The States’ responses

206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Herrera & Tsui, supra note 204.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Press Release, supra note 125, at 1.
214. Covid-19:
The Effect on Refugees, CLEARY GOTTLIEB 1, 1,
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/alert-memos-2020/covid19-the-effect-on-refugeespdf (last updated Apr. 17, 2020).
215. Id. at 2.
216. Id. at 3.
217. Id.

348092-ILSA_International_27-1_Text.indd 64

12/11/20 1:36 PM

2020]

Crebelli

53

to a pandemic must comply with human rights standards.218 In order to
guarantee the rights to individuals in need of international protection,
entry in the territory of the country where they seek asylum must be
allowed.219 The United Nations Network on Migration also urges States
to suspend forced returns during this time of crisis, and to guarantee
human rights to all migrants, regardless of their migratory status.220
Many governments have already included migrants in their response to
the COVID-19 crisis by means of suspending forced returns, providing
temporary residence and non-custodial alternatives: this appears to be
the only effective way to protect migrants’ rights, and at the same time,
dampen xenophobia.221
International solidarity and burden sharing are necessary to help
hosting States to pursue those inclusive responses.222 As the UN
Secretary General António Guterres has said, “COVID-19 is menacing
the whole of humanity — and so the whole humanity must fight back.
Individual country responses are not going to be enough.”223

218. U.N. COMM.’N ON MIGRANT WORKERS, Joint Guidance Note on the Impacts of
COVID-19 Pandemic on the Human Rights of Migrants, at 1–2 (May 26, 2020),
https://reliefweb.int/report/world/joint-guidance-note-impacts-covid-19pandemic-human-rightsmigrants.
219. Id. at 2.
220. Press Release, U.N. Network on Migration, Forced Returns of Migrants Must be
Suspended in Times of COVID-19, U.N. Press Release (May 13, 2020).
221. Id.
222. António Guterres, U.N. Secretary General, Secretary-General's Remarks at Launch of
Global Humanitarian Response Plan for COVID-19 (March 22, 2020), in U.N. SEC‘Y GEN., March
2020.
223. Id.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

A “coronavirus” (CoV) is a part of a significant family of viruses, which
can lead to disease and respiratory infections over a wide range of severity in
humans, from the common cold to more serious diseases, such as Middle
East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS-CoV or MERS) and Severe Acute
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Respiratory Syndrome (SARS-CoV or SARS virus).1 What began as a new
coronavirus and unknown disease when the December 2019 outbreak began
in Wuhan, China, has since become the global COVID-19 pandemic.2
On January 9, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) announced,
“Chinese authorities have made a preliminary determination of a novel (or
new) coronavirus, identified in a hospitalized person with pneumonia in
Wuhan.”3 When this novel coronavirus made its initial appearance in Wuhan
in late 2019, it appeared to be closely related to SARS.4 However, China
subsequently stated that testing ruled out SARS, MERS, the flu, and “other
common respiratory pathogens.” 5 This highly contagious and novel
coronavirus was eventually named Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), which causes an illness now known as
COVID-19.6 By early 2020, COVID-19 had spread through China and began
reaching the United States and Europe through infected travelers.7
On March 12, 2020, the WHO announced that COVID-19 was a
pandemic.8 On March 6, 2020, the President of the United States, Donald
Trump, signed the Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental
Appropriations Act 2020 (Public Law 116–123), and on March 27, 2020,
President Trump signed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(CARES) Act (Public Law 116–127).9 As of October 17, 2020, the WHO
had reported 39,196,259 confirmed cases of COVID-19, resulting in
1,101,298 deaths.10

1.
Q&A on Coronaviruses (COVID-19), WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/question-and-answers-hub/q-adetail/q-a-coronaviruses; Statement Regarding Cluster of Pneumonia Cases in Wuhan, China, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. [WHO] (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.who.int/china/news/detail/09-01-2020-who-statementregarding-cluster-of-pneumonia-cases-in-wuhan-china [hereinafter WHO Statement].
2.
Kara
Rogers
et
al.,
Coronavirus,
ENCYC.
https://www.britannica.com/science/coronavirus-virus-group (last visited July 5, 2020).
3.

WHO Statement, supra note 1.

4.

Rogers et al., supra note 2.

5.

WHO Statement, supra note 1.

6.

Rogers et al., supra note 2.

7.

Id.

BRITANNICA,

WHO Announces COVID-19 Outbreak a Pandemic, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] (Dec.
3,
2020),
https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-emergencies/coronavirus-covid19/news/news/ 2020/3/who-announces-covid-19-outbreak-a-pandemic.
8.

9.
CDC COVID-19 Global Response: Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (June 12, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/global-covid19/fact-sheet-cdc-covid-19-global-response.pdf.
10.
WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] (Oct.
17, 2020, 1:43 PM), https://covid19.who.int/.
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COVID-19 is primarily contracted from person-to-person contact
through “small droplets from the nose or mouth, which are expelled when a
person with COVID-19 coughs, sneezes, or speaks.”11 A person is at high
risk of becoming infected with COVID-19 if he or she is in close contact with
someone else who is infected with COVID-19, and both individuals can
subsequently transmit the disease to others.12 Monitoring persons who come
into close contact with another person who is infected with COVID-19 helps
such exposed persons obtain care and treatment in a timely manner, and
reduce the potential of further transmission to others.13 Such a monitoring
process is called “contact tracing.”14
The modern methods of contact tracing are the result of tools developed
by public health officials since the mid-1800s to study and prevent
epidemics.15 Contact tracing is a “core disease control activity” used by
government health departments to stop, or at least slow, the spread of
infectious diseases.16 Contact tracing for COVID-19 typically involves the
following components:17
1. Identification: Once it is confirmed that a person is infected with
COVID-19 (a “Case”), identification of his or her contacts occurs by asking
about the infected person’s activities, and of the persons around them, from
the time the infected person first became ill (such as family members, friends,
co-workers, and health care professionals).18 The Case is usually directed to
self-isolate.19
2. List: All persons who have had contact with the infected person
should be listed as “contacts.”20 Attempts should be made to notify such
11.

Q&A on Coronaviruses (COVID-19), supra note 1.

12.
Contact Tracing: Q&A, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO] (May 9, 2017), https://www.
who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/contact-tracing.
13.

Id.

14.

Id.

15.
Kara Rogers, Questions About COVID-19 Answered, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (June 18, 2020),
https://www.britannica.com/story/questions-about-covid-19-answered.
16.
Contact Tracing – CDC’s Role and Approach, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/php/contacttracing-CDC-role-and-approach.pdf.
17.
Contact Tracing: Q&A, supra note 12; Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Contact
Tracing, CTRS. FOR D ISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 21, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov
/coronavirus/2019-ncov/daily-life-coping/contact-tracing.html (last visited July 5, 2020) [hereinafter
Coronavirus Disease 2019].
18.

Contact Tracing: Q&A, supra note 12; Coronavirus Disease 2019, supra note 17.

19.

Coronavirus Disease 2019, supra note 17.

20.

Contact Tracing: Q&A, supra note 12.
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contacts of their contact status, explaining what that status means, providing
appropriate referrals to receive testing, explaining why it is important to seek
immediate care if symptoms develop, providing information regarding
transmission prevention, and informing the contacts of any further steps that
are to take place.21 Typically, contacts of COVID-19 Cases are directed to
self-quarantine at home for fourteen days after their last exposure to the Case,
maintain six feet of “social distancing” from other persons during the
“quarantine period,” and self-monitor for symptoms, such as checking their
temperatures twice a day.22
3. Follow-up: Contacts should receive regular follow-ups for
monitoring of symptoms and other signs of infection.23
Normally, these basic steps of contact tracing are performed by
conducting interviews and surveys of the infected persons, which can be
labor-intensive, time-consuming, and expensive.24
As noted by Christine S. Wilson, Commissioner of the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission, “as governments grapple with how to stem the tide of
infection and death” in the age of COVID-19, “many governments are
turning to technology for assistance.”25 Digital smartphone-based contact
tracing tools can trace and notify contacts faster and with less coordination,
providing greater “speed and efficacy while also reducing cost and
interpersonal contact.”26 But the contact tracing applications are so new that
not much is known yet regarding the data types that will be gathered, who
will have access to the data, whether any of the data will be shared, and if so,
to whom and how long it will be retained.27
The purpose for choosing this topic is to explore privacy issues being
faced in distinct parts of the world by countries exploring the use of digital
contact tracing phone applications to help gain control over the COVID-19
global pandemic. First, this article will provide a brief history of the United
States, the European Union, and Israel, and explore the applicable privacy
laws governing its corresponding citizens in relation to the usage of digital
contact tracing applications. Then, this article will compare the similarities
21.

Id.; Coronavirus Disease 2019, supra note 17.

22.

Coronavirus Disease 2019, supra note 17.

23.

Contact Tracing: Q&A, supra note 12.

24.

Rogers, supra note 15.

25.
Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, FED. TRADE COMM’N, Remarks at Privacy + Security
Academy Virtual Event: Privacy and Public/Private Partnerships in a Pandemic 3 (May 7, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1574938/wilson_-_remarks_at_privacy_
security_academy_5-7-20.pdf.
26.

Rogers, supra note 15.

27.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 5.
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and differences between such laws, and how the United States, the European
Union, and Israel are addressing such laws relative to digital contact tracing
application usage. Finally, this article will conclude with an assessment on
the current contact tracing situation in the United States and what can be
learned by looking towards the European Union and Israel.
II.
A.

APPLICABLE PRIVACY LAWS FOR DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING
APPLICATIONS
The United States

Collectively, the United States is a federal republic of fifty states.28 The
U.S. Constitution outlines a federal system of government wherein the
federal government is appointed specific powers and the rest is preserved for
the states.29 Under the U.S. Constitution, the federal government is divided
into three separate branches of government: legislative powers are vested in
Congress, consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate;
executive powers are vested in the President, and judicial powers are vested
in the Supreme Court. 30 The government in each of the fifty states is
structured similarly to that of the federal government, with a state
constitution, a state legislature, a governor, and a state judiciary.31 At the
time of finalizing this article, the United States, with a population of
330,457,878, 32 has incurred 8,081,489 COVID-19 Cases, resulting in
218,511 deaths.33
The federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA) was enacted for the following reasons:
[T]o improve portability and continuity of health insurance
coverage in the group and individual markets, to combat waste,
fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery, to
promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to
long-term care services and coverage, to simplify the
28.
The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, United States: Introduction & Quick Facts,
ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/United-States (last visited Sept. 22, 2020).
29.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.

30.

U.S. CONST. art. I; id. art. II; id. art. III.

31.
Wilfred Owen, et al., United States: State and Local Government, ENCYC. BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/United-States/State-and-local-government (last visited Sept. 22, 2020).
32.
U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 17, 2020),
https://www.census.gov/popclock.
33.
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): CDC COVID Data Tracker, CTRS. F OR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 18, 2020, 12:21 PM), https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-datatracker/#cases_casesper100klast7days [hereinafter Cases in the U.S.].
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administration of health insurance, and for other purposes.34

Under HIPAA, personal health information is that which is created or
received by certain types of entities, such as health care providers, employers,
and public health authorities (covered entities), related to the physical and
mental health of an individual, 35 and specifically identifies the person
(individually identifiable health information). 36 Any U.S. agency or an
individual state or territory that has been delegated the responsibility for the
public health can be considered a “public health authority” under HIPAA
regulation Section 164.501 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), and
such public health authority may use or disclose protected health information
without the authorization of the corresponding individual if required by law
or for the purpose of protecting the public health against disease.37
If a person receives a positive test result for COVID-19, that information
can legally be shared with public health authorities without such person’s
consent.38 During the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued public bulletins
addressing HIPAA privacy rules in relation to covered entities’ release of
personal health information of individuals who have tested positive for
COVID-19.39 One such bulletin, referencing Section 164.512(a) of the CFR,
clarifies that the HIPAA privacy rules allow for a covered entity to disclose
protected health information of an individual who tested positive for COVID19 pursuant to state law that requires reporting of such data.40 Another such
bulletin clarifies further that the HIPAA privacy rule allows for what would
typically be considered “protected” health information to be disclosed to
assist in nationwide public health emergencies, and that the Secretary of HHS
has waived sanctions and penalties for such disclosures without the patient’s

34.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
35.

42 U.S.C. § 1320d(4).

36.

See id. § 1320d(6).

37.

45 C.F.R. §§ 164.501–.512 (2020).

38.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 12.

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., COVID-19 AND HIPAA: DISCLOSURES TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT, PARAMEDICS, OTHER FIRST RESPONDERS AND PUBLIC HEALTH AUTHORITIES (2020)
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/covid-19-hipaa-and-first-responders-508.pdf
[hereinafter
DISCLOSURES]; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., COVID-19 & HIPAA BULLETIN: LIMITED
WAIVER OF HIPAA SANCTIONS AND PENALTIES DURING A NATIONWIDE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY
(2020),
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/hipaa-and-covid-19-limited-hipaa-waiver-bulletin508.pdf [hereinafter LIMITED WAIVER].
39.

40.

DISCLOSURES, supra note 39, at 1.
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consent.41 Such waivers became effective as of March 15, 2020 and shall
only apply during the President’s declaration of a public health emergency.42
There are gaps in the protections afforded to individuals under HIPAA
due to ongoing developments in technology, as information such as one’s
heart health—typically viewed as individually identifiable health
information—is now ordinarily stored on smart phones and smart watches.43
Commercial technology companies that have access to such private health
information are not subject to HIPAA, but are generally under the oversight
of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 44 The FTC is the “primary federal
data security regulator” in the United States.45 The FTC’s authority as a data
security regulator is derived from Section 5 of the FTC Act, which gives the
FTC broad authority over protecting consumers from “unfair or deceptive
trade practices in or affecting commerce.” 46 Consumers who initially
consented to a technology company’s privacy policy, relative to the
collection of their health and personal data on their smart phones, did not
consider the possibility of how such data could be used and shared during a
pandemic.47 According to FTC Commissioner Wilson, “the assumption that
consumers have given informed consent to the collection of their data—
particularly for the purpose of monitoring their compliance with social
isolation measures during a pandemic—is flawed.”48 If U.S. citizens simply
accept that their personal information is not private, their “reasonable
expectation of privacy” under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution is
gutted.49
The Fourth Amendment protects U.S. citizens against unlawful searches
and seizures by the government. 50 The Framers of the U.S. Constitution
experienced unreasonable searches and seizures in England under general
warrants granted by agents of the King.51 The Fourth Amendment was born
41.

LIMITED WAIVER, supra note 39, at 1–2.

42.

Id. at 1.

43.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 13–14.

44.
New HHS Rules Ease Access to Digital Patient Health Data, ASH CLINICAL NEWS (Mar.
13, 2020), https://www.ashclinicalnews.org/online-exclusives/new-hhs-rules-ease-access-digital-patienthealth-data/.
45.
PRACTICAL LAW DATA PRIVACY ADVISOR, F.T.C. DATA SECURITY STANDARDS AND
ENFORCEMENT, 1–2 (2020), Westlaw.
46.

Id.

47.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 12–13.

48.

Id. at 13.

49.

Id. at 16.

50.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

51.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1977); see also Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383, 390 (1914).
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out of the Framers’ intent to protect Americans from unnecessary and unjust
government attacks on their privacy.52 If a contact tracing app would, for
example, lead law enforcement to identify violators of quarantine orders
through “data collection, rather than direct observation,” that could implicate
the Fourth Amendment.53 As Chief Justice John Roberts noted in United
States v. Carpenter, “when the Government tracks the location of a cell
phone it achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle
monitor to the phone’s user.”54 In Carpenter, wherein the Court ruled the
government’s acquisition of the defendant’s cell-site records constituted a
warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Chief Justice
Roberts referenced a comment made by Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v.
United States, that it is the Supreme Court’s duty to ensure as science
continues to develop, such progress does not chip away at the Fourth
Amendment’s protections.55
As FTC Commissioner Wilson has noted, “[t]here has long been a call
for federal privacy legislation.”56 In 2012, the FTC provided a significant
report on privacy to Congress in which the FTC recommended that Congress
enact federal privacy legislation that is comprehensive.57 In the absence of
comprehensive federal privacy legislation which, to date, Congress has not
successfully passed, the FTC has provided consumer privacy and data
security guidance documents for commercial businesses and consumers.58 In
addition, the National Institute for Standards and Technology, the
International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP), and the App
Association have provided recommendations, resources, and guidelines for
best practices; the FTC has utilized its general authority to protect
consumers’ privacy, but such authority has considerable limits.59
Numerous U.S. senators have stated their concerns that contact tracing
applications’ access to personal health information could provide the ability
for technology companies to build consumer health profiles that could
ultimately subject such consumers to discrimination from insurance
companies, employers, and others. 60 The following bills have been
introduced in the U.S. Senate:
52.

See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 8; see also Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390–91.

53.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 16.

54.

Carpenter v. United States, 138 U.S. 2206, 2218 (2018).

55.

Id. at 2223.

56.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 18.

57.

Id. at 18.

58.

Id. at 18–21.

59.

Id. at 21–22.

60.

Id. at 14.
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1. Senate Bill 3663, COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of
2020, introduced May 7, 2020, and described as follows:
This bill generally prohibits covered entities from collecting,
processing, or transferring an individual’s personally identifiable
information for the purpose of contact tracing with respect to
COVID-19 (i.e., coronavirus disease 2019) without first obtaining
the individual's affirmative consent to use such information.
Applicable personally identifiable information includes, but is not
limited to, precise geolocation data, long-lasting digital identifiers
of individuals, and personal health information. However, such
information does not include data that is de-identified, related to
employee health screening for on-site entry, or publicly available.
Covered entities, which include businesses, common carriers, and
certain nonprofit organizations, also must provide a mechanism
for individuals to revoke prior affirmative consent.61

2. Senate Bill 3749, Public Health Emergency Privacy Act,
introduced May 14, 2020, is described as “[a] bill to protect the privacy of
health information during a national health emergency.”62
3. Senate Bill 3861—described as “a bill to establish privacy
requirements for operators of infectious disease exposure notification
services”—was introduced to the Senate on June 1, 2020 and subsequently
referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.63
FTC Commissioner Wilson—while specifically noting Senate Bill
3663, COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020 is “a welcome
development”—continues to assert that comprehensive privacy legislation
governing responsible uses of personal health data with transparency is
preferable to specific legislation that would only address COVID-19 contact
tracing application privacy issues.64 At the time of finalizing this article, all
three Senate bills listed above are still under committee review.65
B.

The European Union

The European Union (EU) is an international organization of twentyseven European countries with social, economic, and security policies that
61.

COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663, 116th Cong. (2020).

62.

Public Health Emergency Privacy Act, S. 3749, 116th Cong. (2020).

63.

Exposure Notification Privacy Act, S. 3861, 116th Cong. (2020).

64.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 19; S. 3663.

65.

S. 3663; S. 3749; S. 3861.
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commonly govern.66 The EU was created by the Maastricht Treaty, which
was made effective as of November 1, 1993, and is the document under
which countries, referred to as “Member States,” joined to form the EU.67
The intention behind the treaty was to improve the incorporation of European
politics and economics by, among other things, creating common rights of its
member states’ citizens.68 The Maastricht Treaty was subsequently amended
by the Lisbon Treaty, ratified on December 1, 2009. 69 Although not a
“constitution” for the EU, the Lisbon Treaty created a position of EU
president of greater permanence, enhanced the European Parliament’s power,
and incorporated a Charter of Fundamental Rights addressing civil and social
rights for the EU citizens. 70 The current Member States of the EU are
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. 71 The United Kingdom (U.K.),
which had been a founding member of the EU, left the EU in 2020; however,
despite a successful “Brexit,” the U.K. remains in the EU through the end of
2020.72 The population of the EU is 446 million.73 For the EU, the European
Economic Area (EEA) (consisting of Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway)
and the U.K., collectively, have a total number of 4,799,988 COVID-19
Cases resulting in 200,587 deaths.74

66.
Matthew J. Gabel, European Union, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
topic/European-Union (last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
67.
Gabel, supra note 66; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 1, June
7, 2016, O.J. (C 202) 13.
68.

Gabel, supra note 66.

69.
Michael Ray, Lisbon Treaty, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event
/Lisbon-Treaty (last visited Sept. 23, 2020).
70.

Id.

71.

Gabel, supra note 66.

72.
Gabel, supra note 66; see Alasdair Sandford, Post-Brexit Guide: Where are we now – and
how did we get there?, EURO NEWS, https://www.euronews.com/2020/06/11/brexit-draft-deal-first-ofmany-hurdles-to-a-smooth-exit (last updated Oct. 23, 2020).
73.
Living in the EU, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/living_
en#:~:text=such%20as%20education.,Size%20and%20population,population%20after%20China%20an
d%20India (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).
74.
Countries in the EU and EEA, GOV’T U.K., https://www.gov.uk/eu-eea (last visited Sept.
23, 2020); COVID-19 situation update for the EU/EEA and the UK, as of 24 October 2020, EUR. CTR.
FOR DISEASE PREVENTION & CONTROL, https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/cases-2019-ncov-eueea (last
updated Oct. 24, 2020).

348092-ILSA_International_27-1_Text.indd 76

12/11/20 1:36 PM

Trotogott

2020]

65

The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) established data
privacy laws governing all of the European Union’s member states.75 The
GDPR created protections over the processing of personal data collected
from citizens in the EU—regardless of whether the business performing the
personal data collection is located within the EU and/or processes the
collection within the EU.76 Under the GDPR, “personal data” is defined as
follows:
Any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference
to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location
data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the
physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity of that natural person.77

Under the GDPR, personal data is to be collected for “specified, explicit
and legitimate purposes,” the scope of which is to be limited to the extent
necessary for such purposes.78 A business collecting personal data of an EU
consumer must also have technology or other measures in place to safeguard
the protection of such data against unauthorized access and accidental loss.79
The consumer must give his or her consent before such data may be
processed for lawful reasons, such as “for the performance of a task carried
out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority.” 80 The
processing of personal health data without the subject’s explicit, specific
consent is prohibited under the GDPR, with some exceptions—one notable
exception being for public health reasons.81 To that end, there are potentially
permissible bases under Articles 6 and 9 of the GDPR to process personal
health data for COVID-19 contact tracing.82 Under Article 6, the personal
health data garnered from contact tracing could potentially be processed by
75.
Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 2016 on the
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data, and repealing directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 32 [hereinafter Protection of Natural
Persons].
76.

Id. art. 3.

77.

Id. art. 4(1).

78.

Id. art. 5.

79.

Id.

80.

Protection of Natural Persons, supra note 75, art. 6.

81.
Id. art. 9; see also Lothar Determann, Healthy Data Protection, 26 MICH. TECH. L. REV.
229, 240 (2020).
82.
Olivia Whitcroft, A Guide to Data Processing During a Pandemic, 20 PRIVACY AND DATA
PROT. 7, 8 (2020).
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public health authorities as a “task carried out in the public interest” in
consideration of COVID-19’s impact on the public’s health as long as it had
a lawful basis.83 Another potential basis under Article 6 would be in the vital
interests of a citizen’s life, for which collection of personal health data related
to COVID-19 contact tracing could be applied.84 As to Article 9 of the
GDPR, Article 9(2)(i) could provide a basis for personal health data
processing as a result of COVID-19 contact tracing if, similar to provisions
in Article 6, it had a legal basis and was necessary for public health
interests.85 Also, similar to Article 6, Article 9(2)(c) could also provide a
basis for processing personal health data resulting from contact tracing if
necessary to safeguard a citizen’s vital interests due to COVID-19.86
The EU’s eHealth Network, a voluntary health network among the
Member States established under Article 14 of Directive 2011/24/EU, 87
developed and released a “Toolbox” of contact tracing application guidelines
for EU Member States with the support of the European Commission. 88 The
critical requirements for contact tracing applications, as stated in the EU
Toolbox, are that personal data is collected in the application on a voluntary
basis, that the application is approved by the corresponding Member State’s
health authority, that it protects the personal data through secure encryption,
and the data is destroyed once no longer needed.89 As Member States chose
contact tracing applications individually rather than agreeing to one universal
application for the EU’s use, the eHealth Network subsequently released
additional guidelines to support interoperability of contact tracing
applications that would exchange data across the Member States while still
safeguarding personal data.90

83.

Id. at 8.

84.

Id.

85.

Id.

86.

Id.

87.
Directive 2011/24, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the
Application of Patients’ Rights in Cross-Border Healthcare, 2011 O.J. (L 88) 45, 63.
88.
Mobile Applications to Support Contact Tracing in the EU’s Fight Against COVID-19:
Common EU Toolbox for Member States, EHEALTH NETWORK 1, 5 (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/ehealth/docs/covid-19_apps_en.pdf.
89.

Id.

Interoperability Guidelines for Approved Contact Tracing Mobile Applications in the EU,
NETWORK 1, 3 (May 13, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/ehealth/docs
/contact tracing_mobileapps_guidelines_en.pdf.
90.

EHEALTH
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Israel

Israel is a small Jewish country in the Middle East.91 Israel’s statehood
was declared on May 14, 1948.92 Israel is a democratic republic and has a
parliamentary system of government.93 Israel’s legislative body is called the
Knesset.94 The Knesset is a single-chamber legislature with 120 members
who are typically elected every four years.95 Both Hebrew—the country’s
official language—and Arabic are used in all Knesset proceedings.96
Israel’s Prime Minister is the head of government and forms the
Cabinet, which is the government’s main policy-making and executive
body.97 Cabinet members are not required to be members of the Knesset.98
The president, who is the head of state, was traditionally elected by the
Knesset for a five-year term that could only be renewed once; however, as of
the year 2000, presidents are elected for one seven-year term.99 The president
has no veto powers and the functions of the office are primarily ceremonial,
but the president does have the authority to appoint certain key officials,
magistrates, district judges, and justices of the Supreme Court. 100 The
population of Israel is 8,675,475.101 Israel has incurred 302,770 COVID-19
Cases resulting in 2,190 deaths.102
Rather than having a formal written constitution, Israel’s system of
government is based on a series of “Basic Laws,” which are a political
compromise that serve as a pseudo-constitution.103 These Basic Laws are
passed in the same way as other legislative acts; however, they are intended

91.
William L. Ochsenwald, Israel, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/
Israel (last updated Sept. 30, 2020).
92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94.

Id.

95.

Id.

96.

Ochsenwald, supra note 91.

97.

Id.

98.

Id.

99.

Id.

100.

Id.

101. The
World
Factbook,
Middle
East:
Israel,
CIA,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/is.html (last updated Sept. 10, 2020).
102. Coronavirus Tracker:
Israel and Worldwide, HAARETZ (Oct. 18, 2020),
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/EXT-INTERACTIVE-coronavirus-tracker-israel-world-updatesreal-time-statistics-covid-19-cases-deaths-1.8763410 (last visited Oct. 18, 2020 12:04 AM).
103.

Ochsenwald, supra note 91.
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to serve as Israel’s “guiding principles.”104 In addition to its Basic Laws,
Israel’s government is also based on legislative acts, executive orders, and
parliamentary practices.105 The Supreme Court of Israel’s precedent is to rule
against laws that conflict with the Basic Laws.106
The Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty was enacted in 1992 with
the purpose of protecting human dignity and liberty.107 Section 7(a) of the
Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty provides that all citizens have a
right to privacy.108 Israel’s Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates that the
privacy rights protected in the Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty are
also deemed to be human rights.109
Under Section 7(a) of the Israel Security Agency Law of 2002 (ISA
Law), the Israeli Security Agency (Shin Bet) is to protect Israel against
terrorism and advance other essential national security interests of Israel.110
When Israel began to incur positive COVID-19 Cases, the executive branch
of its government took quick action involving the Shin Bet, primarily relying
on the government’s broad authority under “Basic Law: The Government”
to issue emergency regulations to protect Israel and secure the public’s
safety.111 Bypassing the legislative branch, as the Knesset was in flux at that
time without the ability to function, the executive branch’s emergency
regulations gave the Shin Bet, which typically deals with terrorism threats,
the power to conduct contact tracing on Israeli citizens by obtaining
“cellphone location data” of citizens who were either positive COVID-19
Cases or suspected Cases without requiring a warrant or a citizen’s
consent. 112 This COVID-19 surveillance was the subject of Ben Meir v.
Prime Minister, resulting in a novel decision of Israel’s Supreme Court
during a novel pandemic.113
104.

Id.

105.

Id.

106.

Id.

107.

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H, amend. 1.

108.

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H, 1, 7.

109. Arye Schreiber, Privacy: Proprietary or Human Right? An Israeli Law Perspective, 2
INTELL. PROP. Q. 13, 19 (2009).
110.

General Security Service Law, 5762–2002, SH. No. 1832 p. 7(a) (Isr.).

Elena Chachko, The Israeli Supreme Court Checks COVID-19 Electronic Surveillance,
LAWFARE (May 5, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/israeli-supreme-court-checks-covid-19electronic-surveillance.
111.

112.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 10; see also Chachko, supra note 111.

113. HCJ 2109/20 Ben Meir v. Prime Minister PD 1, 13 (2020) (Isr.); Dan Or-Hof & Rotem
Perelman-Farhi, Striking the Right Balance: Government Contact Tracing Powers and the Right to
Privacy, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY PROF’LS (May 1, 2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/striking-the-rightbalancegovernment-contact-tracing-powers-and-the-right-to-privacy/.
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In Meir, Israel’s Supreme Court found that the covert COVID-19
contact tracing conducted by the Shin Bet, using non-transparent technology
to surveil Israel’s citizens and residents, was a severe violation of the right to
privacy.114 The Court noted the use of such emergency regulations may have
been appropriate during the initial weeks of Israel experiencing the pandemic
and the matter was one of urgency, but once Israel became in control over
the spread of COVID-19, emergency regulations were no longer sufficient.115
The Court considered whether statutory authority may already exist to allow
for such COVID-19 surveillance by reviewing Section 7(a) of the ISA Law
to determine if public health emergencies fell within its scope.116 The Court
found that the government could grant authority to the Shin Bet under Section
7(a) for matters that do not concern “national security” in its narrow meaning,
but such matters must be of a high level of danger to Israel’s citizens
requiring immediate action through usage of the Shin Bet for a limited time
period, and for which no appropriate alternatives can be produced quickly
enough to thwart such an extreme threat of peril.117 The Court determined
that the pandemic met the requirements of an immediate high level of danger
to Israel’s citizens that legally justified the government’s utilization of the
Shin Bet for contact tracing on a short-term basis.118 However, the Court
held that the Shin Bet’s surveillance could not be extended more than a few
more weeks on an emergency basis after its ruling, and that in order for it to
continue, formal legislation by the Knesset would be required.119
III.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LAW

The United States, EU, and Israel all have some semblance of a
“constitution” in place to protect certain rights of its citizens.120 The United
States and Israel are both lacking certain legislative safeguards to fully
protect their citizens’ privacy related to COVID-19 digital contact tracing
approaches.121 Administrative agencies of both the United States and the EU
have issued guidance to assist with privacy-related concerns.122 However,
114.

Meir PD 34 (2020); Or-Hof & Perelman-Farhi, supra note 113.

115.

Chachko, supra note 111.

116.

Id.

117.

Meir PD 3 (2020).

118.

Id. at 4.

119.

Id. at 5; Or-Hof & Perelman-Farhi, supra note 113.

120. Wilfred Owen, United States: Government and Society, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://
www.britannica.com/place/United-States/Transportation#ref233792 (last visited July 19, 2020); Gabel,
supra note 66; Ochsenwald, supra note 91.
121.

DISCLOSURES, supra note 39, at 3; see also Or-Hof & Perelman-Farhi, supra note 113.

122.

DISCLOSURES, supra note 39, at 1; Protection of Natural Persons, supra note 75, arts. 1–2.
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there are more differences in existing law amongst the United States, EU,
and Israel than there are similarities.
The United States has no comprehensive laws in place to protect
personal data collected by commercial technology companies through
contact tracing mobile applications.123 It is unclear at this time whether any
of the pending U.S. Senate bills will be passed during the current COVID-19
pandemic in the United States. As a result, any government decision to
utilize a contact tracing application, whether by an individual state or
nationwide, would not be governed by federal privacy laws that uniformly
and fully protect the public’s personally identifiable and personal health
information gathered through the use of such an application. By contrast, the
EU does have laws governing the collection, usage, and retention of such
data.124 Yet, the U.K. Human Rights Committee Chair, Harriet Harman,
believes a law specifically tailored to govern COVID-19 contact tracing
applications is needed: “[c]urrently the protection is spread between the
GDPR, the Data Protection Act 2018, case law on privacy and the European
Convention on Human Rights, and it’s a tangle of law which never envisaged
the sort of contact-tracing app that is now about to be brought in.” 125
However, regardless of whether the GDPR is truly sufficient in its current
form to govern data privacy concerns in relation to contact tracing application
usage, the United States has no comprehensive federal legislation that is
comparable to the GDPR in the areas of privacy and data protection.126 The
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides privacy protection in
certain areas without specifically using the term “privacy.” 127 Personal
health data is governed by HIPAA to the extent that covered entities are
involved in the data collection and processing.128 U.S. citizens have the right
to access their own personal health data under HIPAA, but unlike citizens in
the EU pursuant to the safeguards under the GDPR, “patients have no ‘right
to be forgotten’ or erasure.”129
The most significant difference amongst the United States, the EU, and
Israel is that, although all three have some semblance of privacy laws in place
to protect its citizens, Israel had its existing privacy laws put to the test
relative to its chosen COVID-19 contact tracing method and in large part

123.

See Wilson, supra note 25, at 18.

124.

Protection of Natural Persons, supra note 75, art. 1.

125. Rezzan Huseyin, Switzerland First to Roll Out Contact-Tracing App Using Apple-Google
APIs, Amidst Continuing Controversy, 20 PRIVACY AND DATA PROT. 1, 18 (2020).
126.

Determann, supra note 81, at 241.

127.

Id.

128.

Id.

129.

Id.

348092-ILSA_International_27-1_Text.indd 82

12/11/20 1:36 PM

Trotogott

2020]

71

failed per Israel’s Supreme Court ruling in Meir.130 If the United States chose
to surveil its citizens for contact tracing purposes in the same type of covert
manner as Israel did, and did not require its citizens to provide consent by
choosing to participate in the tracing at their option, then based on Carpenter
and regardless of the type of technology platform being used, such type of
contact tracing would most likely be deemed an unconstitutional search
under the Fourth Amendment.131
COMPARISON OF APPROACHES TO CONTACT TRACING

IV.

In the United States, Apple and Google have developed a digital contact
tracing application with a network that relies on Bluetooth technology to
detect other devices in the vicinity and alert users if they have been in contact
with COVID-19 Cases.132 Apple and Google represent that their system will
not collect personally identifiable information or user location data, and that
Cases who share their COVID-19 diagnosis on the digital application will
not have their identities disclosed to other users. 133 The Apple/Google
Bluetooth platform uses beacons to detect location data and then anonymizes
that data using a decentralized system, which means the data is stored locally
on the users’ phone rather than in a centralized database.134 Although Google
and Apple have encouraged each country to utilize a single application for
contact tracing, the United States has not taken a national, unified approach
in its response to COVID-19, which includes its decision to use or not use
contact-tracing applications. 135 Some states are using contact tracing
applications that rely on Bluetooth technology, others are using GPS-based
platforms, and most states are not using a contact tracing application at all,
which has raised concerns of confusing the applications’ users and also
making contact tracing more difficult as users cross state lines.136 As of late
130. Meir PD 5 (2020); see also Covid-19 tracing apps: ensuring privacy and data protection,
EUR. PARLIAMENT, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/ 20200429STO 78174/
covid-19-tracing-apps-ensuring-privacy-and-data-protection (last updated July 27, 2020); Protection of
Natural Persons, supra note 75; see General Security Service Law, SH No. 5762 (2002) (Isr.); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
131. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213; see also TEHILLA SHWARTZ ALTSHULER & RACHEL
ARIDOR HERSHKOVITZ, DIGITAL CONTACT TRACING AND THE CORONAVIRUS: ISRAELI AND
COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES
2–3
(2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/FP_20200803_ digital _contact_tracing.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2020).
132.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 5.

133.

Id.

134. Chas Kissick et al., What Ever Happened to Digital Contact Tracing?, LAWFARE (July 21,
2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-ever-happened-digital-contact-tracing.
135.

Id.

136.

Id.
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summer 2020, only North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Rhode Island,
and Utah are utilizing contact tracing applications.137 In Utah, after a few
months of releasing the application, Utah announced it was inactivating the
location tracking feature in the application due to the public’s lack of
comfort-level with the tracking aspect and would utilize the application going
forward as a COVID-19 information hub for its users.138 Thus far, the only
state appearing to have success with its application is Rhode Island, where
its “Crush COVID RI” has been downloaded 60,000 times and the state was
the first in the United States to test twenty percent of its population.139
Like the United States, the EU had difficulties in achieving a unified
approach with a single choice of a digital contact-tracing application for its
Member States.140 As a result, some individual member countries proceeded
with their own digital applications.141 For example, Switzerland chose an
application called “SwissCovid” which utilizes the Apple/Google
platform.142 Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal published a joint
statement expressing frustration that the Apple/Google application platform
restricts the government’s ability to extract virus data and patient locations,
yet many countries chose a version of the Apple/Google solution because
they simply could not find another viable digital solution. 143 Germany
ultimately decided it would utilize the Apple/Google application, favoring its
decentralization of data only being stored on devices.144 The outliers are
France and the U.K.145 France is using “StopCovid,” developed by French
companies utilizing Bluetooth that is always activated. 146 As a result, a
significant efficiency challenge for the EU in contact tracing application
effectiveness will be the ability, or lack thereof, for these different

137.

Id.

138. Bethany Rodgers, Utah’s Expensive Coronavirus App Won’t Track People’s Movements
Anymore its Key Feature, SALT LAKE TRIB. (July 11, 2020), https://www.sltrib.com/news/
politics/2020/07/11/states-m-healthy-together.
139.

Kissick et al., supra note 134.

140. Natasha Lomas, How Will Europe’s Coronavirus Contact-Tracing Apps Work Across
Borders?, TECHCRUNCH (May 15, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/05/15/how-will-europescoronavirus-contacts-tracing-apps-work-across-borders.
141.

See Huseyin, supra note 125, at 18.

142.

Id.

143. Id.; see Ben Lovejoy, More countries adopting or switching to Apple/Google contact
tracing API, 9TO5Mac (June 4, 2020), https://9to5mac.com/2020/06/04/switching-to-apple.
144.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 6.

145.

Huseyin, supra note 125, at 18.

146.

Id.
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applications to interface and share data by interoperating effectively in a
region of multiple countries.147
In Israel, per its Supreme Court ruling in Meir, legislation from the
Knesset will be required in order for the government’s contact tracing
program involving the Shin Bet to continue.148 What is notable overall is that
when considering opt-in contact tracing applications, researchers are not
certain as to the percentage of users that would be required to result in the
efficacy of these applications. 149 Some researchers estimate that eighty
percent of a population’s participation would be required to be effective,
while other researchers have stated that even a ten percent participation rate
could slow the rate of COVID-19 infections.150
V.

CONCLUSION

As Israel’s Supreme Court stated in Meir, “these are days of national
and worldwide crisis of dimensions and scope the likes of which we have not
known.”151
As U.S. citizens are encouraged to get tested for COVID-19, even
waivers of privacy rights regarding sample collections at COVID-19 testing
locations open to the public and subsequent test processing can be a cause
for concern. For example, consider the following language from the Florida
COVID-19 Test Consent and Authorization online document presented to me
when I attempted to sign up for a testing service recommended on Twitter by
the Florida Division of Emergency Management:152
II. HIPAA Authorization
I hereby consent to and authorize (i) the disclosure of my
completed Test to the Labs [defined as “one or more independent
clinical laboratories”] in order to permit the Labs to analyze and
interpret my Test, and (ii) the disclosure of my Test results in any
manner permitted by federal or state privacy and security laws.
This consent and authorization is valid as of the day this document
is signed by me and expires after one (1) year.
In addition, I understand and acknowledge the following:
147.

Lomas, supra note 140.

148.

Meir PD 34 (2020).

149.

Kissick et al., supra note 134.

150.

Id.

151.

Meir PD 1 (2020).

152. Florida Division of Emergency Management (@FLSERT), TWITTER (JULY 21, 2020, 4:44
PM), https://twitter.com/FLSERT/status/1285677159902859264.
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1. I understand that I have the right to revoke this consent and
authorization at any time that I so choose by notifying eTrueNorth.
If I revoke this consent and authorization, I understand that the
revocation would only apply after I notify eTrueNorth.
2. I understand that my consent and authorization will result in the
use or disclosure of my protected health information. Though
precautions will be taken to protect the confidentiality of this
protected health information, I understand that the transmission of
protected health information presents risks and that the
confidentiality of such information may be compromised by
failures of security safeguards or illegal tampering.
3. I understand that I may receive a copy of this consent and
authorization by accessing “DoINeedaCovid19test.com” or by
calling (800) 635-8611.153

This consent and authorization to transmit protected health information
to a testing agency, recommended by the state government with the
knowledge that such health information may be compromised due to
“failures of security safeguards or illegal tampering” may be realistic, but it
does not bode well for the encouragement of the publics’ trust.154 Arguably,
a person presented with such a waiver of rights requirement before obtaining
a test, that such person felt was necessary to protect his or her health as well
as family members from virus transmission, may be averse to trusting a
contact tracing application to have adequate data protection safeguards. “The
core associated concern for Coronavirus apps generally, and interoperability
specifically, is that users need to be able to trust apps to use them.”155 Florida
is one of the many states that have elected not to utilize an application.156 As
reported in the New York Times, the Florida Department of Health has hired
1600 college students, along with epidemiologists and other staff, to conduct
contact tracing manually, which is roughly a third of the amount of contact
tracers recommended per capita by the National Association of County and
City Health Officials.157 One of the college students hired by the state to
153. COVID-19 Test Consent and Authorization, ETRUENORTH, https://www.doineeda
covid19test.com/consentandauthorization.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2020).
154.

Id.

155.

Lomas, supra note 140.

156. See Zac Hall, Which U.S. States Are Using Apple’s Exposure Notification API For Covid19 Contact Tracing?, 9TO5Mac, https://9to5mac.com/2020/10/01/covid-19-exposure-notification-apistates/ (last updated Oct. 26, 2020, 9:00 AM).
157. Patricia Mazzei, As the Coronavirus Surged, Florida Partied Without Enough Contact
Tracing, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/06/us/coronavirus-floridamiami.html.
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conduct contact tracing, Dalton Price, initially only had a few to several
COVID-19 Cases to contact each day, but now he and his fellow contact tracers
have over a hundred Cases to contact, resulting in significantly shorter
interviews with each Case due to lack of resources.158 Mr. Price has indicated
that it is so overwhelming that the Florida tracers are expediting each Case
investigation now, such that if a person does not have severe symptoms, the
tracers will tell the Case to inform their own contacts that they should selfquarantine and will only get a “general idea” of where the Case has been
without monitoring all of their contacts.159 As COVID-19 Cases in Florida
continue to spike, a contact tracing application could potentially increase
efficiency in such a situation.
Ideally, contact tracing would be a global, interoperable technology
approach when travel restrictions are relaxed, but at the very least each
system of government should be sharing data in real time to identify and
quickly contain outbreaks when they occur. As FTC Commissioner Wilson
noted:
[a] recent Washington Post/University of Maryland poll found that
60% of Americans are not willing or able to use the contact-tracing
app that Apple and Google are developing. If public health
authorities are going to rely on these apps, then researchers,
companies, and governments need to bridge the trust gap.160

We need preemptive federal legislation if we expect the public trust to
reach a level wherein usage of the application will be significant enough to
be effective, especially in a time when personal liberty to Americans is so
paramount that they refuse to wear masks. It should be comprehensive
legislation to resolve current ambiguities in the gaps left in HIPAA and FTC
regulations as it pertains to phone applications gathering personal
information, but part of its safeguards should also be that the data is purged
after a reasonable period of time. The collection of data should be
proportional to what is necessary for the intended purpose; that is,
understanding that “for a short time, health and safety issues may take
precedence over some privacy protections” but privacy concerns cannot be
ignored, as “privacy and data security missteps can cause irrevocable
harm.”161
However, this may ultimately be a moot point. According to Dr. Peter
Hotez, Dean of Tropical Medicine at Baylor College of Medicine, “the cases
158.

Id.

159.

Id.

160.

Wilson, supra note 25, at 20.

161.

Id. at 11.
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are rising so rapidly (across the South and Southwest in the United States),
that we cannot even do contact tracing anymore. I don’t see how it’s possible
to even do that.” 162 As noted above, the United States has incurred
8,081,489 COVID-19 Cases resulting in 218,511 deaths. 163 And as Dr.
Aileen M. Marty, an infectious disease professor at Florida International
University, told the New York Times, “[c]ontact tracing and testing is a tool
for action, and that’s not the way we’ve been using it in the United States,
for the most part . . .When you do it right, testing and contact tracing can
eliminate the virus from the community.”164
“We failed to act.”165

162. Madeline Holcombe, Contact tracing is no longer possible across the US South due to virus
surges, health expert says, CNN (July 7, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/coronaviruspandemic-07-07-20-intl/h_54d4d91728301ea6e136a29467bc8114.
163.

Cases in the U.S., supra note 33.

164.

Mazzei, supra note 157.

165.

Id.
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WHERE THERE IS A WILL, THERE IS NO WAY:
COVID-19 AND A CASE FOR THE RECOGNITION
OF E-WILLS IN INDIA AND OTHER COMMON
LAW JURISDICTIONS
Naman Anand* & Dikshi Arora**
ABSTRACT
The question of providing due recognition to E-Wills is not a new one.
As industries across the world increasingly rely upon technology during
the global outbreak of COVID-19, it should come as no surprise that
legal professionals have renewed their interest in the present topic.
However, at the outset, we must view the present situation with a
simultaneous sense of both caution and excitement. If we keep the
technological dangers apart (in arguendo), the present situation opens
the door for courts to intervene and to bring about a sudden overhaul of
the ancién Family and Succession Law regime in commonwealth nations.
But on the other hand, numerous hurdles exist—namely with regard to
the recording and testing of the genuineness of an E-Will, for example.
The question of the validity of an E-Will in probate cases under the
Succession Acts of various common law countries is also an interesting
one. This article seeks to move a step ahead from Ghatak by analyzing
how two years on from her 2017 publication, the COVID-19 crisis has,
in all probability, made major common law jurisdictions (with a focus on
India, the most populous and judicially overburdened of them all) move
into the uncharted territory of recognizing E-Wills as a necessity.
Further, this article addresses how the courts can retain their active role
and thus obviate the need for a legislative process (presumably, a hushed
ordinance) in order to formalize the inclusion of digital methodology.
KEYWORDS: COVID-19, Comparative Law, Common Law, Family
Law, E-Wills, Probate
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the World Health Organization’s declaration of the COVID-19
outbreak as a pandemic,1 the usage of technology has surely risen to the
forefront of legal affairs.2 From online dispute resolution3 to rescue
mergers,4 legal professionals are now reorganizing their lives over the
“World Wide Web.”5 Thus, it does not require a “Sherlock Holmes” to
infer that individuals today would like to make sure that their legal
documents, such as wills or codicils, can be signed, uploaded, and stored
online so that when the time comes, the benefactors could access them
with ease.6 Wills are documents that can easily influence the legacy of
*
Naman Anand is the Founder and Managing Editor of the Indian Journal of Projects,
Infrastructure, and Energy Law (IJPIEL). He is presently a third-year B.A. LL.B. (Honours) student
at the Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab and is a Nominated Member at
the RGNUL Financial and Mercantile Law Review (RFMLR). He can be reached at
namananand.esq@gmail.com. Special thanks to Dr. Paramjit S. Jaswal (Hon’ble Vice Chancellor,
RGNUL) and Dr. Ruchi Anand (Dept. of Commerce, DAV College, Chd.) for their active support
and guidance.
**
Dikshi Arora is a Junior Editor at the Indian Journal of Projects, Infrastructure, and
Energy Law (IJPIEL). She is presently a second-year B.A. LL.B. (Honours) student at the Rajiv
Gandhi National University of Law (RGNUL), Punjab.
She can be reached at
dikshiarora@rgnul.ac.in.
1.
Rachel Rettner, Coronavirus outbreak finally declared a pandemic, WHO says, LIVE
SCI. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.livescience.com/coronavirus-pandemic-who.html.
2.
Lyle Moran, Will the COVID-19 pandemic fundamentally remake the legal industry?,
ABA J. (Aug. 1, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/will-the-covid-19-pandemicfundamentally-remake-the-legal-industry.
3.
Bhaven Shah & Mehak Vohra, Justice in 2020: BC (Before Corona), DC (During
Corona) and AC (After Corona), LAWYERED (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.lawyered.in/legaldisrupt/articles/justice-2020-bc-corona-dc-during-corona-and-ac-after-corona/.
4.
Paolo Palmigiano, Louisa Penny & Pauline Bénézet-Toulze, Competition law and
coronavirus:
what’s the connection?, TAYLOR WESSING (Apr. 2, 2020), https://unitedkingdom.taylorwessing.com/en/competition-law-and-coronavirus-whats-the-connection.
5.

See Moran, supra note 2.

6.
See Simon Goldring & Simon Gibb, Where There’s a Will There’s a Way – Executing
Wills During COVID-19, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.mwe.com/it/insights/where-theres-a-will-theres-a-way-executing-wills-during-covid19.

348092-ILSA_International_27-1_Text.indd 90

12/11/20 1:36 PM

Anand & Arora

2020]

79

the person who writes it as well as the lives of those who were related to
him or her.7 The plot gets murkier when we consider the fact that there
is a global pandemic going on.8 With “lockdowns” turning into the new
normal,9 the probate registration procedure is also delayed, with its legal
ramifications being debated and enumerated by experts across the
world.10 This is especially true across common law jurisdictions rife with
archaic family law legislations dating back to the times of the British
Empire.11 Hotly contested legal claims over both intestate and
testamentary succession are a common phenomenon in India, with
litigation periods spanning across over two decades in certain cases.12
For example, one of the authors witnessed a Regular Second Appeal
concerning a succession dispute filed in 1984.13 When we take into
account the effects of the ongoing pandemic, the process of recognizing
digitized wills is indeed neither unwarranted nor an act that should be
delayed.14
II.

MAKING LAWS PANDEMIC PROOF

Although the Indian Succession Act came into force only six years
after the end of the world’s last major pandemic—the Spanish Flu of
1918–19 totaling over seventeen million deaths in India15—the

7.
See Ben Geler, What Is a Will, and How Do You Write Your Own?, SMARTASSET (Feb.
24, 2020), https://smartasset.com/estate-planning/what-is-a-will.
8.

Rettner, supra note 1.

9.
Zahrah Mazhar, Humans
https://www.dawn.com/news/1558250.

Under

Lockdown,

DAWN

(May

22,

2020),

10.
Corina S. Weigl et al., Pandemics, Policy, Probate, Powers of Attorney and Private
Client
Services:
We’re
Here
to
Help,
FASKEN
(Mar.
25,
2020),
https://www.fasken.com/en/knowledge/2020/03/24-covid-19-pandemics-policy-probate-powersof-attorney.
11.
Marry Ann Glendon et al., Common Law, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Nov. 29, 2019),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/common-law; Divorce law: Plans to overhaul ‘archaic’ laws
revealed, BBC (Sept. 15, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-45525979.
12.
Vishal Gada, Succession is the biggest challenge being faced by Indian families,
CAMPDEN FB (Jan. 24, 2019), http://www.campdenfb.com/article/succession-biggest-challengebeing-faced-indian-families; Ashwini Kumar Sharma, 3 steps to take when you inherit a property,
MINT, https://www.livemint.com/Money/57stHYz0srQrzTOrujoOfM/3-steps-to-take-when-youinherit-a-property.html (last updated Dec. 23, 2015).
13.

Jagir Singh v. Dalip Kaur, AIR 1996 PH 158 (India).

14.
See Kyle B. Gee, The COVID-19 Pandemic Raises the Importance of Understanding
Whether and When Documents May Be Signed Electronically and Witnessed or Notarized Remotely,
BAKER HOSTETLER (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/the-covid-19-pandemicraises-the-importance-of-understanding-whether-and-when-documents-may-be-signedelectronically-and-witnessed-or-notarized-remotely.
15.
I.D. Mills, The 1918-19 Influenza Pandemic: The Indian Experience, 23 INDIAN
ECON. & SOC. HIST. REV. 1, 7–10 (1986).
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legislation had no specific provision to deal with the execution of wills
in case of a pandemic.16
This lacuna and its effect, particularly on section 63,17 was noted by
the 110th Law Commission of India Report in 1985, which recommended
easing the formalities relating to the execution of a will in situations
where the individual wishing to execute a will perceives a very high
threat of death, and that situations of “pestilence” must be considered
and suggested an amendment.18 Sadly, the same was never done and the
law—as it stands today—possesses no provision as to safeguard the
interests of individuals in the case of a pandemic.19
This paper shall progress in three parts. It shall first look at the
challenges that traditional governance structures in India might face in
the recognition of electronic wills (E-Wills). The second part shall
address how to deal with the same. The third part shall contain a
concluding note and the author’s own analysis.
III. ADMISSIBILITY BEFORE LAW

In common law nations, three broad requirements are needed in
order for a court to consider a will as legitimate.20 The requirements are:
1) the will must be rendered in writing;
2) the will must be signed; and
3) the will must have been attested to by a stipulated amount
of individuals, who shall act as witnesses.21

It is interesting to note that, in India, even an illegible or incomplete
mark can be considered as signifying the intent of the testator.22 The
same has also been further held to possess evidentiary value.23 It is even
more appreciable to note that wills in India do not require a stamp duty
or notarization, which has turned into a legal hurdle in jurisdictions, such

16.
Radhika Gaggar, India–Wills in the Time of Corona: Challenges And Solutions,
CONVENTUS L. (Apr. 2, 2020), http://www.conventuslaw.com/report/india-wills-in-the-time-ofcorona-challenges-and.
17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

Id.

20.
John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489,
490 (1975).
21.

Id.

K.H. Kaji & Manish K. Kaji, The Entire Law On The Making Of Wills, ITATONLINE
1,
3
https://itatonline.org/articles_new/wpcontent/files/The_Entire_Law_On_The_Making_Of_Wills.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2020).
22.

23.

See Rakesh Mohindra v. Anita Beri, (2015) 16 SCC 483, 6 (India).
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as in the United States.24 Excluding wills that are intermingled with
religious laws, a vast majority of laws relating to succession in India are
attributable to the British Raj—originating from the Wills Act of 1837.25
Thus, an analysis of the United Kingdom and other common law
jurisdictions is necessary as legislators continuously vie to shoehorn EWills into the existing framework of things.26
IV. A LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS RELATED
TO E-WILLS ACROSS SIX COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS
A.

The United States

The United States has been the pioneer of data protection laws
across the world, enacting the Stored Communications Act (SCA) in
1986—as part of Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act—to provide a regulatory framework for electronic communications
held by third party Internet Service Providers (ISPs).27 The Act has been
criticized for being archaic and unable to meet the challenges of modern
technology, particularly as to how useful it shall be in protecting the
rights of individuals who choose to store their data, such as wills, with
third party ISPs on the Internet.28 Although certain progressive decisions,
such as the Act’s usage to disallow school authorities to spy on their
students, have occurred,29 United States courts have attained notoriety for
rendering convoluted decisions by literally construing the existing statute
as it stood in 1986 or by excluding the act altogether.30 Thus, these terse

24.
Shabnum Kajiji, It is not necessary to register a Will for it to be valid, MINT,
https://www.livemint.com/Money/x7Yh40v1N3m7qToh1uvCkP/It-is-not-necessary-to-register-aWill-for-it-to-be-valid.html (last updated June 15, 2015).
25.
See generally Wills Act 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26 (Eng.); Stanley A. Wolpert,
British Raj, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/British-raj (last updated Sept.
8, 2020); Shekhar Agrawal, Succession Laws in India in a Nutshell, L. POINT,
https://www.thelawpoint.com/post/succession-laws-in-india-inanutshell?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=LinkedIn-integration
(last updated June 26, 2020); see generally Raj Rani, “Testamentary Succession: A Comparative
Study of Family Laws in Indian Context” 1, 3–5 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Maharshi
Dayanand University) (on file with author) https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/132452.
26.

Gee, supra note 14.

27.
CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41733, PRIVACY: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT 6 (Oct. 9, 2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712.
28.
Meera Unnithan Sossasamon, Subpoenas and Social Networks: Fixing the Stored
Communications Act in a Civil Litigation Context, 57 LOY. L. REV. 619, 635–36 (2011).
29.
Robbins v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. No. 10-655, 2010 WL 3421026, at 8, 18 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 30, 2010).
30.

See O’Grady v. Superior, 139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 1431–32, 1440–41 (Cal. Ct. App.

2006).
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decisions have left individuals with little to no data protection or
privacy.31

1.

Taylor v. Holt: A Convoluted Scholastic Precedent

One of the earliest recognized common law cases pertaining to the
recognition of E-Wills is the Supreme Court of Tennessee’s 2003
judgment in Taylor v. Holt.32 In this case, the testator wrote a will on his
personal computer and signed the last page of the document by signing
his name in a cursive font, thus, clearly distinguishing it from the rest of
the document.33 A legal battle then ensued between the decedent’s
girlfriend, the sole beneficiary of the electronic will, and the decedent’s
sister, who would have been the sole intestate beneficiary as per the laws
of the State.34 The Court held that the definition of the term “signature,”
as per the law, was “any other symbol or methodology executed or
adopted by a party with intention to authenticate a writing or record.”35
On the basis of the aforementioned facts, the Court’s decision seems
highly liberal and progressive.36 However, Boddery37 very rightly notes
the fact that most commentaries on this leading case ignore key details—
that two disinterested neighbors, whom by sheer chance came to visit the
testator at his residence, happened to witness the e-signature process, and
that no remote witnesses were involved.38 When these facts are analyzed
in a proper manner, it seems highly evident that the Court’s decision is
possibly a convenient application of the “harmless error” rule39 rather
than the highly progressive quantum leap it is projected as by numerous
legal scholars.40 It is important to note that as of 2020, Nevada,41
Arizona,42 Florida,43 and Indiana44 remain the only states to make E-Wills

31.
In re Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2703(d), 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 127 (E.D. Va. 2011);
Daniel Shickich, What Your Tweet Doesn't Say: Twitter, Non-Content Data, and the Stored
Communications Act, 8 WASH. J.L., TECH. & ARTS 457, 472 (2013).
32.

Taylor v. Holt, 134 S.W. 3d 830, 830–31 (2003).

33.

Id. at 830–31.

34.

Id. at 831.

35.

See id. at 833 (quoting TENN. CODE. ANN. § 1-3-105 (27) (1999)).

36.

See id.

37.
Scott S. Boddery, Electronic Wills: Drawing a Line in the Sand Against Their Validity,
47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L. J. 197, 197 (2012).
38.

Id. at 202–03.

39.

Id. at 203.

40.

Id. at 202.

41.

NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.085 (2019).

42.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2518 (LexisNexis 2020).

43.

FLA. STAT. § 731.201(40) (2019).

44.

IND. CODE § 29-1-21-1 (2020).
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fully legal.45 Additionally, Pennsylvania has temporarily suspended
statutes requiring notaries to be physically present and has allowed
remote notarization of estate planning, such as wills, during COVID-19.46
Despite the catastrophic loss of lives caused by COVID-19 in the
country,47 the future still seems bright for E-Wills in the United States as
Wisconsin joined twenty-two other states in approving the Remote
Online Notarization (RON) mechanism, widely seen as a gateway to
permit E-Wills under a few state laws in the United States.48 With the
United States being the most affected nation across the world (with
respect to the COVID-19 outbreak)49 many state governments in the
United States have introduced numerous emergency measures.50
Most notably, the Governor of Georgia, on April 8, 2020, issued an
executive order enabling the suspension of the mandatory requirement of
proceeding with notary and witness-related formalities until May 30,
2020.51 Pennsylvania has also suspended in-person requirements for real
estate related transactions.52
Delaware also issued an eleventh
modification to its “Declaration of a State of Emergency,” authorizing
succession and notary activities via audio-visual means.53 As of today,
Vermont is the only state where e-recordings are not legally acceptable
in any form, although the process of e-recording varies by state.54 Certain
45.
GERRY W. BEYER, ELECTRONIC WILLS–WHAT ESTATE PLANNERS NEED TO KNOW
(Oct.
2019),
https://www.ti-trust.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/PT-Newsletter-October2019.pdf.
46.
Amanda DiChello & Cozen O’Connor, Pennsylvania Allows Remote Notarization Of
Estate Planning Documents During COVID-19 Crisis, JD SUPRA (Apr. 24, 2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/pennsylvania-allows-remote-notarization-72039.
47.
Marty Johnson, U.S. Reports More Than 25,000 Deaths in July, HILL (Aug. 1, 2020),
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/510103-us-posts-more-than-25000-covid-19-deaths-in-july.
48.
(May 14,
35244.

Sun Lee & Jeffrey Page, UPDATE: E-Signatures and Remote Notarization, JD SUPRA
2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/update-e-signatures-and-remote-online-

49.
U.S., the world’s hardest-hit country, reaches 5m coronavirus cases, ALJAZEERA
(Aug. 9, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/08/world-hardest-hit-country-reaches-5mcoronavirus-cases-200809143758394.html.
50.
State Data and Policy Actions to Address Coronavirus, KFF,
https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/state-data-and-policy-actions-to-address-coronavirus/
(last updated Oct. 23, 2020).
51.
Exec. Order No. 04.09.20.01, GOVERNOR BRIAN P. KEMP OFF. GOVERNOR (Apr. 9,
2020), https://gov.georgia.gov/executive-action/executive-orders/2020-executive-orders.
52.
Charles Morris, Lauren Capitini, & Maddie Bailey, Remote online notarization and
COVID-19, REJOURNALS (Apr. 14, 2020), https://rejournals.com/remote-online-notarization-andcovid-19.
53.
EXEC. DEP’T DOVER, ELEVENTH MODIFICATION OF THE DECLARATION OF A STATE
EMERGENCY FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE DUE TO A PUBLIC HEALTH THREAT (2020),
https://governor.delaware.gov/health-soe/eleventh-state-of-emergency.
OF

54.
The Basics of E-Recording, AM. LAND TITLE ASS’N. BLOG (June 25, 2019, 1:11 PM),
https://blog.alta.org/2019/06/the-basics-of-e-recording.html.
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states, such as Hawaii, have mechanisms to validate e-recordings for
numerous purposes, including wills.55
In addition to the state law amendments, a valiant effort has also been
made to enact a federal law paving the way for completing legal
formalities through virtual means.56 On March 18, 2020, Kevin
Cramer—a Republican Senator from North Dakota—introduced The
Securing and Enabling Commerce Using Remote and Electronic
Notarization (SECURE) Act of 2020.57 The Act shall empower every
registered public notary in the United States to perform their jobs via
the RON mechanism.58 What is particularly appreciable is the Act’s
utilization of “multi-factor authentication” in order to prevent
fraudulent practices,59 which can indeed turn out to be a pioneering
effort in case this bill becomes law.60 As of now, it has been read twice
and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. 61
B.

South Africa

The Electronic Communication Transaction Act (ECT) is the central
legislation pertaining to all matters related to data stored in an electronic
form in South Africa.62 The Act was passed in 2002 and amended once
in 200863 to recognize electronic data transmission and “promote
universal access to electronic communications . . . transactions[,] and the
use of electronic transactions by SMMEs [Small, Medium and Micro
Enterprises].”64 However, section 4(4) of the ECT Act places several
restrictions before any form of electronic data can be recognized as a
valid will under the Wills Act 7 of 1953.65 The two most major
restrictions are: (1) conclusive proof of the fact that the testator has
indeed made the will by his or her own self, or of their own volition; and
(2) the document was accepted by the testator as final and not as a draft
55.
Bureau of Conveyances E-RECORDING, ST. OF HAW. BUREAU OF CONVEYANCES,
https://dlnr.hawaii.gov/boc/e-recording (last visited Sept. 11, 2020).
56.
Securing and Enabling Commerce Using Remote and Electronic Notarization Act,
S.3533, 116th Cong. § 3 (2020).
57.

Id. § 1.

58.

Id. § 3.

59.
Id. § 4 (describing multiple factors used in authenticating electronic wills); David
Strom, Exploring multifactor authentication benefits and technology, SEARCH SECURITY (Jan.
2019),
https://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/The-fundamentals-of-MFA-Multifactorauthentication-in-the-enterprise.
60.

See generally S.3533; Strom, supra note 59.

61.

S.3533.

62.

See Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 (S. Afr.).

63.

Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 § 1 (S. Afr.).

64.

Electronic Communications and Transactions, pmbl. (S. Afr.).

65.
Wills Act 7 of 1953 § 2 (S. Afr.); Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, §
4(4) (S. Afr.).
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version.66 These two restrictions have generally led to courts adopting a
skeptical opinion regarding probate matters, where the validity of a will
is contingent solely on an electronic document.67 This skepticism renders
the purpose of section 2(1)(c) of the legislation, seeking to “promote the
understanding and, acceptance of and growth in the number of electronic
transactions in the Republic,” as altogether redundant.68
The landmark 2002 judgment of MacDonald is one of the few cases
in which South African courts have gone ahead and interpreted the ECT
Act in a liberal manner.69 In this case, the deceased, a former
International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) employee,
committed suicide and left four notes stating that his last and final will
and testament was stored in the hard drive of his computer.70 The legal
question that arose was whether the retrieved electronic will, which was
not signed by the decedent or any witnesses, was a valid will or not.71
The Court was quick to note that, although the will failed to satisfy South
African law, it validated the will by applying a “rescue” provision under
section 2(3) of the Act by which courts can validate prima facie illegal
wills, provided the intention to make the same is manifest and bonafide.72 Clearly, extreme factual circumstances led to this decision,73 and
thereafter, the Court adopted such approaches sparingly—with a
subsequent High Court decision reducing the rescue provision’s mandate
solely to cases where it can be proved that the testator drafted the
document under question themselves.74
C.

Canada

Recently, provinces—such as Ontario and Quebec—have made
emergency provisions allowing virtual witnessing and other procedures
related to the making of E-Wills.75 In April 2020, the Ontario
government amended its Emergency Management and Civil Protection
Act in order to promote the continuance of the steady execution of estate

66.

Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, §§ 13(3)(a), (5)–14 (S. Afr.).

67.
David Burton, Where You Can Go Wrong with a Do-It-Yourself Will, CNBC (Jan. 17,
2013), https://www.cnbc.com/id/100388275.
68.

See Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, § 2 (S. Afr.).

69.

MacDonald v. The Master 2002 (3) SA 64 (N) at 11 (S. Afr.).

70.

Id. at 2–4.

71.

See id. at 2, 6.

72.

Id. at 7, 13.

73.

Id. at 7.

74.
Young v Master of the High Court, Durban 2015 (2) SA 2 (H) at 5 para. 12, 8 para.
18–19 (S. Afr.).
75.
Michael Rosen et al., Virtual testimony in wills and powers of attorney, BLG,
https://www.blg.com/fr/insights/2020/04/virtual-witnessing-of-wills-and-powers-of-attorney (last
updated May 30, 2020).
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planning documents during the pandemic. 76 On April 7, 2020, virtual
signing of documents was permitted in which the document had to be
passed through three stages (testator to witnesses) for signing, one by
one.77 Later, changes were made to allow three signatories to sign on one
separate and identical document, which would be considered one
document once compiled.78

1.

“Dispensing Powers”

In Rioux v. Coulombe, the police found a note guiding them to an
electronic file in the hard disk stored in the testator’s personal computer
after she committed suicide.79 The note said, “[t]his is my will/Jacqueline
Rioux/1 February 1996,” and the file contained directions of a
testamentary nature, which stated “my credit card amount shall go to, my
house shall go to, etc...”80 However, the note was not followed by a
signature.81 The Court declared the electronic will to be valid under the
“dispensing powers” of Quebec law, despite the absence of the legal
requisites of a will as per Article 726 of the Code Civil du Quebec.82
In Re Buckmeyer Estate, the decedent, John Buckmeyer, sent an
email to the executor of his will mentioning certain additional duties to
be undertaken by the executor prior to reaping the benefits arising out of
the will.83 The question that arose was whether the email was a
testamentary document under section 37 of the Wills Act 1996 or not.84
The Court found that the email was drafted by the testator when his health
was deteriorating, and in his last days, he wanted to give directions to the
executor concerning his funeral services.85 The email was duly signed
by typing his name at the end, which the Court considered as an electronic
signature under The Electronic Information and Documents Act 2000.86
However, the email concerning the directions was not declared as a
testamentary document and, hence, probate was not ordered.87

76.

Id.

77.

See Signatures in Wills and Powers of Attorney O. Reg 129/20 (Can.).

78.
Order Under Subsection 7.02 (4) of the Act - Signatures in Wills and Powers of
Attorney, O. Reg. 164/20, s.1 § 2 para. 1.
79.

Rioux v. Coulombe, 1996 CarswellQue 1226, para. 2 (Can. Que.) (WL).

80.

Id. at para. 3.

81.

Id. at para. 21–30.

82.

Id.; Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c 64, art. 726 (Can.).

83.

Buckmeyer Estate (Re), 2008 SKQB 260 para. 33 (CanLII).

84.

Id. at para. 4.

85.

Id. at para. 5.

86.

Id. at para. 5, 7.

87.

Id. at para. 32.
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After numerous provinces, such as Saskatchewan,88 British
Columbia,89 and Alberta,90 recommended the addition of the same, the
power for the courts to validate prima facie non-compliant wills was
added in the revised version of the Uniform Wills Act in 2015—passed
by the Uniform Law Commission of Canada.91 The Act recommended
that, where a court is satisfied with the evidence presented to prove that
an intention to formulate a will existed, it should declare the document
fully effective even if it is not in accordance with the law.92
British Columbia incorporated this provision in section 58 of the
Wills, Estates and Succession Act.93 Alberta’s legislations do not
prohibit E-Wills, but do not enable them either, creating a convoluted
scenario.94 Saskatchewan, which had otherwise not enacted any
legislation permitting E-Wills, enacted the Wills (Public Emergencies)
Act 2020 on April 16th of this year in order to enable the same during the
COVID-19 period via “remote witnessing,”95 along with mandating
courts to utilize their “dispensing powers” effectively during this period
in line with the 2014 federal legislation.96
D.

United Kingdom

The Victorian-era Wills Act of 1837 is still the primary law
regulating all probate matters in the United Kingdom.97 The Act, as
applied to England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, was amended in 1852,
allowing for a signature anywhere on the document as long as it
represents the testators intent and is physically signed in the presence of
a specified number of witnesses; Scotland law requires that every page
of the will must be signed.98 Nonetheless, the usage of e-signatures and
88.
L. REFORM COMM’N OF SASKA., REPORT ON ELECTRONIC WILLS 26 (2004),
http://lawreformcommission.sk.ca/electwills2.pdf.
89.
B.C. L. INSTIT., BRITISH COLUMBIA SUCCESSION LAW REFORM PROJECT, WILLS,
ESTATES AND SUCCESSION:
A MODERN LEGAL FRAMEWORK 30 (2006),
https://www.bcli.org/sites/default/files/Wills_Estates_and_Succession_Report.pdf.
90.
John Gregory, Electronic Wills Down Under and Closer to Home, SLAW (Jan. 18,
2018), http://www.slaw.ca/2018/01/18/electronic-wills-down-under-and-closer-to-home.
91.

Uniform Wills Act, S.C. 2015, c 10 (Can.).

92.

Id.

93.

Wills, Estates and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c 13, art 58 (Can.).

94.

Gregory, supra note 90.

95.

See The Wills (Public Emergencies) Regulations, S. Gaz. 2020, c L-10.2 s 3–4 (Can.).

96.
Katherine Melnychuk, One Click Away:
Saskatchenwan, 77 SASK. L. REV. 27, 32 (2014).
97.

The Prospect of Electronic Wills in

See generally Wills Act 1837, 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26 (Eng.).

98.
The Wills Act Amendment 1852, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 24, § 1107 (UK); Kenneth Reid,
Testamentary Formalities in Scotland, in TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, 1 COMP. SUCCESSION L.
404, 424–25 (2011); Roger Kerridge, Testamentary Formalities in England and Wales, in
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digital signatures are not uncommon in England.99 Courts in the United
Kingdom have considered typing one’s name at the end of the email as
an electronic signature,100 and the exchange of offer and acceptance via
email may constitute an enforceable agreement.101 The Law Commission
of the United Kingdom launched a public consultation in 2017 to reform
the Wills Act of 1837 by proposing incremental changes, such as
digitalization of the process and mental check-ups for dementia and other
medical conditions prior to rendering a will.102
E.

New Zealand

In New Zealand, The Wills Act 2007 is the federal legislation
governing wills.103 However, in stark contrast with its neighbor
Australia, neither the legislators nor the courts have projected a favorable
attitude towards the recognition of E-Wills.104 The most ideal example
of this approach would be in Re Crawford Estate, wherein the Court
refused to probate a scanned copy of a will. 105 The decedent’s solicitor
had destroyed the original copy under the false presumption that probate
would not be required, and kept the scanned copy.106 The Court held that
section 32 of The Electronic Transactions Act 2002107 mandates parties
to produce the original document for the purpose of evidence and an
electronic version used solely for the purposes of comparison.108 Part 27
of the High Court Rules 2016 deals with the granting of probate by courts
in New Zealand where there is clearly an established practice of not
granting probate where the original document is not available.109 In

TESTAMENTARY FORMALITIES, id. at 311–12; The Wills and Administration Proceedings (Northern
Ireland) Order 1994, SI 1994/1899 (N. Ir. 13) art. 2, ¶ 5.
99.
Britney Pay, The UK’s Electronic Communications Act and Electronic Signatures
Regulation, EFILECABINET (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.efilecabinet.com/the-uks-electroniccommunications-act-and-electronic-signatures-regulation.
100. Stephen Mason, The International Implications of Using Electronic Signatures,
COMPUT. & TELECOMM. L. REV. 161, 161 (2005) (“[w]hen a person types their name on to a file in
electronic format, such as a letter, email, or other form of document, the text added is a form of
electronic signature.” Id.).
101. See Raymond Bieber and Others v. Teathers Ltd. (In Liquidation) [2014] EWHC (Ch)
4205 [56]–[58] (Eng.).
102. Professor Nicholas Hopkins, Project Data on the Public Consultation on E Wills, L.
COMM’N (July 13, 2017), https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/project/wills.
103.

See The Wills Act 2007, pt 1, s 3 (N.Z.).

104.

Re Crawford (deceased), [2014] NZHC 609 at [9] (N.Z.).

105.

Id. at [14]–[15].

106.

Id. at [3].

107.

See Electronic Transactions Act 2002, pt 3, subs 2, s 32 (N.Z.).

108.

Re Crawford (deceased), NZHC 609 at [11].

109.

Id. at [7].
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addition to the aforementioned requirements, the document needs to be
physically available and duly signed by the testator and the witnesses.110
F.

Australia

In Australia, the scenario is markedly different from the
aforementioned jurisdictions.111 It is not uncommon to make a will in an
electronic format under the Succession Act 2006.112 Courts have
probated electronic documents where it shows the decedents
testamentary intent.113 In Yazbek v. Yazbek, before leaving for a holiday,
the testator prepared a testamentary Microsoft Word document named
Will.doc, which was later found on his personal computer after his death
by his family members.114 A legal battle ensued between his brother and
parents, with the former claiming it was a testamentary document where
he is the beneficiary, and the latter claiming that their son died
intestate.115 The legal question that arose before the Hon’ble Courts of
New South Wales was whether a printout or electronic copy of a
testamentary statement is considered a will under section 8 of the
Succession Act 2006.116
The Hon’ble Judge Slattery accepted the electronic document as
Daniel Yazbek’s last will, since the act of typing his name at the end of
the document—in his humble opinion—showed a degree of adoption and
presence of intention.117 Similarly, in Re Yu, the Hon’ble High Court of
Queensland probated the will of Mr. Yu, the deceased, which was stored
on his iPhone.118 The document was prepared like a traditional will and
contained directions for the appointment and replacement of the
executor.119 The Court declared it to be testamentary, legally effective,
and subsequently declared that the document for which probate is sought
satisfies all the requirements.120 The Court also accepted unsent
messages as an enforceable will in Nichol v Nichol, where the messages

110.

Id.

111. Succession Act 2006 [NSW] ch 2, ss 3–5 (Austl.) (stating that the court may dispense
with the requirements of a will when there is evidence relating to the matter or evidence showing the
testators intent).
112. See id. at ch 2, s 6; see generally Mahlo v Hehir [2011] QSC 243 ¶ 44 (Austl.); Yazbek
v Yazbek [2012] NSWSC 594 ¶ 142 (Austl.).
113.

Mahlo, [2011] QSC at ¶ 44; Yazbek, [2012] NSWSC at ¶ 142.

114.

Yazbek, [2012] NSWSC at ¶¶ 4–5.

115.

Id. at ¶ 1.

116.

Id. at ¶ 79–81.

117.

Id.

118.

Re Yu [2013] QSC 322 ¶ 1 (Austl.).

119.

Id. at ¶ 7.

120.

Id. at ¶ 9.
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were found in the phone of the decedent.121 The decedent mentioned the
name of his nephews, ex-girlfriend, and sons in the will, clearly
demarcating and elaborating how his belongings shall be disbursed
amongst all of them.122 The sons then filed a suit claiming intestate
succession with equal disbursement of the testator’s assets amongst
them.123 The Hon’ble Court came to the conclusion that the messages
fulfilled all essential elements to be declared as a will and allowed the
“dispensation of,”124 as the text shows, the testator’s intention, although
the document was not in the format that was required by law.125
V.

E-WILLS, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, AND THE CLOUD
CONUNDRUM: AN INDIA PERSPECTIVE

After the advent of the right to privacy and the Puttaswamy126
judgment in India, the most immediate concern that arises out of the EWill concept is that of privacy and possible data breaches arising out of
the storage of data.127 Section 2(1)(t) of the Information Technology (IT)
Act, 2000 (India) defines an electronic record as “data, record or data
generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form
or micro film or computer generated micro fiche” (emphasis added).128
However, with the emergence of novel technologies such as block-chain
and artificial intelligence, it is important to possibly rethink the
provisions of the IT Act in order to define the term ‘data’ in a more
succinct manner.129 However, that discussion is for another day. Another
crucial question that arises with regard to the evidentiary value of E-Wills
and other forms of electronic documentation in India is whether a
certificate is mandatory while producing electronic evidence under
section 65B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act.130

121.

Nichol v Nichol & Anor [2017] QSC 220 ¶ 12 (Austl.).

122.

Id. at ¶¶ 13, 15.

123.

Id. at ¶ 69.

124.

Id. at ¶ 72.

125.

Id. at ¶ 46.

126.

See Justice KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 (India).

127. See Vrinda Bhandari & Renuka Sane, Protecting Citizens from the State Post
Puttaswamy: Analyzing the Privacy Implications of the Justice Srikrishna Committee Report and
the Data Protection Bill, 2018, 14 SOCIO LEGAL REV. 143 (2018).
128.

Information Technology Act, 2000, No. 21, Acts of Parliament, § 2(1)(t), 2000 (India).

129. Bhavana Alexander & Kayal Manivannan, Disruptive tech like Blockchain is here to
stay, law will have to simply catch up, ECON. TIMES, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/smallbiz/security-tech/technology/disruptivetech-like-blockchain-is-here-to-stay-law-will-have-tosimply-catchup/articleshow/59397014.cms (last updated July 1, 2017).
130.

The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, § 65B(4), 1872 (India).
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Regarding this issue, there exists two conflicting judgements:
Shafhi Mohammad131 and Anvar PV.132 In the former 2018 case, the
Court declared that while producing electronic evidence, the requirement
of a certificate is not always mandatory under section 65B(4) of the
Evidence Act.133 Whereas in the latter 2014 case, the Court admitted that
electronic records—such as CD, Chips, VCD, etc.—can be categorized
as “secondary evidence” and shall be accompanied by the certificate
provision of section 65B.134
The supreme court has now finally addressed this concern in the
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal case.135 The
case was initially put up before a two judge division bench, which
referred it to a three judge bench on July 26, 2019, in order to reconsider
the 2018 Shahfi Mohammad decision in light of the 2014 Anwar PV
judgment.136 The arguments were concluded on March 3, 2020 before
the bench, with written submissions also being concluded by March 7,
2020.137 The judgment had been pronounced and has had a profound
impact on the evidentiary value of electronic documents in India.138 The
Division Bench—led by Nariman, J.—came to the conclusion that the
mandatory requirement of such a certificate is justified so as to prove
“lawful control” of the “primary source evidence” under the Indian
Evidence Act for E-Wills, but becomes “impracticable” when the
evidence can be produced in a physical form.139
With inhibitions rife about the safety of government-based
applications and modalities, such as Aadhar140 and Aarogya Setu,141 the
131.

Shafhi Mohammed v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2018) 2 SCC 801 (India).

132.

Anwar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 (India).

133.

Shafhi Mohammed, (2018) 2 SCC 801, at ¶ 4.

134.

Anwar PV, (2014) 10 SCC 473, at ¶ (4)(a).

135. Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) Supreme Court of
India, Civil Appeal Nos. 20825-20826 (India).
136. Arjun Panditrao Khotkar, Civil Appeal Nos. 20825-20826 at ¶ 2; Case Status,
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, https://main.sci.gov.in/case-status (last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
137.

Case Status, supra note 136.

138.

Arjun Panditrao Khotkar, Civil Appeal Nos. 20825-20826 at ¶ 2.

139. Arjun Panditrao Khotkar, Civil Appeal Nos. 20825-20826 at ¶¶ 1–2, 72; The Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, No. 1, Acts of Parliament, §§ 62, 65 1872 (India).
140. Reetika Khera, The Different Ways in Which Aadhaar Infringes on Privacy, WIRE
(July 19, 2017), https://thewire.in/government/privacy-aadhaar-supreme-court; What is Aadhaar,
IDENTIFICATION
AUTH.
OF
INDIA,
https://uidai.gov.in/what-isUNIQUE
aadhaar.html#:~:text=Aadhaar%20number%20is%20a%2012,enrol%20to%20obtain%20Aadhaar
%20number (last visited Sept. 13, 2020).
141. Andrew Clarance, Aarogya Setu: Why India’s COVID-19 contact tracing app is
controversial, BBC (May 14, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-52659520;
Aarogya Setu data only shared with government officials directly involved in Covid-19 interventions,
'highly encrypted' says Niti Aayog CEO, INDIA TIMES (May 11, 2020),
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role of private players—apart from banks, which in India are not
predominantly public-sector—may come into play.142
However,
bringing in non-banking private players into a hypothetical E-Will
storage market without any solid regulatory framework to support it will
endanger the privacy and legacy of numerous generations to come. 143
India can perhaps draw some inspiration from Australia, which is in the
implementation stage of its Consumer Data Right (CDR) legislations,
allowing consumers to obtain details about any information stored by
private players about them by sending an application (akin to an RTI) to
the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner.144 Such
measures create a robust regulatory framework, which aggressively urges
private players in the market to promote transparency with regards to
consumer data.145
Australia’s personal information protection
legislations, which come with strict safeguards, such as Tasmania’s, are
as old as 2004.146
VI. CONCLUSION
Although E-Wills are definitely going to increase in importance
with the passage of time, three central concerns still remain relevant for

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/aarogya-setu-data-only-shared-withgovernment-officialsdirectly-involved-in-covid-19-interventions-highly-encrypted-saysniti-aayogceo/articleshowprint/75672278.cms; Aditya Saroha, Government gets notice after saying it has no
information on Aarogya Setu creator, THE HINDU (Oct 28, 2020), https://www.thehindu.com/scitech/technology/govt-gets-notice-after-saying-it-has-no-information-on-aarogya-setucreator/article32963829.ece (the Central Information Commission issued a notice because the
creator of the program remains ‘unknown’ to the government).
142. Nileena MS, From Aadhaar to Aarogya Setu, Vidhi’s questionable role in technologyrelated
policy
making,
CARAVAN
MAG.
(Aug.
26,
2020),
https://caravanmagazine.in/technology/vidhi-aadhaar-aarogya-setu-arghya-sengupta-privacy-thinktank; see generally Sujan Hajra, Expert view: Indian banks need to wake up to harsh cyber realities,
ECON. TIMES, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/expertview/expert-take-indian-banksneed-to-wake-up-toharshcyberrealities/articleshow/65509359.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text
&utm_campaign=cppst (last updated Aug. 23, 2018); Vivek Kaul, How private banks are taking
over Indian banking, MINT, https://www.livemint.com/industry/banking/how-private-banks-aretaking-over-indian-banking-1560706195840.html (last updated June 17, 2019).
143.

See MS, supra note 142.

144. Data Protection Laws
of
The World (Australia),
DLA PIPER,
https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=law&c=AU (last modified Feb. 3, 2020)
[hereinafter DLA PIPER].
145. AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N, DIGITAL PLATFORMS INQUIRY 14
(2019),
https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Digital%20platforms%20inquiry%20%20final%20report.pdf.
146.

DLA PIPER, supra note 144.
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most common law nations until the time federal legislation is enacted.147
The three concerns are, namely:
1) finding a lawyer in order to provide assistance in drafting
the will;
2) getting the typed draft of your will printed in order to sign
on the same, if ready access to a printer is not available; and
3) finding the specified number of witnesses in order to testify
to the document.148

Another option, if available, is oral wills.149 However, the same also
possesses a host of evidentiary issues and is illegal in a host of common
law jurisdictions.150
Although numerous lawyers, will-making sites, and companies are
now available remotely, it is important to note that most common law
jurisdictions do not specify that a will has to be made using professional
assistance,151 nor does it specify that it should be typed or in a particular
format; needless to say, only the recipients and executors details must be
specified.152 As for witnesses, it could be neighbors or even a person’s
family members—in most cases, legatees.153 Although a vast majority of
common law nations—such as Kenya—do not consider it as a fair
practice to do so, the law in nations—such as India—allow individuals
from all religions, apart from Christianity and Zoroastrianism, to allow
legatees to their wills in order to act as witnesses to the same as well.154

147. See generally Christine Fletcher, The Pros and Cons of Electronic Wills, FORBES (Oct.
25,
2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/christinefletcher/2019/10/25/the-pros-and-cons-ofelectronic-wills/#77447a285457.
148.

See generally id. (stating general concerns people run into when they are writing their

will).
149. Michael Savage, Make bedside oral wills legal during pandemic, UK campaigners
urge, GUARDIAN (May 2, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/02/make-bedsideoral-wills-legal-during-pandemic-uk-campaigners-urge.
150. See generally Developments in the Law: More Data More Problems, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 1714, 1797 (2018).
151. Make Wills FAQ — What you need to know about wills–the most basic estate planning
Document, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/wills-faq.html (last visited Aug. 31,
2020).
152. Mary Randolph, How to Determine If a Will Is Valid, ALLLAW,
https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/wills-trusts/how-determine-will-valid.html (last visited Sept.
9, 2020);
see generally What
is an
executor of
a
will?, FREEWILL,
https://www.freewill.com/learn/what-is-an-executor-of-a-will (last updated Aug. 29, 2019).
153.

See Randolph, supra note 152.

154. See generally Sanjeev Sinha, All you need to know about making a Will, ECON. TIMES,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tdmc/your-money/all-you-need-to-know-aboutmaking-awill/articleshow/53209791.cms (last updated July 15, 2019) (stating the general principle for a will
to be valid a legatee or beneficiary should not be a witness).
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Although the authors have deliberately kept the same outside the
ambit of this short article, security breaches via breaking encryption keys
and firewalls are a common occurrence.155 It is important that
mechanisms, such as the Nevada Lockbox, be viewed with immense
scrutiny as any data breach, followed by the hypothetical deletion of data,
could automatically result in the activation of the state’s intestate laws—
with no legal recourse for a beneficiary who was allegedly supposed to
inherit all proceeds arising out of the same. 156 What is even worse is that,
if this happens, some prospective beneficiaries might not even realize that
they have been denied something that would have otherwise rightfully
belonged to them.157 Technology is moving at a rapid pace; however, a
lot of responsibility now rests on the shoulders of legislators across
common law jurisdictions to inculcate these changes into law with
adequate safety measures.

155. See Mark Leon, Public key encryption: And they said it couldn't be done, TECH
REPUBLIC (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/public-key-encryption-and-theysaid-it-couldnt-be-done.
156. See
Online
Services:
Nevada
Lockbox,
NEV.
SEC’Y
https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/online-services/nevada-lockbox (last visited Sept. 13, 2020).

ST.,

157. See Data Breach Notification in the United States and Territories, PRIVACY RTS.
CLEARINGHOUSE (Dec. 10, 2018), https://privacyrights.org/resources/data-breach-notificationunited-states-and-territories.
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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

____________________________________________________________

SPECIAL AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE STATE OF ADAWA (APPLICANT)
AND THE REPUBLIC OF RASASA (RESPONDENT)
TO SUBMIT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE
PARTIES
CONCERNING THE HELIAN HYACINTH
jointly notified to the Court on 20 September 2019

____________________________________________________________

COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE

____________________________________________________________

COMPROMIS
ENTRE L’ ÉTAT D’ ADAWA (DEMANDEUR)
ET LA RÉPUBLIQUE DE RASASA
(DÉFENDERESSE)
VISANT À SOUMETTRE À LA COUR
INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE LES
DIVERGENCES QUI OPPOSENT LES DEUX
PARTIES CONCERNANT LE HELIAN HYACINTH
notifié conjointement à la Cour le 20 Septembre 2019
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JOINT NOTIFICATION
ADDRESSED TO THE REGISTRAR OF THE COURT:

The Hague, 20 September 2019
On behalf of Applicant, the State of Adawa, and Respondent, the Republic
of Rasasa, and in accordance with Article 40(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, we have the honor to transmit to you an
original of the Special Agreement for submission to the International Court
of Justice of the Differences between the Applicant and the Respondent
concerning the Helian Hyacinth, signed in The Hague, The Netherlands, on
the ninth day of September in the year two thousand nineteen.
Omar Moraga, President of Adawa Venevar Pindro, President of Rasasa
to the Kingdom of The Netherlands to the Kingdom of The Netherlands
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SPECIAL AGREEMENT
SUBMITTED TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE BY
THE STATE OF ADAWA AND THE REPUBLIC OF RASASA ON
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM
CONCERNING THE HELIAN HYACINTH
The State of Adawa (“Applicant”) and the Republic of Rasasa
(“Respondent”) (hereinafter “the Parties”);
Considering that differences have arisen between them concerning the
Helian Hyacinth and other matters;
Recognizing that the Parties have been unable to settle these differences by
direct negotiations;
Desiring further to define the issues to be submitted to the International
Court of Justice (“the Court”) for resolution;
In furtherance thereof the Parties have concluded this Special Agreement:
Article 1
The Parties submit the questions contained in the Special Agreement
(together with Corrections and Clarifications to follow) (“the Case”) to the
Court pursuant to Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.
Article 2
It is agreed by the Parties that the State of Adawa shall appear as Applicant
and the Republic of Rasasa as Respondent, but such agreement is without
prejudice to any question of the burden of proof.
Article 3
The Court is requested to adjudicate the claims of the State of Adawa
specified in paragraph 61 below, applying the rules and principles of
international law, including any applicable treaties, in accordance with
Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and Articles 31, 44, 45(1), 48, 49, and
80 of the Rules of Court.
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Article 4

The Court is requested to adjudicate the counterclaims of the Republic of
Rasasa specified in paragraph 62 below, applying the rules and principles of
international law, including any applicable treaties, in accordance with
Article 48 of the Statute of the Court and Articles 31, 44, 45(1), 48, 49, and
80 of the Rules of Court.
Article 5
(a)

Procedures shall be regulated in accordance with the applicable provisions
of the Official Rules of the 2020 Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot
Court Competition.

(b)

The Parties request the Court to order that the written proceedings should
consist of one round of written Memorials presented by each of the Parties
not later than the date set forth in the Official Schedule of the 2020 Philip
C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition.
Article 6

(a)

The Parties shall accept any Judgment of the Court as final and binding
upon them and shall execute it in its entirety and in good faith.

(b)

Immediately after the transmission of any Judgment, the Parties shall
enter into negotiations on the modalities for its execution.
In witness whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized, have
signed the present Special Agreement and have affixed thereto their
respective seals of office.
Done at the The Hague, The Netherlands, this twentieth day of September
in the year two thousand nineteen, in triplicate in the English language.
Omar Moraga
President
State of Adawa

348092-ILSA_International_27-1_Text.indd 110

Venevar Pindro
President
Republic of Rasasa

12/11/20 1:36 PM

I.C.J. Special Agreement

2020]

99

SPECIAL AGREEMENT
CASE CONCERNING THE HELIAN HYACINTH
(State of Adawa
v.
Republic of Rasasa)
1. The State of Adawa and the Republic of Rasasa are neighboring
countries in the Region of Crosinia (“the Region”), a subtropical and semiarid inland expanse formed by hills and valleys where citrus fruits, olives,
grapes, dates, and spices are grown. The Region is also the only place on
Earth where the Helian hyacinth (Hyacinthus solaris) is cultivated. The
Helian hyacinth is a flowering plant best known for producing the flavoring
spice Helian, which is derived from its pollen and which has a weight-tovalue ratio comparable to that of saffron. According to well-established
botanical scholarship, it takes no less than 20 years for newly planted Helian
bulbs to produce export-quality spice.
2. There are four other States in the Region. All six States are dominated
by the same ethnic group, speak the same language and share many cultural
traditions. Exports of Helian spice contribute significantly to the GDPs of all
six Crosinian States. Adawa has a population of approximately 5.4 million
and a nominal GDP per capita of approximately €17,500. Rasasa has a
population of approximately 9.9 million and a nominal GDP per capita of
approximately €21,000. Adawa and Rasasa share a border that is 201
kilometers long.
3. Until 1928, all six Crosinian States were provinces of the Kingdom of
Crosinia. When the last king, Narang III, died in 1924 without a direct male
descendant as required by royal tradition, the provinces divided over
competing claimants to the throne. Four of the provinces, including Rasasa,
backed the late monarch’s brother, Taplup, while the other two, Zeitounia
and Adawa, sought to have Narang’s eldest daughter, Goleta, named Queen.
4. Scattered violence and skirmishing over the next three years became a
full-fledged civil war in 1927, with Rasasa as the main belligerent on the side
favoring Taplup. Over the next year, each of the three provinces allied with
Rasasa declared independence and withdrew from the hostilities.
5. On 29 October 1929, representatives of the remaining belligerents –
Adawa, Zeitounia, and Rasasa – met in the Rasasan capital of Botega and
concluded negotiations ending the bloodshed. Rasasa declared itself an
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independent republic, and the provinces of Adawa and Zeitounia united to
form the Adawa-Zeitounia Union (AZU), an independent monarchy, as of
that date. The newly installed President of Rasasa and Queen Goleta of the
AZU signed the Treaty of Botega on Armistice and Pacification (“the Treaty
of Botega”) several days later. The relevant portions of the Treaty of Botega
are attached to this Statement of Agreed Facts as Annex A.
6. The five independent Crosinian States promptly applied for and were
granted membership in the League of Nations, and all became parties to the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
7. During the 1930s, the AZU encountered significant economic and social
stresses. Adawa became more urbanized and industrialized while Zeitounia
did not, and the central government, under heavy Zeitounian influence,
opposed what it considered to be demands that it invest disproportionately in
infrastructure in Adawa. Effective 1 January 1939, the two provinces
amicably agreed to dissolve their Union, and each declared its independence
as of that date. Adawa adopted a republican form of government, while
Zeitounia retained Queen Goleta as monarch.
8. Both Adawa and Rasasa joined the United Nations in 1947 and acceded
to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Neither State has filed a
declaration accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36(2)
of the Statute.
9. In the decades following the Second World War, Rasasa became a
substantial participant in the international technology sector, eventually
developing a robust robotics industry. Adawa’s economy was and remains
primarily focused on the exploitation of natural resources. All of the
Crosinian States engaged in the highly profitable activities of growing,
harvesting, and processing Helian hyacinth pollen and exporting Helian
spice.
10. In light of the very specific equipment and exacting procedures needed
for successful cultivation of the Helian hyacinth, and the need for ongoing
research and development, the Agriculture Ministries of the six Crosinian
States in 1964 formed an unofficial roundtable, meeting twice per year to
discuss technical and economic issues specific to the Helian industry. Five
years later, that arrangement was formalized in a treaty, signed on 20 June
1969 and promptly ratified by all six Member States, declaring the formation
of the Crosinian Helian Community (CHC). The parties to the CHC agreed
to impose no customs duties within the CHC on Helian spice or the
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equipment and materials used to harvest or process the Helian hyacinth.
Relevant portions of the CHC Treaty are attached as Annex B.
11. Between 1969 and 1979, the net value of Helian spice exports across
the six CHC Member States increased by an average of 12.3% per year, and
employment in Helian-related activities increased by 8% per year. In 1979,
to mark the tenth anniversary of the Community, heads of government of the
CHC Member States were invited to participate in the semi-annual meeting.
They issued a joint communiqué at its conclusion, proclaiming what they
called “the remarkable achievements of the Crosinian Helian Community in
improving revenue, employment, and the quality of life for all of the people
of our Region.”
12. In 1982 and 1985, respectively, Rasasa and Adawa acceded to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Both States became
original members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and
remain members. When they joined the GATT, both States submitted their
then-applicable tariff schedules, and agreed that these would be “bound
rates” applicable on a most favored nation (MFN) basis. With respect to
Helian plants, bulbs, pollen, spice, and other material, the bound rates were
zero.
13. In 1998, Adawa became an original party to the Rome Statute
establishing the International Criminal Court, and remains a party to that
treaty. Rasasa is not a party to the Rome Statute.
14. Ms. Darian Grey was (and remains) one of the wealthiest citizens of
Rasasa. From 1979 to 2016, she served as founder and chief executive officer
of the Rasasan Robotics Corporation (RRC), a privately-held company
headquartered in Botega. RRC advises governments on computerized and
autonomous defense and security systems; designs, develops and implements
these systems in conflict zones around the world; and provides training in
their use. Ms. Grey and her company have been the subjects of mixed
publicity. In 1998, Forbes Magazine named her one of “The 20 Women Who
Will Make a Mark in the 21st Century.” In 2000, Human Rights Watch
accused Ms. Grey and RRC of “active complicity in keeping some of the
worst despotic regimes in the world securely in power.”
15. In February 2009, the remote island Republic of Garantia (not a party
to this case or otherwise involved in this dispute) formally referred a situation
to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court concerning war crimes
and crimes against humanity that were alleged to have occurred during the
2007-2009 civil war in that State. The referral noted that “several private
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foreign enterprises sold weapons systems and provided training to
government militias, and such systems and training materially aided the
[regime then in power] in its unlawful conduct.” The referral specifically
mentioned RRC as one of the accused foreign contractors, and cited Ms. Grey
as having been personally responsible for its activities. In accordance with
ICC procedures, the Office of the Prosecutor opened an investigation in
August 2009.
16. On 14 July 2012, an unprecedented and catastrophic tropical cyclone,
Hurricane Makan, struck the entire Region. The death toll from the cyclone
exceeded 8,000 and, in each of the six States, entire towns were inundated,
roads and power lines were destroyed, and major urban centers suffered
historic flooding. More than 60% of the Helian hyacinths in Rasasa, 20% of
those in Adawa, and between 15% and 20% of those in the other four States
were destroyed. Unemployment began to increase across the Region as
farms, their suppliers, and the businesses that depended on them became no
longer viable.
17. In the weeks and months following the storm, crime rates skyrocketed
throughout the Region. Armed gangs roamed the countryside, stealing
salvageable Helian plants and harvesting and processing equipment from the
devastated farms. According to the overwhelmed police forces of the six
States, many of the gang members were former Helian farmers whose way
of life had been disrupted by the cyclone. Official reports described them as
“simple hooligans,” drawn to the opportunity to make easy money with little
risk, and noted the broad range of their criminal activities: acts of violence,
arsons, vandalism of public and private property, as well as thefts of cash,
equipment, and trade goods.
18. In October 2012, the President of Rasasa, Beta Tihmar, convened a
meeting of major Rasasan corporate executives to elicit ideas on how to
address the increasingly serious crime wave that the police had been unable
to staunch. Notes of the meeting later released to the media reported that Ms.
Grey offered “to devote RRC’s expertise and resources to spearhead the
development of a ground-breaking autonomous security system to suppress
criminal activities in Rasasa and throughout the Region.” Ms. Grey referred
to the system she had in mind as the “Weaponized Autonomous Limitation
Line” (or “the WALL”). Its principal feature, she contended, was that it
would deploy advanced technology to deter and apprehend criminals, while
using force only when absolutely necessary and when the chance of targeting
innocents was reduced to virtually zero.
19. President Tihmar expressed great interest in the concept and asked Ms.
Grey to prepare a formal proposal. Although the details of the ensuing
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negotiations between RRC and the Rasasan government remain classified, in
January 2013 the President notified the other five CHC Member States that
Rasasa had contracted with RRC to undertake research and development of
the WALL. President Tihmar invited them to collaborate in “this state-ofthe-art system that will reduce the pressure on our respective police forces,
facilitate the efficient apprehension of dangerous criminals, eliminate the
potential for tragic interactions between police and civilians, and help our
societies recover from Hurricane Makan.” President Tihmar added that the
WALL would be especially valuable in promoting “the revival of our
Region’s Helian industry and those who depend on it.”
20. On 2 February 2013, RRC distributed further technical details in a report
signed by 15 police and military technology experts from 12 States, including
all six CHC Member States. The report disclosed that the WALL employed
machine learning algorithms, developed from a large quantity of “training
data” acquired from the Rasasan police and the police and military forces of
10 other States, in order to identify threats. The training data included
millions of images, video footage, computer models, and other information
derived from prior instances of armed conflict, civil unrest, and criminal
activities during peacetime. According to RRC, the WALL featured an
advanced form of “supervised learning,” in which the training data had been
meticulously “tagged” by teams of software engineers from RRC working in
cooperation with Rasasan police officers and military officials. The tagging
highlighted aspects of the training data that indicated armed threats, as well
as indicators of retreat, surrender, incapacity, and other factors that would
render an individual effectively hors de combat.
21. All six CHC Member States devoted funds and provided leading
government and private sector scientists and engineers, as well as materials,
to the research and development phase of the project, which was conducted
at RRC’s laboratories in Botega and its testing ranges in rural Rasasa.
22. By April 2013, police in the other four Crosinian States had gained the
upper hand, and crime levels were restored to pre-Hurricane Makan levels.
Each of these States gradually withdrew from the WALL project and, by
August 2013, only Rasasa and Adawa continued to participate in the
development of the venture. The withdrawing States assigned any rights they
might have acquired during the development of the project back to RRC.
23. Research and development of the WALL proceeded steadily over the
next two years, including a review by advisers from the Rasasan government
for compliance with international law. The system was subjected to hundreds
of thousands of computer simulations and field tests under the close
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supervision of representatives of police, military, and engineering experts
from the Rasasan and Adawan governments.
24. On 6 July 2015, Ms. Grey announced the completion of the project. At
a meeting of ministerial-level representatives of Rasasa and Adawa, she
described the WALL as follows:
The physical infrastructure of the WALL consists of 10-meter-tall
metal towers, each topped with an advanced surveillance and
response unit. With 360-degree motion-sensing, high-definition,
and infrared cameras, each surveillance unit can closely monitor
all ground and aerial activity within a 130,000 square meter area
around the base of its tower, enabling the towers to be placed as
far as 200 meters from one another without sacrificing coverage.
To respond to threats, each unit is equipped with an array of lethal
and non-lethal options, ranging from speakers broadcasting
audible warnings, all the way to fully automatic .50 caliber
machine guns mounted on 360-degree turntables.
But the true genius of the WALL lies in what you cannot see. The
system is fully autonomous and independent of human control, in
a way the world has never seen before. Once deployed and
activated, each unit is in constant communication with every other
unit, sharing data and responses over secured, encrypted wireless
channels. Using advanced artificial swarm intelligence, the WALL
can instantaneously and appropriately decide whether and how to
respond to any given threat, without any intervention by human
actors. In fact, decisions are made so rapidly that second-guessing
by humans is practically impossible. Finally, this distributed
approach to decision-making means that the destruction or
incapacitation of a single unit will not impair the efficacy of the
entire system.1

25. Teams of Adawan and Rasasan scientists then presented their
conclusions based upon the simulated and field tests. They explained that
each element of the system, as well as the system as a whole, had been
extensively peer-reviewed and tested by government and private experts in
more than 30 countries. The head of the Adawan team spoke next:

1. This version of Ms. Grey’s remarks was reported in the national and international media the
following day. It was edited by Rasasan government authorities to remove classified technical
information.
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Naturally, the testing team paid particular attention to the question
of whether the WALL might deploy deadly force when the
situation does not warrant such a response. Although it carries
lethal potential as a last resort, the WALL is unimaginably more
reliable than human police or soldiers. During months of testing,
it demonstrated a ‘false positives’ rate of less than 0.0001% –
meaning that the system, or any unit of the system, will make a
mistake no more than one time in one million encounters. And
with embedded rules instructing the software to favor non-lethal
deterrence, our testing indicates that the WALL would mistakenly
use excessive force no more than once in two hundred million
encounters.

26. Although the attendees declared themselves suitably impressed with the
WALL and the testing data, neither government elected to purchase it. Both
Adawa and Rasasa announced their satisfaction with having been involved
in the development of the WALL, but stated that it was neither economically
feasible nor politically desirable to go further with the project. RRC
reportedly marketed the WALL in the ensuing years, but there has been no
public confirmation of its deployment by other governments.
27. Throughout this period, violent and property crime rates continued to
dwindle in both Adawa and Rasasa. However, in August 2016, relying upon
arrest records and eyewitness accounts, the Rasasan Border Police reported
what they termed “an alarming new trend” along the border: “The small
Adawan gangs that arose in the wake of Hurricane Makan have apparently
organized themselves into larger armed groups, and have turned the
resources, personnel, and weapons they previously used for localized crimes
towards cross- border crime into Rasasa.”
28. Adawan criminal gangs regularly entered Rasasa under cover of night
and attacked small villages, assaulting and even killing villagers, returning
to Adawa with Helian bulbs, growing and processing equipment, and
virtually anything else of value. The Rasasan Border Police observed that
there had been a marginal but constant increase in the frequency of such raids
every month since January 2016.
29. At the request of President Tihmar, in September 2016 the Rasasan and
Adawan governments established a high-level task force to “consider joint
responses to the increase in cross-border crimes.” The joint task force met
several times over the next year, but was unable to formulate a
comprehensive plan to suppress the gangs.
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30. According to a report published by the Rasasan Helian Growers
Association (RHGA), a prominent industry group based in Botega, beginning
in October 2016 Rasasa’s share of the global Helian market had declined
sharply relative to that of other States in the Region. The RHGA expressed
alarm that Rasasan Helian processors had increasingly begun to purchase
their raw material from Adawan Helian farmers in lieu of Rasasan suppliers,
who had been unable to meet their Helian pollen requirements. The RHGA’s
report concluded, “if current trends continue, many Rasasan Helian farms
will collapse in five to ten years, with catastrophic effects for the Rasasan
economy and Rasasan society in general.”
31. Rasasa held its regular presidential election in December 2016. Mr.
Venevar Pindro, a former military officer, ran on a platform calling for,
among many other things: tightening border controls to eliminate armed
incursions; and enhancing and protecting Rasasa’s Helian industry, the
failure of which he repeatedly claimed “would pose a fundamental threat to
our economy and national security.”
32. Mr. Pindro was elected president of Rasasa with 58% of the vote, and
he took office in January 2017. He quickly named officers of the new
government, appointing Darian Grey as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Upon
her nomination, Ms. Grey resigned her post at RRC and divested herself of
any direct financial stake in the company. Shortly after her appointment,
investigative reporters for the Budapest-based daily newspaper
Népszabadság obtained and published what it claimed were previouslyundisclosed memoranda from Ms. Grey to her staff at RRC approving the
clandestine supply of arms and the training of military personnel in numerous
conflict zones, including Garantia. Rasasan human rights groups protested
Ms. Grey’s appointment as Foreign Minister, and the opposition party in
parliament was unanimous in voting against it. As of the time of her
nomination to the cabinet, neither RRC nor Ms. Grey had been charged with
crimes in any domestic or international tribunal. Her appointment was
confirmed by parliament on 15 January 2017.
33. During the campaign and following his election, President Pindro
criticized the joint task force as ineffective. He called upon Adawa, “in the
spirit of our long friendship,” to take prompt and effective measures to quash
the criminal gangs based within its territory. Shortly after taking office,
President Pindro submitted two bills for legislative approval. The first
invoked “essential security interests” and provided for the introduction of
tariffs of 25% ad valorem on Helian bulbs, live plants, and pollen imported
into Rasasa, in an effort to encourage Rasasa’s domestic processors to return
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to local farms for their feedstock. The second called for expedited review of
options for the hardening of the Adawa-Rasasa border.
34. In its annual report delivered to the Rasasan Parliament in February
2017, the Rasasan Border Police reported that, “The border issue has
fundamentally changed in its character. What were once disorganized gangs
have become organized militias, and their crimes are no longer limited to
opportunistic thievery.” The report indicated that Adawan nationals had
established permanent and well-defended encampments within Rasasan
territory, which they were using as bases for international trafficking in
illegal drugs. The report concluded, “These new militants are well armed and
well-organized, and the police are simply unable to remove them.”
35. In March 2017, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) reported that, “There is a new and major player in international
trafficking of illegal drugs. The previously unorganized Adawan bandits
have used their profits to create a structured and well-armed militia, which
uses its permanent camps within Rasasan territory as a headquarters for its
global enterprise.” In response, both Adawa and Rasasa declared that their
domestic police efforts had been ineffective in counteracting the militia, in
part because criminal operatives were able to freely cross the Adawa-Rasasa
border.
36. On 1 June 2017, the militia simultaneously attacked nine Rasasan
Border Police stations, killing 21 officers. Eyewitnesses stated that the
raiders were “heavily armed with military- grade weapons and equipment,”
and that the attacks indicated “a high level of prior planning and training.”
37. On 25 June 2017, President Pindro authorized the deployment of the
Rasasan Army against the militia camps within Rasasa, as well as the
purchase of the WALL from RRC and its installation along the RasasaAdawa border. He simultaneously sent a message to Adawan President Omar
Moraga which read, in relevant part:
I have today given my authorization to the Rasasan Army
Engineers Battalion to begin installation of the WALL along the
entire length of our shared border. This is a step necessitated by
critical national security concerns. As you are well aware – since
your government was involved in the development of this weapons
system – it is infinitely more reliable than any in the history of
mankind. The WALL will be erected and deployed entirely on
Rasasan soil, and each tower will surveil up to 200 meters on each
side of our shared frontier. The system is designed to detect threats,
and to prevent them from becoming reality. It will deploy, on the
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basis of graduated sequencing, demonstrative measures (alarms,
verbal warnings of increasing volume and urgency) to preset levels
of force (dispersal of disabling chemicals, non-targeted
explosions, and finally gunfire), based upon its training data,
against anyone attempting to cross the border illegally, in either
direction.

38. President Moraga responded, saying:
Mr. President, while your words apparently intended to provide
comfort, the WALL will still involve the deployment of lethal
weaponry along our border. So long as the possibility exists that
this autonomous system might be unleashed against our people or
on our soil, its deployment will be incompatible with international
law. We are firmly of the view that your proposed installation of
the WALL would be a flagrant violation of international law,
including but not limited to the Treaty of Botega of 1929 between
your government and the predecessor of mine. We urge you to
reconsider this aggressive and ill-advised measure.

39. President Pindro announced the completed installation of the WALL on
10 January 2018. He declared, in a televised address:
With vanishingly close to 100% accuracy, the WALL will prevent
illegal border crossings, while virtually guaranteeing that no
mistakes will be made and no innocents will be harmed. Lawabiding Rasasans and our Adawan neighbors need have no
concern; they may go about their lives just as they did before, and
so long as they do not act out of intent to injure our country, they
will do so in safety and tranquility.

40. On 1 February 2018, President Moraga issued a statement saying, in
relevant part:
The fact that lethal weapons have been amassed along our border,
and that the WALL will monitor the activities of our citizens, fills
all Adawans with dread and anger. That these weapons are fully
under the control of an advanced artificial intelligence, with no
possibility for the exercise of mercy or judgment by human actors,
only exacerbates our fears and violates the letter and spirit of
Rasasa’s international obligations. Even if lethal force were
unleashed no more than once in a millennium, that would be small
comfort. The placement of these weapons on our frontier is far out
of proportion to whatever was claimed to have motivated it. But
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that is only one indication of the illegality of this belligerent
exercise.

41. The Defense Ministers of the two States agreed to meet to discuss the
issue of the WALL, and the joint task force resumed its regular meetings,
which had been suspended after President Pindro’s election. The task force
reviewed reports from both States’ national police forces, which indicated
that, in the four months following the deployment of the WALL, reports of
trans-border incidents decreased more than 80 percent. The Rasasan Minister
reported that the Rasasan Army was making “substantial inroads” into
dispersing the armed camps within her country.
42. In May 2018, in response to recommendations from the task force,
Adawa stationed unarmed human monitors on its side of the border, and the
Rasasan Border Police launched a telephone and Internet “hotline” to permit
members of the public in both countries to communicate any concerns to the
authorities. To this date, there have been no reports of any incidents of lethal
force deployed by the WALL. In its May 2018 official publication, the joint
task force observed: “Although Adawa continues to maintain its opposition
to the program on legal grounds, the WALL has without question had a
positive impact in reducing and deterring cross-border crime.”
43. A few months earlier, in January 2018, Rasasa’s Parliament had, with
little debate, adopted President Pindro’s proposal to impose tariffs on
unprocessed Helian materials imported into Rasasa. Adawa protested the
decision and, in addition, the CHC Director-General issued the following
statement: “I remind Rasasa of its obligation, under Article 3 of the CHC
Agreement, to abstain from creating impediments to trade in Helian and
Helian- related goods. Its unilateral actions do not further, and in fact may
well hinder, the CHC’s goals of ensuring the everlasting and sustainable
cultivation of the Helian hyacinth across Crosinia.”
44. The Rasasan Foreign Ministry responded: “Rasasa must take steps to
protect and promote the wellbeing of our own Helian growers. Ensuring their
survival, and that of our citizens who depend on them, is a vital matter of
national security.”
45. In October 2018, Adawa formally requested consultations with Rasasa
pursuant to Articles 1 and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) of the WTO. Government
officials from both Adawa and Rasasa met, but were unable to resolve the
dispute amicably.
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46. In January 2019, the International League for the Support of Agriculture
(ILSA) – a non- profit and non-partisan organization headquartered in
Ottawa devoted to “supporting farmers and agri-business worldwide” –
published a study entitled “Another Rise and Fall: The Market for Helian
Spice Around the World, 1975-2018.” The monograph presented
comprehensive and detailed evidence that, as a direct result of the tariffs
imposed by Rasasa in January 2018, Adawan farmers were estimated to have
lost more than €10 million in revenue through the end of the studied period
in October 2018 as a result of declining sales to processors in Rasasa. It
projected that the losses would increase in coming years.
47. In February 2019, Adawa requested the establishment of a panel
pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU, alleging that Rasasa’s tariffs on Helian
products were an unjustifiable breach of its commitment to maintain the
bound rate of zero on such items.
48. On 13 April 2019, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
announced that, pursuant to Article 58 of the Rome Statute, she was
requesting the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Minister Grey, assigning
to her criminal responsibility for certain alleged activities of RRC in Garantia
between 2007 and 2009. The charged acts included war crimes, and “other
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable to armed conflicts not
of an international character,” within Articles 8.2(a) and 8.2(e) of the Rome
Statute. The indictment specifically cited the training and supervision of
paramilitary forces that perpetrated such crimes, the sale and use of
prohibited weapons systems, and the conduct of unauthorized surveillance of
civilians that allegedly led to their becoming the targets of violent repression.
49. On 18 June 2019, the CHC welcomed representatives of its Member
States to Novazora, the capital city of Adawa, for its regular annual meeting,
which coincided with the 50th anniversary of the founding of the
Community. Minister Grey, representing Rasasa, arrived late in the morning
of 18 June 2019 for the four-day session.
50. On 20 June 2019, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC granted the
Prosecutor’s 13 April 2019 request and issued a warrant of arrest for Minister
Grey.
51. Two days later, on 22 June 2019, officers of the Novazora police
approached Minister Grey as she was leaving her hotel. After ascertaining
her identity, they took her into custody. She did not resist but informed the
arresting officers that she “enjoyed diplomatic immunity.”
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The Foreign Ministry of Adawa promptly notified the Rasasan Ambassador
to Adawa of Minister Grey’s arrest, and Rasasan consular agents were
provided access to her. She was then brought before a magistrate, who
confirmed that she was the person named in the indictment. Minister Grey’s
counsel (whom she selected freely and without interference) argued that she
was entitled to immunity while on Adawan soil in her official capacity, but
the magistrate rejected that argument, noting that, “the Rome Statute of the
ICC makes no exception for sitting government ministers.” A judicial appeal
was denied, as was a request for the Minister’s provisional release.
52. The Adawan Ministry of Justice informed the ICC Office of the
Prosecutor that it had apprehended the indictee and would arrange for her
transfer to The Hague. However, at the time of the signature of both parties
to this Statement of Agreed Facts, it was agreed that Minister Grey would
remain under house arrest at a monitored diplomatic guesthouse in Adawa,
pending this Court’s disposition of the case.
53. Rasasa’s Deputy Foreign Minister, upon learning of the arrest, delivered
a note verbale to the Adawan Embassy to Rasasa:
The apprehension and detention of diplomatically protected
persons is prohibited by international law. One of our Ministers
has been kidnapped while she was visiting Adawan territory. She
is entitled to absolute immunity under binding treaties and
customary international law. We have no reason to believe that the
Minister committed a crime recognized in our legal system, and
we have no intention of trying, rendering, or extraditing her.
Meanwhile, it is the responsibility of the Adawan authorities to
return her immediately. There will be serious consequences if this
responsibility is not carried out.

54. Several hours after the note was delivered, the Adawan Ambassador
was declared persona non grata by President Pindro, and the Ambassador
promptly left the country. Adawa protested the expulsion, insisting that it had
acted legally in its treatment of Minister Grey. The Adawan Foreign Minister
declared the next day that, “it is time for us to bring in the assistance of a
third party, before the situation with Rasasa gets completely out of hand and
our long and peaceful relationship is forever jeopardized. We are very
fortunate that, in accordance with international law, the doors of the
International Court of Justice are open to us, and we will seek the Court’s
help in resolving this and our other pending controversies with our neighbor.
I have instructed my legal office to prepare an Application to the Court.”
55. On 23 June 2019, the Permanent Representative of Rasasa to the United
Nations delivered a communication to the Secretary General, noting that
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“Rasasa objects to the purported succession of Adawa to the Treaty of Botega
and, accordingly, does not consider itself in treaty relations with Adawa
pursuant to the aforementioned treaty.”
56. On 24 June 2019, at a press conference in Botega, the Rasasan Minister
of Justice answered a question from a reporter about the charges against
Minister Grey. She replied, “We continue to be offended by the violation of
international law and protocols regarding the treatment of our Minister,
which we consider an insult to our sovereignty. We are reserving all of our
legal options in this matter, both international and domestic.”
57. On 1 July 2019, after negotiations between the parties, the Adawan
Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands submitted an Application
instituting proceedings on behalf of Adawa against Rasasa, invoking the
compromissory clause of the 1929 Treaty of Botega. Adawa contested the
legality of the installation of the WALL, and also alleged that Rasasa’s
Helian tariffs violated the CHC, seeking monetary reparation for the resulting
financial harm, a remedy that it characterized as “not typically awarded by
WTO Panels.”
58. Rasasa responded by contesting the Court’s jurisdiction under the
Treaty of Botega, stating that “the State of Adawa is not a party to the Treaty,
nor can it claim to have become one through the law of State succession. This
sudden attempt to invoke the Treaty – for the sole purpose of bringing a
dispute before the ICJ – is improper and abusive.” Rasasa further contested
the Court’s jurisdiction over, and the admissibility of, Adawa’s claim based
on the CHC treaty, arguing that the WTO has exclusive jurisdiction over
trade disputes between the Parties, and that proceedings were already
underway before the Dispute Settlement Body. Rasasa asserted that the
tariffs were, in any event, lawful protections of its essential security interests.
Finally, Rasasa asserted a counterclaim concerning the illegality of the
apprehension of Minister Grey.
59. On 22 July 2019, the Court entered an Order recommending that the
parties draft a Statement of Agreed Facts (the present document), without
prejudice to any arguments they might seek to present during the
proceedings.
60. In addition to the treaties and other international agreements referenced
elsewhere in this Statement, at all relevant times both Adawa and Rasasa
have been parties to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
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61. Pursuant to the Order of the Court, and the agreement of the parties,
Adawa, as Applicant, respectfully requests that the Court:
a.
Declare that it has jurisdiction over Adawa’s claims
because Adawa is a party to the 1929 Treaty of Botega;
b.
Adjudge that Rasasa’s development and deployment
of the WALL along the border between Adawa and Rasasa
is in violation of international law, and order that the WALL
be dismantled and removed forthwith;
c.
Declare that it may adjudicate Adawa’s claim that
Rasasa’s imposition of tariffs on Helian products from
Adawa violates the CHC Treaty, and that Adawa is entitled
to compensatory damages reflecting the financial harm it has
suffered to date, such amount to be determined in subsequent
proceedings; and
d.
Declare that the arrest and detention of Darian Grey
were consistent with Adawa’s obligations under
international law, and that Adawa may proceed to render her
to the International Criminal Court.
62. Rasasa, as Respondent, asks the Court to adjudge and declare that:
a.
The Court lacks jurisdiction over Adawa’s claims
because Adawa is not a party to the 1929 Treaty of Botega;
b.
Rasasa’s development and deployment of the WALL
along the border between Adawa and Rasasa is consistent
with international law;
c.
Adawa’s claim that Rasasa’s Helian tariffs violate the
CHC Treaty falls outside the Court’s jurisdiction or is
inadmissible; in the alternative, the imposition of the tariffs
did not violate the CHC Treaty; and
d.
Adawa’s arrest and detention of Darian Grey
constitute internationally wrongful acts, and that she must be
immediately repatriated to Rasasa.
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ANNEX A
TREATY OF BOTEGA ON ARMISTICE AND PACIFICATION
1 November 1929
[excerpts]
The Adawa-Zeitounia Union and the Republic of Rasasa:
Desiring to save succeeding generations of Crosinians from the scourge of
war;
Conscious that all Crosinian peoples are united by common bonds, their
cultures having developed together in a shared heritage, and concerned that
peace in the region may be shattered at any time,
Recognizing that Crosinia’s endemic Helian fields suffered grave damage
during the recent war and that, by reason of the developments in the
techniques of warfare, they are in increasing danger of destruction;
Manifesting their desire to renounce all recourse to armed force as an
instrument of policy among Crosinian nations;
Accepting the establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of the
two High Contracting Parties as an indispensable step toward the cessation
of armed conflict and the restoration of peace and security to the peoples of
Crosinia; and
Resolving to ensure the pacific settlement of future disputes which may arise
between them, have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
1. In pursuance of regional peace and stability, a general armistice among
and between the armed forces of the High Contracting Parties – land, sea and
air – is hereby declared and established.
2. The Armistice Demarcation Lines have been defined with a view
toward separating the armed forces of the High Contracting Parties in such
manner as to minimize the possibility of friction and incident, while
providing for the gradual restoration of normal civilian life, without prejudice
to the ultimate settlement.
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3. The Armistice Demarcation Lines shall be as delineated on the map
attached to this Agreement as Annex I.
[...]

ARTICLE 3

1. The High Contracting Parties agree to establish on the border between
the Zeitounian region of the Adawa-Zeitounia Union and Rasasa an
International Zone of Peace, which shall be accessible to all citizens of both
High Contracting Parties without the need for border formalities. It is their
intention that this Zone shall stand as a reminder to the peoples of both
nations of the scourge of war, and the need to resolve disputes peacefully.
2. The High Contracting Parties agree in principle to explore, over the
coming years, the possibility of expanding the International Zone of Peace to
other areas on or in close proximity to the border between Zeitounia and
Rasasa.
[. . . ]

ARTICLE 6

In conformity with Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, the High Contracting Parties declare that they recognize
the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory ipso facto, without the necessity
of any special agreement so long as the present Treaty is in force, in all
disputes of a juridical nature that arise among them concerning:
a)

The interpretation of a treaty;

b)

Any question of international law;

c) The existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute the
breach of an international obligation; and
d) The nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
[ . . .]
In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.
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DONE at Botega, Rasasa, this first day of November, one thousand nine
hundred twenty-nine, in one copy, which will be deposited in the archives of
the League of Nations.
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ANNEX B
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE CROSINIAN HELIAN COMMUNITY
20 June 1969
[excerpts]
ARTICLE 1
The High Contracting Parties to this Treaty – the six independent and
sovereign States of the Crosinian Region – hereby establish the Crosinian
Helian Community. The Member States of this Community solemnly
pledge their everlasting commitment to the sustainable cultivation of the
Helian hyacinth.
ARTICLE 2
The Member States of the Community agree:
a) To share their agronomic, scientific, and economic data regarding the
growing, harvesting, processing, and commercializing of the Helian
hyacinth and especially the spice derived from it, which is prized around
the world; and
b) To meet periodically at technical levels, and no less than twice
annually at the Ministerial level, to discuss matters of common interest
regarding the production, processing, and exportation of Helian products,
and to take decisions as provided in this Treaty.
ARTICLE 3
To facilitate the development and health of the Helian industry, the Member
States agree to impose no customs duties on Helian products, as well as
goods that are primarily or exclusively used in the harvesting or processing
of the Helian hyacinth, which originate from the territory of a Member
State.
[. . . ]

ARTICLE 22

Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed as:
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a) Requiring any Member State to furnish information, the disclosure of
which it considers contrary to its essential security interests, or
b) Precluding the application of measures necessary to protect a Member
State’s essential security interests.
[. . . ]

ARTICLE 31

The Community shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Member States
such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and
the fulfillment of its purposes.
ARTICLE 32
Representatives of Member States at meetings convened by the Community
shall, while exercising their functions and during their journeys to and from
the place of meeting, enjoy immunity from personal arrest or detention and
from seizure of their personal baggage, and in respect of words spoken or
written and all acts done by them in their official capacity, immunity from
legal process of every kind.
[. . . ]

ARTICLE 41

Nothing in this Treaty shall be read as undermining or compromising the
sovereignty, independence, or international legal personality of any
Member State of the Community.
DONE at Pivo, Adawa, this twentieth day of June, one thousand nine
hundred sixty-nine, in one copy, which shall be deposited in the archives of
the United Nations.
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2020 PHILIP C. JESSUP INTERNATIONAL LAW MOOT COURT
COMPETITION
CORRECTIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS TO THE SPECIAL
AGREEMENT
The following correction and clarifications to the Statement of Agreed Facts
have been stipulated to by the parties, and the Statement of Agreed Facts
jointly communicated to the Court on 9 September 2019 should be
considered amended accordingly. The Registrar of the Court reminds all
parties and participants of the following:
a. The wording of the Statement of Agreed Facts has been carefully
chosen, and is the result of extensive negotiation. The parties decline to
“clarify” matters about which they are unlikely to agree. The parties will not
stipulate as to which legal principles are relevant, or which arguments are
acceptable or unacceptable.
b. Any request for clarification not addressed in the following paragraphs
has been considered by the parties to be redundant, inappropriate, or
immaterial, or the parties were unable to reach a mutually acceptable answer.
c. Except to the extent that corrections and clarifications are set out below,
participants are to assume that the Statement of Agreed Facts is accurate and
complete in all respects. In particular, both parties stipulate as to the
authenticity of all documents and of the signatures on all documents
referenced in the Statement.
d. With respect to the pronunciation of the various proper names used in
the Statement of Agreed Facts, all parties and the Court have agreed that they
will not take formal or informal offense at any reasonable effort to pronounce
proper names correctly.
e. Adawa and Rasasa are not parties to any relevant bilateral or multilateral
treaties, conventions, or accords other than those referenced within the
Statement of Agreed Facts or herein.
CORRECTIONS
1. The second sentence of Paragraph 48 is corrected to read: “The acts
alleged included ‘serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949,’ and ‘other serious violations of the laws
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and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character,’
within Articles 8.2(c) and 8.2(e) of the Rome Statute.”
CLARIFICATIONS
1. The Treaty of Botega was ratified by the Republic of Rasasa and the
Adawa-Zeitounia Union in December 1929, and entered into force on 1
January 1930.
2. The Republic of Garantia has been a party to the Rome Statute since
2005, and its referral mentioned in paragraph 15 was pursuant to Article 14
of the Rome Statute.
3. The final physical elements of the WALL were installed on 10 January
2018, and the system was activated on 12 January 2018. Since the time of
deployment, each tower that makes up the WALL has been situated within
Rasasan territory, between six and 35 meters from the Rasasa-Adawa border,
depending upon local terrain. There are no permanent human settlements
within 200 meters of the Adawa-Rasasa border.
4. Since January 2018, the WALL has never deployed lethal force. It has
on approximately 100 occasions issued verbal warnings and in five instances
non-lethal “warning shots.” No injuries are known to have occurred as a
result of these measures.
5. The parties to the CHC Treaty, all of whom subsequently became
members of the GATT, each duly notified the Treaty to the GATT as a
Regional Trade Agreement. These notifications were carried over when the
WTO was established in 1995.
6. To the present date, Rasasa has not notified its imposition of tariffs on
unprocessed Helian materials to the WTO.
7. On 1 August 2016, both Adawa and Rasasa assigned their rights to the
WALL project to RRC.
8. The Pre-Trial Chamber’s order of 20 June 2019 consisted of a warrant
of arrest and a request for arrest and surrender under Article 89 of the Rome
Statute.
9. Minister Grey’s appeal was filed on 25 June 2019, and was duly notified
to the ICC, consistent with Article 59(5) of the Rome Statute. The denial of
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the appeal was likewise notified to the ICC, with a statement that “under
Adawan law, no further appeal is available to the defendant.”
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

_______________________________________________________
The State of Adawa has, by application pursuant to Article 31(1) of this
Court’s Statute, instituted proceedings against the Republic of Rasasa with
regard the dispute concerning violations of international law by the Republic
of Rasasa and invoked the compromissory clause of the 1929 Treaty of
Botega. On 9 September 2019, the Parties have jointly notified to the Court
a Statement of Agreed Facts.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

_______________________________________________________
I.
Whether or not the Court lacks jurisdiction over Adawa’s claims and if
Adawa is a party to the 1929 Treaty of Botega;
II.
Whether or not Rasasa’s development and deployment of the WALL along
the border between Adawa and Rasasa is consistent with international law;
III.
Whether or not Adawa’s claim that Rasasa’s Helian tariffs violate the CHC
Treaty falls outside the Court’s jurisdiction or is inadmissible; and, in the
alternative, if the imposition of the tariffs violates the CHC Treaty; and
IV.
Whether or not Adawa’s arrest and detention of Darian Grey constitute
internationally wrongful acts, and if she must be immediately repatriated to
Rasasa.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

_______________________________________________________
The State of Adawa and the Republic of Rasasa are neighboring
countries in the Crosinian Region, sharing a 201 kilometers long border.
There are other four States in the Crosinian Region, being the only place on
Earth where the Helian hyacinth is cultivated.
All six Crosinian States were provinces of the Kingdom of Crosinia
until 1928, when they divided. Rasasa declared its independence, and the
provinces of Adawa and Zeitounia united to form the Adawa-Zeitounia
Union ¨(“AZU”).
In 1929, Rasasa and AZU, signed the Treaty of Botega on Armistice
and Pacification (the “Treaty of Botega”). On 1 January 1939, Adawa and
Zeitounia amicably agreed to dissolve their Union, and each declared its
independence as of that date.
On 20 June 1969 the six Member States signed a Treaty declaring the
formation of the Crosinian Helian Community (“CHC”). The parties to the
CHC agreed to impose no customs duties within the CHC on Helian spice or
the equipment and materials used to harvest or process the Helian hyacinth.
For the next ten years, the Helian exports flourished in all CHC Member
States. Until the 14 July 2012, when an unprecedented and catastrophic
tropical cyclone, Hurricane Makan, struck the entire Region. A great amount
of Helian hyacinths were destroyed. As a consequence, unemployment began
to increase, and crime rates skyrocketed throughout the Region. Armed
gangs roamed the countryside, stealing salvageable Helian plants and
harvesting and processing equipment from the devastated farms.
In October 2012, the President of Rasasa, Beta Tihmar, convened a
meeting of major Rasasan corporate executives to elicit ideas on how to
address the increasingly serious crime wave that the police had been unable
to staunch.
In that meeting, Ms. Grey, the chief executive officer of the Rasasan
Robotics Corporation (“RRC”), proposed the development of a groundbreaking autonomous security system to suppress criminal activities in
Rasasa and throughout the Region. She called it the “Weaponized
Autonomous Limitation Line” (“WALL”), an autonomous weapon system
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that would deploy advanced technology to deter and apprehend criminals,
while using force only when absolutely necessary. Moreover, the WALL
featured an advanced form of “supervised learning,” in which the training
data had been “tagged” by teams of software engineers from RRC working in
cooperation with Rasasan police officers and military officials. The tagging
highlighted aspects of the training data that indicated armed threats, as well
as indicators of factors that would render an individual effectively hors de
combat.
In January 2013 President Tihmar notified the other five CHC Member
States that Rasasa had contracted with RRC to undertake research and
development of the WALL and all six CHC Member States got involved with
the research and development phase of the project.
By April 2013, police in the other four Crosinian States had gained the
upper hand, and crime levels were restored to pre-Hurricane Makan levels.
Each of these States gradually withdrew from the WALL project. By August
2013, only Rasasa and Adawa continued to participate in the development of
the venture.
On 6 July 2015, Ms. Grey announced the completion of the project.
Both Adawa and Rasasa stated that it was neither economically feasible nor
politically desirable to go further with the project.
In August 2016, the Rasasan Border Police reported that “the small
Adawan gangs that arose in the wake of Hurricane Makan have apparently
organized themselves into large armed groups, and have turned the resources,
personnel, and weapons they previously used for localized crimes towards
cross-border crime into Rasasa.”
Mr. Pindro was elected president of Rasasa and took office in January
2017. He appointed Darian Grey as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Rasasan
human rights groups protested Ms. Grey’s appointment as Foreign Minister,
and the opposition party in parliament was unanimous in voting against it. It
must be noted that in August 2009 the International Criminal Court had
started an investigation concerning war crimes and crimes against humanity
that were alleged to have occurred during the 2007-2009 civil war in the State
of Garantia, and in the referral Ms. Grey was specifically cited as responsible
for the RRC activities there.
Shortly after taking office, President Pindro submitted two bills for
legislative approval. The first provided for the introduction of tariffs of 25%
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ad valorem on Helian bulbs, live plants, and pollen imported into Rasasa.
The second called for expedited review of options for the hardening of the
Adawa-Rasasa border.
On 25 June 2017, President Pindro authorized the deployment of the
Rasasan Army against the militia camps within Rasasa, as well as the
purchase of the WALL from RRC and its installation along the RasasaAdawa border. President Pindro announced the completed installation of the
WALL on 10 January 2018.
In January 2018, Rasasa’s Parliament had, with little debate, adopted
President Pindro’s proposal to impose tariffs on unprocessed Helian
materials imported into Rasasa. Adawa protested the decision and reminded
Rasasa of its obligations under article 3 of the CHC treaty.
In October 2018, Adawa formally requested consultations with Rasasa
in the WTO. Government officials from both Adawa and Rasasa met, but
were unable to resolve the dispute amicably.
In January 2019, the International League for the Support of Agriculture
(ILSA) published a study that presented comprehensive and detailed
evidence that, as a direct result of the tariffs imposed by Rasasa in January
2018, Adawan farmers were estimated to have lost more than €10 million in
revenue through the end of the studied period in October 2018 as a result of
declining sales to processors in Rasasa. It projected that the losses would
increase in coming years.
In February 2019, Adawa requested the establishment of a panel
pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU, alleging that Rasasa’s tariffs on Helian
products were an unjustifiable breach of its commitment to maintain the
bound rate of zero on such items.
On 13 April 2019, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
announced that, pursuant to Article 58 of the Rome Statute, she was
requesting the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Minister Grey, assigning
to her criminal responsibility for certain alleged activities of RRC in
Garantia. The charged acts included war crimes, and “other serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable to armed conflicts not of an
international character,” within Articles 8.2(c) and 8.2(e) of the Rome Statute.
The indictment specifically cited the training and supervision of paramilitary
forces that perpetrated such crimes, the sale and use of prohibited weapons
systems, and the conduct of unauthorized surveillance of civilians that

348092-ILSA_International_27-1_Text.indd 159

12/11/20 1:36 PM

148

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 27.1

allegedly led to their becoming the targets of violent repression.
On 18 June 2019, the CHC held its annual meeting in Adawa. Minister
Grey, representing Rasasa, arrived on the 18 June 2019. Two days later, a PreTrial Chamber of the ICC granted the Prosecutor’s request and issued a
warrant of arrest for Minister Grey under Article 89 of the Rome Statute.
Two days later, on 22 June 2019, officers of the Novazora police approached
Minister Grey as she was leaving her hotel. After ascertaining her identity,
they took her into custody.
On 1 July 2019, after negotiations between the parties, Adawa submitted
an Application instituting proceedings against Rasasa before this Court.
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

_______________________________________________________
I.
The State of Adawa submits that this High Court has jurisdiction over
Adawa’s claim since Adawa is a party to the 1929 Treaty of Botega. This is
due to the fact that Adawa automatically succeeded to all of the AdawanZeitounia Union’s treaties following its dissolution in 1939; or in any event,
the Treaty of Botega automatically continued in force since it establishes a
territorial regime. Notification of succession to Rasasa was not required
under international law. Alternatively, Rasasa tacitly consented to the
continuity of the Treaty of Botega.
II.
With regards to the development of the WALL, it is submitted that it is
attributable to Rasasa and that it violates the new weapons review customary
obligation. Rasasa cannot allege Adawa has no clean hands since it is not a
principle under international law. Regarding the deployment of the WALL
along the shared border, Adawa submits that it violates international law.
First, because it constitutes a prohibited threat of use of force against
Adawa’s territorial integrity and the demarcation lines established in the
Treaty of Botega. Second, because it violates the human right to life and
effective remedies of Adawan nationals under the ICCPR. Third, if the Court
considers that there is a non-international armed conflict, the WALL violates
the international humanitarian law. Consequently, the Court should the
immediate dismantlement and removal of the WALL.
III.
Regarding Rasasa’s imposition of tariffs on Helian products, Adawa
contends that this Court has jurisdiction since there is no normative conflict
between the CHC Treaty and the GATT; and Adawa’s claim is admissible
either because there is no rule of lis pendens under international law or
because its requirements are not met in the present case. Moreover, Adawa
contends that the imposition of tariffs is inconsistent with article 3 of the CHC
Treaty. Adawa further submits that the essential security interest clause
enshrined in article 22(b) of the CHC Treaty is not self-judging and that
Rasasa cannot rely on it to justify non- compliance. Alternatively, Rasasa
cannot plea state of necessity as a circumstance precluding the wrongfulness.
As a result, Adawa is entitled to compensatory damages derived from
Rasasa's violation of its international obligations.
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IV.

Finally, Adawa submits that the arrest and detention of Darian Grey
were consistent with Adawa's obligations under international law since Ms.
Grey does not enjoy immunity under international law. First, because there
is a there is an exception to immunities of public officials with respect to
prosecution by international courts under customary law. Second, because
Ms. Greys immunities are overridden by the jus cogens status of the
prohibition of war crimes. Third, because her immunities were lifted under
the abuse of rights doctrine. Furthermore, Adawa was obliged to prosecute
or extradite Ms. Grey pursuant to the aut dedere aut judicare principle.
Alternatively, Adawa argues that had to execute the arrest warrant
notwithstanding conflicting obligations since the ICC is the sole authority to
decide over its judicial functions. In the further alternative, Adawa acted as
an agent of the ICC when arresting Ms. Grey. Therefore, Adawa may
proceed to render Ms. Grey to the ICC.
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PLEADINGS

_______________________________________________________
A. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE HAS
JURISDICTION OVER ADAWA’S CLAIMS BECAUSE ADAWA IS
A PARTY TO THE 1929 TREATY OF BOTEGA.
I.

Adawa automatically succeeded to the 1929 Treaty of Botega.
a) IN CASES OF DISSOLUTION, ALL BILATERAL TREATIES
AUTOMATICALLY SUCCEED.

Under customary international law, when States dissolve and cease to
exist, leading to the creation of new States on their original territory,1
bilateral treaties in force at the date of the succession automatically succeed.2
This rule is supported by both State practice and opinio juris.3
State practice is evinced by the dissolution of the Union of Colombia,4
5

the Norway and Sweden Union, the Austro-Hungarian Empire,6 the IslandDenmark Real Union,7 the Federation of Mali,8 and the United Arab
Republic.9
Evidence of opinio juris, arising from official publications, diplomatic
correspondence and national legislation stating that a given practice is

1.
Draft Articles on Succession of States in respect of Treaties with commentaries, Report of
the ILC 26th sess., GAOF, 29º Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/29/10) 265; Legality of Use of Force (Serb. and
Montenegro v. Can.) 2004 I.C.J. (Dec. 15) (Separate opinion of judge Elaraby) [“Use of Force, Elaraby”],
512; J. CRAWFORD, STATE PRACTICE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN RELATION TO SECESSION 92 (2014).
2.
Int’I Law Comm’n, Yearbook of the ILC (1974), UN.Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.l (Part
1) 265; J. Mervyn Jones, State Succession in the Matter of Treaties, 24 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 360 (1947)
[“Mervyn Jones”], 374.
3.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, [“ICJ Statute”]
Article 38 (1)(b); North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Neth.), 1968 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 26), ¶¶74, 77.
4.

Mervyn Jones, supra note 2, 368.

5.

Id.

6.
Int’I Law Comm’n, Yearbook of the ILC (1970), UN.Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1970Add.l (vol.
II) [“Yearbook 1970”]123.
7.

Yearbook 1970 supra note 6,122; Mervyn Jones, supra note 2, 369.

8.
Int’I Law Comm’n, Yearbook of the ILC (1971), UN.Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1971/Add.l (vol.
II) (Part 2) [“Yearbook 1971”]146.
9.

Yearbook 1971, supra note 8, 142.
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binding under customary international law,10 conforms the practice of
automatic succession.11
After the Adawa-Zeitounia Union [“AZU”] was dissolved into two
independent States in 1939,12 Adawa and Zeitounia automatically succeeded
to all of the AZU’s treaties, including the Treaty of Botega.
b) IN ANY EVENT, AUTOMATIC CONTINUITY APPLIES TO TREATIES
ESTABLISHING TERRITORIAL REGIMES

Even if this Court considers that a successor State does not
automatically succeed to all of its predecessor’s treaties,13there is a
customary exception of automatic continuity regarding treaties establishing
territorial regimes, inter alia, boundary and demilitarization treaties.
Therefore, Adawa automatically succeeded.

(i) The Treaty of Botega is a boundary treaty
Treaties establishing boundaries and their respective ancillary
provisions, such as dispute settlement mechanisms, remain in force
notwithstanding any State succession.14 This Court,15 the U.N. Security
Council16 and scholars17 have recognized that armistice demarcation lines are
tantamount to boundaries, since they delineate the territory, bind the parties

10.
Int’I Law Comm’n, Draft conclusions on identification of customary international law with
commentaries, A/73/10 (2018), 141.
11.
Syrian Arab Republic – Legislative Decree 25 of 13 June 1962, Article I; France – Journal
Officiel de la Republique Française, Lois et Decrets, Paris 2 June 1961; Nations, Multilateral Treaties
Deposited with the Secretary-General, Historical Information. Note of Czech Republic to the UN.
12.

Statement of Agreed Facts [SAF] ¶7.

13.
P. Dumberry, State Succession to Bilateral Treaties: A Few Observations on the Incoherent
and Unjustifiable Solution Adopted for Secession and Dissolution of States under the 1978 Vienna
Convention, 28 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW , 13 (2014) 14.
14.

Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect to Treaties, Aug. 23, 1978, 1946

U.N.T.S. 3 [“VCSST”], Article 11; Draft Articles on Succession of States in respect of Treaties with
commentaries, Report of the ILC, 26º sess., GAOF, 29º Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/29/10) [“VCSST
commentaries”] 201; A. ZIMMERMANN, Secession and the law of State succession in M. KOHEN (ED),
SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES, 215-216 (2006).
15.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion 2004 I.C.J. (Jul. 9) [“Wall Advisory Opinion”] ¶¶72-76.
16.

S.C. Res. 95, 10-11 (Sep. 1, 1951).

17.
Y. DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 46 (2011); H. S. Levie, The Nature
and Scope of the Armistice Agreement, 50 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 880 (1956),
890.

348092-ILSA_International_27-1_Text.indd 164

12/11/20 1:36 PM

Distinguished Brief

2020]

153

indefinitely and can only be modified by mutual consent.18 The mere fact
that armistice lines are established “without prejudice” to their ultimate
settlement do not alter their permanent character.19
In the case at bar, the Treaty of Botega is a boundary treaty since it
established an Armistice Demarcation Line between the contracting parties.20

(ii) The Treaty of Botega is a demilitarization treaty
As recognized by this Court, treaties creating obligations or restrictions
upon the use of a territory for the benefit of a group of Sates are not affected
by a State succession.21 Demilitarization treaties, which separate the armed
forces of former belligerent parties,22 are typically regarded as treaties
attaching obligations to a particular territory23 and thus continuing ipso jure
after a State succession.24
The Treaty of Botega is a demilitarization treaty since its object and
purpose is the cessation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace and
security in the general interest of the peoples of Crosinia through the
establishment of an armistice.25 The treaty’s text supports this interpretation,
for it establishes Demarcation Lines to separate the armed forces of the
parties,26 thus imposing restrictions upon the use of the territory.
c) NOTIFICATION OF SUCCESSION IS NOT REQUIRED
Respondent may allege that notification by a successor State expressing
its consent to be bound by a bilateral treaty is required under international
law. However, notifications, unilateral declarations, devolution agreements
and other means to demonstrate that the successor State is obliged by its

18.

Y. Dinstein, war, aggression and self-defence 46 (2011)

19.

Y. Dinstein, Demarcation Line, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law

20.

Botega Treaty, Article I.

21.

VCSST, supra note 14, Article 12; Gabčíkovo- Project (Hung. v. Slo) 1997

I.C.J. (Sep. 25) [“Gabčíkovo”] ¶152.
22.
(2010), ¶1.
23.

J. Von Bernstorff, Demarcation Line, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law
VCSST commentaries, supra note 14, 197; J. CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF
(2012).

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 439

24.

M. CRAVEN, THE DECOLONIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW : STATE SUCCESSION AND THE
(2007).

LAW OF TREATIES, 188-189

25.

Botega Treaty, Preamble.

26.

Botega Treaty, Article I.
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predecessor’s obligations have a mere confirmatory character.27 In cases of
dissolution, the successor State automatically assumes the treaty obligations
of its predecessor even in the absence of such notification.28 Thus, Adawa’s
lack of notification does not bar the continuity of the Treaty of Botega.
II.

Alternatively, Rasasa acquiesced to Adawa’s claim of succession

According to the principle of acquiescence,29 silence or inaction by a
State after a reasonable period of time is interpreted as consent30 when a
response expressing objection in relation to a declaration of another State
would be called for.31 The need for a response is particularly required when
such declaration specially affects the silent State’s interests or rights.32
Here, Rasasa was specially affected by President Moraga’s declaration
regarding the violation of the Treaty of Botega by the installation of the
WALL.33 This declaration was public and addressed to President Pindro,
thus giving Rasasa ample opportunity to object to the continuity of the Treaty
of Botega. Therefore, Rasasa consented to Adawa’s claim of succession.
III.

The Court has jurisdiction over Adawa’s claim

As a successor State of the AZU, Adawa is a party to the Treaty of
Botega. Pursuant to Article VI of such Treaty and Article 36(5) of this Court's
Statute, this Court has jurisdiction over Adawa's claims.34

27.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Croat. v. Serb.) 2008 I.C.J. 595 (Nov. 18) ¶109; B. Stern, Questions choisies, 262 R.C.A.D.I 233 (1996)
253.
28.
Use of Force, Elaraby, supra note 1, ¶511; International Law Association, ILA Resolution
on Aspects on the Law on State Succession, 73 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE (2008) ¶4.
29.
Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. (December 18) ¶138-139; Delimitation of
the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.) 1984 ICJ (Oct. 12) [“Gulf of Maine”]
¶130; Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malay. v. Sing.)
2008 ICJ (May 23) ¶121.
30.

Gulf of Maine, supra note 29, ¶130.

J. CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 419 (2012)
[“CRAWFORD”]; N. S. Marques Antunes, Acquiescence, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International
Law, (2006) ¶21.
31.

32.

CRAWFORD, supra note 31, 419; P. DUMBERRY, A GUIDE TO STATE SUCCESSION IN
85 (2018).

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW

33.

SAF ¶38.

34.

ICJ Statute, supra note 3, Article 36(5).
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B. RASASA’S DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE
WALL ALONG THE BORDER BETWEEN ADAWA AND RASASA
IS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE WALL
MUST BE DISMANTLED AND REMOVED FORTHWITH
I.

The development of the WALL violates international law
a) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WALL IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO RASASA

The conduct of a private company is attributable to the State when it is
performed under the State’s instructions, directions or control.35 The terms
“instructions”, “direction” and “control” are disjunctive, hence it is sufficient
to establish one of them.36
Here, Rasasa instructed the RCC to develop the WALL37 and directed
every other instance of the project, including the tagging of training data and
the field tests. Hence, the development is attributable to Rasasa.
b) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WALL VIOLATES THE WEAPONS
REVIEW OBLIGATION

According to customary law, States are obliged to review the legality of
new means and methods of warfare,38 as evidenced by State practice39 and
opinio juris.40 This review has to take into account the foreseeable use of the
weapon.41
Rasasa’s review considered the potential use of the WALL in an armed
conflict –as evidenced by RCC’s reference to individuals “hors de

35.
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda) 2005 I.C.J. 168 (Dec.
19) [“Armed Activities”], ¶¶175-176.
36.
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act with commentaries,
adopted by the ILC at its 53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [“ARSIWA commentaries”], 48.
37.

SAF ¶19.

38.

W. Boothby, weapons and the law of armed conflicts 249 (2016) [“boothby”].

39.
I. Daoust, New wars, new weapons? The obligation of States to assess the legality of means
and methods of warfare, 84 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, 345 (2012), 354-357; ICRC,
A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977, 88 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, 931 (2006),
933, 934.
40.
Group of Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, Weapons Review Mechanisms
Submitted by the Netherlands and Switzerland, CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.5, ¶18 (Nov. 7, 2017).
41.

BOOTHBY, supra note 38, 347.
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combat”42 when presenting the weapon– but not as border control system in
a law enforcement situation. Therefore, Rasasa’s review does not meet the
standard required by customary international law.
c) RASASA CANNOT ALLEGE THE CLEAN HANDS PRINCIPLE
Rasasa cannot allege “clean hands”, as it is not a principle under
international law43 and this Court has declined to consider it on several
opportunities.44
II.

The deployment of the Wall violates international law.
a) THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE WALL VIOLATES ARTICLE 2(4) OF
THE U.N. CHARTER

Under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, States shall refrain from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity of other States.45 Territorial
integrity relates to the exclusive sovereignty of a State over its own
territory.46 A threat of force can consist in the possibility of cross–border use
of weapons47 and the concentrations of troops along borders,48 as evidenced

42.

SAF ¶20.

43.
Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. Russia, Final Award, P.C.A. Case No.2005nd
05/AA228, Jul. 18, 2014, ¶ 1358; James Crawford (Special Rapporteur) 2
Report on State
Responsibility, UN Doc A/CN.4/498 and Add.1–4 ( Jul. 19, 1999), 83; B. BOLLECKER- STERN, LE
PRÉJUDICE DANS LA THÉORIE DE LA RESPONSABILITÉ INTERNATIONAL 312 (1973).
44.
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003, I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6), ¶100; Wall Advisory Opinion, supra
note 15, ¶ 63.
45.
Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, [“U.N. Charter”], Article 2(4); G.A.
Res. 2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970).
46.
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [“Nicaragua
¶209; S. Blay, Territorial Integrity and Political Independence, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public
International Law (2010), ¶8.
47.
G. NOLTE & A. RANDELZHOFER, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of
the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, Article 51, in B. SIMMA et al (EDS), THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, VOLUME II, 1410 (2012).
48.
J. GREEN, F. GRIMAL, The Threat of Force as an Action in Self-Defense Under International
Law, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 285 (2011) 297.
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by the State practice of Turkey,49 Yugoslavia,50 Pakistan51, Iraq52 and the
Soviet Union.53 Furthermore, this Court has acknowledged that military
maneuvers near a State border may amount to a threat of force.54 Rasasa’s
deployment of hundreds of autonomous armed towers along the entire 201kilometer shared border,55 equipped and authorized to use force against
Adawan territory and people,56 constitutes a prohibited threat to use force in
violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
b) THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE WALL VIOLATES THE TREATY OF
BOTEGA

The Treaty of Botega establishes a general armistice with a view towards
regional peace as well as demarcation lines to minimize the possibility of
friction and incidents.57 It is understood that an armistice consists of a
suspension of military operations.58 Accordingly, States must refrain from
the threat of use of force to violate armistice demarcation lines.59
Respondent placed in the Adawan-Rasasan border a weapon capable of
deploying force beyond the demarcation lines. This constitutes a threat to
use force60 contrary to Article I of the Treaty of Botega.
c) THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE WALL VIOLATES INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

49.
Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Suppl. 1964-1965, XVI, 238 S. (Sales
No. 1968. VII. 1). Doc. ST/PSCA/l/Add. 4., 202 (1968).
50.
U.N.S.C., Letter dated 1 February 1999 from the Chargé D’Affaires A.I. of the Permanent
Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N Doc.
S/1999/107 (Feb. 2, 1999); U.N.S.C., Letter dated 5 February 1999 from the Chargé D’Affaires A.I. of the
Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/118 (Feb. 4, 1999).
51.
U.N.S.C., Cablegram dated 15 July 1951 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to
the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2245 (Jul. 15, 1951).
52.

S.C. Res. 949, (Oct. 15, 1994).

53.
A. De Luca, Soviet- American Politics and the Turkish Straits, 92 POLITICAL SCI. Q. 503
(1977), 516–20.
54.

Nicaragua, supra note 46, ¶227.

55.

SAF ¶2.

56.

SAF ¶37.

57.

Botega Treaty, Article I.

58.

U.K. — Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, 263

59.

G.A. Res. 2625, (Oct. 24 1970).

60.

Supra §(II)(B)(1).
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(i) Adawa has standing to bring this claim
Adawa complies with the requirements to exercise diplomatic
protection61 since (i) the WALL affects Adawan nationals;62 and (ii)
exhaustion of local remedies is not required when no relevant connection
exists between the injured individuals and the responsible State.63

(ii) International human rights law is applicable
A non-international armed conflict [“NIAC”] exists when organized
armed groups engage in protracted and intense armed violence with the
State.64 Banditry, unorganized and short-lived insurrections do not amount
to a NIAC. 65 The isolated attacks to the Rasasan Border Police stations does
not reach a NIAC’s threshold.

(iii) ICCPR applies extraterritorially
States must protect human rights of individuals within their territory and
under their jurisdiction.66 Extraterritorial jurisdiction exists when a State’s
actions produce effects outside its territory.67 Here, the WALL has the
potential to injure and even kill people in Adawan territory,68 thus the ICCPR
applies.

(iv) Rasasa violates the right to life

61.
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, Report of the ILC, 58th Sess. G.A. 63rd Sess. Supp.
No. 10 A/61/10 [“Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection”], Articles 1, 3, 14; Articles on Responsibility
of States for Internationally Wrongful Act adopted by the ILC at its 53rd Sess., annexed to G.A. Res.
56/83, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) [“ARSIWA”], Article 44 (b).
62.

SAF ¶¶37-38.

63.
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, supra note 61, Article 15(c); Trail smelter case,
Award, (U.S v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1961
64.
International Law Association, Final Report on The Meaning of Armed Conflict in
International Law (Aug. 2010), http://www.ila-hq.org, p.2; The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction Appeal Chamber, I.C.T.Y. Case No. IT-94-1AR72 Oct.2, 1995, ¶70.
65.
1997 ¶562.

The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, Trial Chamber I.C.T.Y., Case No. IT-94-1-T, May 7,

66.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 19, 1966) 999 U.N.T.S.171
[“ICCPR”], Article 2(1); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 1996 I.C.J. (July 11) [“Genocide”] ¶31.
67.

Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, No. 12747/87 E.Ct.H.R. (Jun. 26, 1992), ¶91.

68.

SAF ¶37.

348092-ILSA_International_27-1_Text.indd 170

12/11/20 1:36 PM

Distinguished Brief

2020]

159

Under Article 6(1) of the ICCPR, States cannot engage in conducts that
may arbitrarily deprive life,69 even if such conducts do not result in loss of
life.70 Potential use of force in law enforcement situations is only lawful
when there is an imminent threat to life.71 Border control,72 disobeying a
warning,73 the suspected possession of a weapon74 or wearing an “enemy”
uniform75 do not justify use of lethal force.
Moreover, the imminence requirement is extremely strict,76 meaning “a
matter of seconds, not hours”.77 LAWS employed with algorithmic tagging
to identify objectives and authorize use of force violate this requirement since
threats are identified in advanced, when there is no “imminent” emergency to
response.78
The WALL uses algorithmic tagging to establish threats,79 and forcibly
prevent illegal border-crossings in either direction of the Adawan-Rasasan
border.80 Accordingly, individuals not presenting any imminent threat to life
might be arbitrarily killed. The fact that the WALL deploys force as a last
69.
ICCPR, supra note 66, Article 6; Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 36, U.N.
Doc CCPR/C/GC/36 (Oct. 30, 2018), ¶7.
70.
Benzer and others v. Turkey, No. 23502/06 E.Ct.H.R (Mar. 24, 2014), ¶163; Andreou v.
Turkey, No. 45653/99 E.Ct.H.R. (Oct. 27, 2009), ¶46; D. MURRAY, Conduct of Hostilities and Targeting
in E. WILMSHURT et al (ED.), PRACTITIONERS' GUIDE TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 119120 (2016).
71.
U.N. Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, United Nations Basic Principles
on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, (1990), ¶9; Landaeta Mejías Brothers et al.
v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 281, (Aug. 24, 2014) ¶131; Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions), Twenty-fifth session of the Human Right Council, UN Doc. A/HR/C/26/36 (April 1,
2014) [“Heyns”] ¶59.
72.
Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. Germany, Nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98 E.Ct.H.R.
(Mar. 22, 2001), ¶73.
73.

Kakoulli v. Turkey, No 38595/97 E.Ct.H.R. (Nov. 22, 2005), ¶119.

74.

Kallis and Androulla Panayi v. Turkey, No 45388/99 E.Ct.H.R. (Oct.27, 2009), ¶60.

75.

Id.

76.
G. Gaggioli, “The Use of Force in Armed Conflicts: Conduct of Hostilities, Law
Enforcement and Self-Defense” in C. FORD, W. WILLIAMS, COMPLEX BATTLESPACES: THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT AND THE DYNAMICS OF MODERN WARFARE 76 (2019).
77.

Heyns, supra note 71, ¶59

78.
M. Brehm, Defending the Boundary: Constraints and Requirements on the Use of
Autonomous Weapon Systems Under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, 9 GENEVA
ACADEMY BRIEFING 3 (2017) [“Brehm”] 24.
79.

SAF ¶20

80.

SAF ¶¶37,39
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resort and guarantees that law-abiding citizens will not be harmed81 does not
render it lawful since “every human being” has the inherent right to life, not
just innocent civilians.82 Consequently, Rasasa violated the right to life.

(v) Rasasa violated the right to remedy
Effective remedies83 includes the State’s obligation to prosecute and
punish those accountable for human rights violations.84 In the case of LAWS,
individual accountability for arbitrary deprivation of life is not possible,85
since the weapon cannot be punished nor deterred. 86
Moreover,
dismantlement of the weapon is not an effective remedy for victims seeking
retribution.87
The WALL’s potential use of force together with lack of any human
control violates the right to an effective remedy, since no actor would be
directly criminally responsible for human right violations.
d) IN ANY EVENT, THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE WALL VIOLATES IHL

(i) The WALL violates principles of targeting
The distinction principle mandates that attacks may only be directed
against military targets and objectives.88 Weapons programmed to target on
the basis of observable, behavioral or other “signatures” do not comply with

81.

SAF ¶37

82.

ICCPR, supra note 66, Article 1.

83.

ICCPR, supra note 66, Article 2(3).

84.
B. Docherty, Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 1
(2012) 42; D. Hammond, Autonomous Weapons and the Problem of State Accountability, 15 CHICAGO
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 652 (2015) 662; U. C. Jha, Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems and
International Humanitarian Law, 16 ISIL Y.B. INT'L HUMAN. & REFUGEE L. 112 (2016-2017) 125.
85.
Christof Heyns (Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions),
Twenty-third session of the Human Right Council, UN Doc. A/HR/C/23/47 (April 9, 2013) ¶76.
86.
C. Heyns, Human Rights and the use of Autonomous Weapons Systems During Domestic
Law Enforcement, 38 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, 350 (2016) 373; B. Docherty, Losing Humanity: The
Case against Killer Robots, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 1 (2012) 44.
87.
(2012) 45.

B. Docherty, Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 1

88.
J. HENCKAERTS, L. DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
I 3, 25; Legality of the threat or use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ 1996 [“Nuclear
Weapons”] ¶78
VOL.
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this principle, since they do not map exactly onto the definitions of persons
or objects that may be made the object of attack under IHL.89
Moreover, under the principle of proportionality, civilian damage must
not be excessive in relation to the concrete military advantage anticipated
from the attack as a whole.90 Such balance requires a subjective judgment
between military advantage and humanitarian concerns.91
Finally, the precaution principle obliges States to do everything feasible
to cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that the target is not
military.92 This requires human agents to retain sufficient control to identify
changing circumstances and make adjustments in a timely manner.93
The WALL cannot distinguish between civilian and military targets
since it is programmed to target whatever its algorithm –based on tagged
“signatures”94 - interprets as an armed threat.95 Further, the WALL lacks
meaningful human control to strike the subjective balance to weight
damages.96
Consequently, the WALL violates the principles of necessity,
proportionality and precaution.

(ii) The WALL cannot determine the applicable body of law
During the conduct of hostilities, human control over LAWS is required
to shift to a law enforcement model when the circumstances so require.97 The

89.
K. Benson, 'Kill 'em and Sort it Out Later:' Signature Drone Strikes and International
Humanitarian Law, 27 PACIFIC MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUSINESS & DEVELOPMENT LAW JOURNAL 17 (2014),
49.
90.
D. Thürer, International Humanitarian Law: Theory, Practice, Context, 338 R.C.A.D.I 9,
74 (2008); J. HENCKAERTS, L. DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOL
I, 173, 175 (2009); S. Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in D. FLECK, (ED.) THE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 119 (2009) 186; W. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilian as a
Punishable Offense, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 53 (1997) 548.
91.
The Prosecutor v. Galić, Judgment and Opinion, Trial Chamber I, I.C.T.Y., Case No. IT98-29-T, Dec. 5, 2003, ¶58.
92.

J.-m.henckaerts & l.doswald-beck, customary international humanitarian law, vol.i, 60

93.

Brehm, supra note 78, 40.

94.

SAF ¶20.

95.

SAF ¶20.

96.

SAF ¶24.

97.

Brehm, supra note 78, 40.

(2009)
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WALL detects individual and isolated threats,98 but it is unable to analyze
social or political factors to determine whether the State is engaged in an
armed conflict that would trigger the applicability of IHL or not.
III.

The WALL must be dismantled and removed forthwith

Under international law, the State responsible for an internationally
wrongful act must fully repair the injury caused,99 re-establishing the status
quo ante.100 Since the deployment of the WALL is attributable to Rasasa101
and constitutes an internationally wrongful act,102 it must be dismantled and
removed forthwith.
C. THE COURT MAY ADJUDICATE ADAWA’S CLAIM THAT
RASASA’S IMPOSITION OF TARIFFS ON HELIAN PRODUCTS
FROM ADAWA VIOLATES THE CHC TREATY, AND ADAWA IS
ENTITLED TO COMPENSATORY DAMAGES REFLECTING THE
FINANCIAL HARM IT HAS SUFFERED TO DATE.
I.

The Court may adjudicate Adawa’s claims

This Court may adjudicate Adawa’s claim because: (i) the Crosinian
Helian Community Treaty [“CHC Treaty”] remains applicable as it has no
normative conflict with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
[“GATT”]; and (ii) the Dispute Settlement Understanding [“DSU”] exclusive
jurisdiction does not prevent this Court from adjudicating disputes arising
from treaties other than the World Trade Organization [“WTO”] agreements.
a) THERE IS NO NORMATIVE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE GATT AND
THE CHC TREATY
The same international law issue may be regulated by more than one

98.

SAF ¶24.

99.
Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928, P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 13), ¶29;
Gabčíkovo, supra note 21, ¶152; ARSIWA, supra note 61, Article 31.
100.

ARSIWA, supra note 61, Article 31.

101. ARSIWA, supra note 61, Article 2; Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of
a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62 (Apr. 29), 87.
102.

ARSIWA, supra note 61, Article 2.
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treaty.103 In this case, there is a presumption against normative conflict104
and thus the interpretation which preserves the operation of the two treaties
must be followed.105 Indeed, there is a presumption that when creating new
obligations, States do not to derogate from their previous ones.106 Only if a
normative conflict exists the principles of lex posteriori107 and lex specialis108
are applicable.109
Under the CHC Treaty, Adawa and Rasasa agreed to impose no custom
duties on Helian products or related goods. Subsequently, both States
submitted zero bound rates for these same products under the GATT.110 The
obligations assumed under both treaties are very similar to each other since
they both regulate Helian tariffs, thus the presumption against normative
conflict applies. This conclusion is further supported by Article XXIV of the
GATT, which permits the existence of regional trade agreements with similar
obligations,111 such as the CHC Treaty.112
Since there is no normative conflict between the CHC Treaty and the

103. The Mox Plant Case, (Ire. v. U.K.), Case No. 10, Request for Provisional Measures,
I.T.L.O.S. (Dec. 3) 2000, (Separate opinion of Judge Wolfrum), [“Mox Plant”], 131; Southern Bluefïn
Tuna Case, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, (Aus. N.Z. v. Jap.), 23 R.I.A.A. 1, 57, [“Southern
Bluefin Tuna”] ¶41(h).
104. Int’I Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Study Group of the International Law Commission,
Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, (2006), 37; J. PAWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW , HOW THE WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 240-241
(2003) [“PAWELYN”]; Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Por. v. Ind.) Judgement on Preliminary
Objections, 1957 I.C.J. (Nov. 26) ¶22.
105.

O. CORTEN & P. KLEIN, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A
VOLUME I 789 (2011); Panel Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and
Clothing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS34/R, 31 May 1999 ¶9.92-9.96; Panel Report, Indonesia - Certain
Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WTO Doc. WT/DS64/R, 2 Jul. 1998 ¶14.28.
COMMENTARY.

106.

R. JENNINGS ET AL (EDS.), OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1275 (1992).

107. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [“VCLT”],
Article 30(3).
108. Int’I Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law,
Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, (2006), 56; PAWELYN, supra note 104, 385; ARSIWA
commentaries, supra note 36, 140; Nicaragua, supra note 46, ¶274; Gabčíkovo, supra note 21, ¶132;
ARSIWA, supra note 61, Article 55.
109. Int’I Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law,
Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, (2006), 56, 230.
110.

SAF ¶ 12.

111.

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867

54U.N.T.S. 154, Annex 1.A, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, [“GATT”], Article XXIV.
112.

SAF Clarification 5.
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GATT, both treaties are applicable over tariffs on Helian products.
b) THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS UNDER THE CHC
TREATY
Respondent may argue that Article 23(1) of the DSU prevents this Court
from adjudicating Adawa’s claims. However, the WTO does not have the
monopoly over the settlement of trade disputes.113
The Dispute Settlement Body [“DSB”] has exclusive jurisdiction only
over disputes arising from the “covered agreements”,114 i.e. the treaties set
in Appendix 1 of the DSU.115 No claims for the violation of international law
other than those set out in the covered agreements can be brought before a
WTO panel. Moreover, breaches of free trade agreements are adjudicated by
their own dispute settlement mechanisms.116 Here, Adawa’s claims arise
under the CHC Treaty,117 over which the DSB lacks jurisdiction. Thus, this
Courts has jurisdiction over such claims under Article VI of the Treaty of
Botega.118
II.

Adawa’s claim is admissible
a) THERE IS NO RULE OF LIS PENDENS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

When the jurisdictions of two unrelated and independent tribunals
extend to the same dispute, there is no rule of international law preventing
them from exercising their jurisdiction.119 International tribunals have only
refused to exercise jurisdiction pending a decision by another tribunal based

113. Panel Report, Argentina – Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil, WTO
Doc. WT/DS241/R, Apr. 22, 2003, ¶7.38.
114.

PAWELYN,

supra note 104, 444.

115. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154, Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
[“DSU”].
Y. Lee, Regional Trade Agreements in the WTO System: Potential Issues and Solutions, 7
353 (2015), 365; North American Free Trade Agreement, Jan.
1, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, Chapter Twenty; Protocolo de Olivos para la Solución de controversias en el
MERCOSUR, Feb. 18, 2002, 2251 U.N.T.S. 243; Agreement establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New
Zealand Free Trade Area, Jan. 28, 1992, 2672 U.N.T.S. I-47529, Article 30
116.

JOURNAL OF EAST ASIA AND INT’L LAW

117.

SAF ¶61.C

118.

Botega Treaty, Article VI.

119. Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited V. Arab Republic of Egypt (Pyramids
Case), Decision on preliminary objections to jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3 (Nov. 27) 1985
[“Southern Pacific Properties”], ¶84
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on comity120 which has discretionary nature.121 Accordingly, the fact that a
similar proceeding is taking place before the WTO122 does not render
Adawa’s claim inadmissible.
b) ALTERNATIVELY, THERE IS NO LIS PENDENS IN THE PRESENT
CASE

Even if this Court considers lis pendens is binding under international
law, this rule is only applicable where there are identical parties, legal basis
and relief sought before tribunals of the same character.123 Here, these
requirements are not cumulatively met.
First, the actions do not have the same legal basis. A single State act
may violate more than one treaty124 since rights and obligations from
different conventional sources have a separate existence.125 Consequently,
actions arising from two different treaties have different causes of action.126
Here, the WTO Panel will deal with violations under GATT, while the ICJ
will address violations of the CHC Treaty.
Second, the relief sought is different. The relief before a WTO Panel is,
primarily, to put the measure in conformity with WTO law.127 Exceptionally,
the DSB may authorize suspension of concessions or a compensation (which
is temporary, voluntary and proactive).128 Conversely, the relief sought
before this Court under the CHC Treaty concerns financial and retroactive
compensation under customary law.129

Southern Pacific Properties, supra note 119, ¶84; Mox Plant, supra note 103, ¶28.
J. CRAWFORD, CHANCE, ORDER, CHANGE: THE COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW , GENERAL
COURSE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 299 (2014); Y. SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 261 (2003).
120.
121.

122. SAF ¶47.
123. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, (Qatar v. U.A.E) 2019 I.C.J (June 14) (Dissenting opinion of Judge ad-hoc Cot) ¶5;
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6 (Aug. 25) 20;
S.A.R.L Benvenuti & Bonfant v. People’s Republic of the Congo, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/77/2
(Dec. 15) 1977 ¶1.14
124. Southern Bluefin Tuna, supra note 103, ¶52; Mox Plant, supra note 103, 131.
125. Mox Plant, supra note 103, ¶50.
126. J. Pawelyn, et. al, Forum Shopping before International Tribunals: Real Concerns,
Impossible Solutions, 42 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 77 (2009), 110.
127. C. Amerasinghe, jurisdiction of specific international tribunals 507 (2009); DSU, supra note
115, Article 22 (1).
128.

DSU, supra note 155, Article 22 (1).

129.

ARSIWA, supra note 61, Article 36(1).
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Finally, the tribunals have a different character. The DSB is a quasijudicial or quasi- adjudicative body130 while the ICJ is a judicial organ.131
Consequently, Adawa’s claim is admissible.
III.

Rasasa’s imposition of tariffs on Helian products is inconsistent
with the CHC Treaty.
a) THE IMPOSITION OF TARIFFS VIOLATES ARTICLE 3 OF THE CHC
TREATY

Pursuant to Article 3 of the CHC Treaty, members of the Community
agreed to impose no custom duties on Helian products and related goods.
Accordingly, Rasasa’s imposition of tariffs violates this Article.
b) ARTICLE 22(B) IS NOT SELF-JUDGING
When States intend to exclude judicial revision from measures
importing non- compliance with a treaty, they do so expressly.132 For this
purpose, they specifically include the wording “it considers” or “the State
considers”.133
Article 22(b) cannot be interpreted as being self-judging because it lacks
the words “it considers”. Thus, Rasasa’s actions are susceptible of judicial
revision by this Court.
c) RASASA CANNOT RELY ON ARTICLE 22(B) AS A JUSTIFICATION
FOR NON-COMPLIANCE
Rasasa cannot invoke Article 22(b) of the CHC Treaty in order to justify
the imposition of tariffs given that (i) its essential security interests were not
threatened or, alternatively (ii) the measures taken were not necessary.

130. E. Ramirez Robles, political & quasi-adjudicative dispute settlement models in european
union free trade agreements Is the quasi-adjudicative model a trend or is it just another model?, ERSD2006-09, World Trade Organization Economic Research and Statistics Division Working Paper (2006) 3.
131.

ICJ Statute, supra note 3, Article 1.

132. CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, May.
12, 2005, ¶370, LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp., LG&E International INC. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on liability, Oct. 3 2006, ¶213 [“LG&E”]; CC/Devas
(Mauritius) Ltd., Devas Employees Mauritius Private Limited., and Telcom Devas Mauritius Limited v.
The Republic of India, Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, UNCITRAL PCA Case No. 2013-09, (Jul. 25,
2016), ¶219.
133.

Nicaragua, supra note 46, ¶222.
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(i) Rasasa’s economic crisis does not fulfill the threshold of
Article 22(b)

The concept of essential security interests refers to the quintessential
functions of the State, namely the protection of its territory and population,
and the maintenance of public order.134 Economic crisis have only been
deemed as threatening essential security interests in situations where the
State endures large portion of the population below the poverty line,
widespread unrest, disturbances with risk of insurrection, breakdown of
government and political institutions,135 which would cause the whole State’s
economic foundation to be under siege.136
Here, the decline in the Helian production, and the mere prospect of a
future economic crisis,137 are not menaces to Rasasa’s essential security
interests. Contrarily, the tariffs were driven by a protectionist intent, since
mere sectorial difficulties138 cannot reach the threshold of a threat to an
essential security interest.

(ii) In any event, the measures taken were not necessary
Measures are “necessary” if they are objectively required in order to
achieve the protection of an essential security interest and States do not have
any other reasonable alternatives less in conflict or more compliant with its
international obligations.139
Rasasa’s justification for the measure was the prospect of economic
collapse in five or ten years.140 For such a long period of time, unilateral
imposition of tariff seems hardly the only alternative. Contrary, rather a more
progressive approach with the inclusion of all the Helian community and in
compliance with the mere purpose of the CHC Treaty would have been
preferred.

134. Panel Report, Russia – Measures concerning traffic in transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R
(Apr. 5, 2019) ¶7.130.
135.
2008 ¶180.

Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9 Sep. 5

136.

LG&E, supra note 132, ¶238.

137.

SAF ¶30, ¶44.

138.

SAF ¶30.

139. Deutsche Telekom AG v. The Republic of India, Interim Award, UNCITRAL PCA Case No.
2014-10 (Dec. 13) 2017 ¶239.
140.

SAF ¶30.
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IV. Additionally, Rasasa cannot allege a state of necessity.
States may not allege state of necessity as a circumstance precluding
wrongfulness if it seriously impairs an essential interest of another State.141
By imposing tariffs on the Helian hyacinth, Rasasa seriously impaired
Adawa’s essential interests. Rasasa caused grave damages to Adawan
farmers, with estimated losses of more than €10 million in revenue.142 That
will only continue to increase in the upcoming years.143 Therefore, Rasasa
cannot plea necessity.
V.

Adawa is entitled to compensatory damages derived from Rasasa’s
violation of its obligations.

States must compensate for any material loss caused by their breaches
of international law.144 By imposing tariffs on Helian products, Rasasa has
committed an internationally wrongful act145 and owes compensation to
Adawa on behalf of the Adawan farmers that suffered direct financial losses
estimated in €10 million.146
D. THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF DARIAN GREY WERE
CONSISTENT WITH ADAWA’S OBLIGATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND ADAWA MAY PROCEED TO
RENDER HER TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
I.

Ms. Grey does not enjoy immunity under international law.

Respondent may argue that Ms. Grey enjoys personal immunity under
the CHC Treaty or customary law. However, such alleged immunities are
not applicable since (i) there is a customary exception with respect to
prosecution by international courts, (ii) the jus cogens nature of the
prohibition of war crimes overrides immunity, and, alternatively (iii) her
appointment constituted an abuse of rights.

141. ARSIWA, supra note 61, Article 25(b); Wall Advisory Opinion, supra note 15, ¶140; J.
CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART, 313-314 (2013).
142.

SAF ¶43.

143.

SAF ¶43.

144. Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment on Jurisdiction, 1927 P.C.I.J (Ser. A) Nº 8 (Jul.
26), ¶21; Genocide, supra note 66, ¶460. Gabčíkovo, supra note 21, ¶15; ARSIWA, supra note 61, Article
34.
145.

Supra §(III)(C).

146.

SAF ¶46.
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TO

Under international customary law, there is an exception to immunities
of public officials with respect to prosecution by international courts.147 State
practice is evidenced by the adherence to the Charter of the Nuremberg148 and
Tokyo149 Tribunals, the Nuremberg Principles,150 the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [“ICTY”] Statute,151 the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Statute152 and the Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind.153 Opinio juris can be found in
Security Council resolutions154 and submissions to the United Nations
Secretary-General.155
This customary exception is recognized in judicial decisions issued by
the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg,156 the ICTY,157 the Special
147. The Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, I.C.C.
The Appeals Chamber, May. 6, 2019 [“Al-Bashir AC”] ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2 ¶¶103-113; The Prosecutor
v. Al-Bashir, Judgment in the Jordan Referral re Al-Bashir Appeal, Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges
Eboe-Osuji, Morrison, Hofmański and Bossa, I.C.C. The Appeals Chamber, May. 6, 2019, ICC-02/0501/09 OA2 ¶¶65-174.
148.

Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Aug. 8, 1945, Article 7.

149.

International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter, Jan. 19, 1946, Article 6.

150. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal and in
the Judgment of the Tribunal adopted by the ILC at its second Sess., annexed to G.A. Res. 488, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/488 (Dec. 12, 1950), Principle III.
151. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May. 25, 1993,
Article 7(2).
152. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA,
NOV. 8, 1994 (UN DOC S/RES/955(1994), ANNEX, (1994), ARTICLE 6(2).
153. Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with commentaries, Report
of the ILC 48th sess., GAOF, 51º Sess., Supp. No. 10 (A/51/10) 17, Article 7.
154. S.C. Res. 1315 (Aug. 14, 2000); S.C. Res. 1564 (Sep. 18, 2004); S.C. Res. 1593 (Mar. 31,
2005); S.C. Res. 827 (May. 25, 1993); S.C. Res. 955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
155. S.C. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolutions 808 (May. 3, 1993), S/25704, ¶53; United Nations Security Council, ‘Report of the SecretaryGeneral, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993)’, S/25704, May. 3, 1993, 14;
S.C., Final report of the Independent Commission of Experts established in accordance with Security
Council resolution 935 (1994), Doc. No S/1994/1405, ¶¶171-173; GA. Res. 596, Memorandum by the
Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/596 (Mar. 31, 2008), ¶¶141-142, 150.
156. The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military
Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Oct. 1, 1946 ¶56.
157. The Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Preliminary Motions, I.C.T.Y. The Trial
Chamber, Nov. 8, 2001 ¶28; The Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Decision on the objection of the Republic of
Croatia to the issuance of subpoenae duces tecum, I.C.T.Y. The Trial Chamber, Jul. 17, 1997 ¶89.
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Court for Sierra Leone158 and the International Criminal Court [“ICC”]. 159
Further, in the Arrest warrant case, this Court expressly identified
prosecution by the ICC as an exception to personal immunity.160 Scholars
also confirm the existence of this rule.161
In the present case, Adawa executed an arrest warrant issued by the
ICC.162 Hence, Ms. Grey cannot invoke immunities and her arrest163 was
consistent with international law.
b) IMMUNITIES ARE OVERRIDDEN BY THE JUS COGENS STATUS OF
WAR CRIMES

The prohibition of war crimes is a jus cogens norm.164 To give proper
effect to this hierarchically higher status, not only contrary substantive rules
158. The Prosecutor v. Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, S.C.S.L. The Appeals
Chamber, May. 31, 2004, SCSL-03-01-I-059 ¶52.
159. Al-Bashir AC, supra note 147, ¶¶113,115,117; The Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Corrigendum to
the Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to
Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, I.C.C. The Pre-Trial Chamber I, Dec. 13, 2011, ICC-02/05-01/09 [“AlBashir Malawi”] ¶43.
160. Arrest Warrant of Arp. 11, 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Bel) 2002 I.C.J. 3 (14 Feb) [“Arrest
Warrant”] ¶61.
161. The Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Observations by Professor Paola Gaeta as amicus curiae on
the merits of the legal questions presented in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s appeal against the
‘Decision under Article 87 (7) of the Rome Statute on the non- compliance by Jordan with the request by
the Court for the arrest and surrender [of] Omar Al-Bashir’ of Mar. 12, 2018, The Appeals Chamber
I.C.C., Jun. 18, 2018, ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, ¶10/6; The Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Observations by
Professor Claus Kreß as amicus curiae on the merits of the legal questions presented in the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan’s appeal against the ‘Decision under Article 87 (7) of the Rome Statute on the noncompliance by Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender [of] Omar Al-Bashir’ of
Mar. 12, 2018, The Appeals Chamber I.C.C., Jun. 18, 2018, ICC-02/05-01/09 OA2, [“Claus Kreß”]
¶15; Concepción Escobar Hernández (Special Rapporteur on immunity of State officials from foreign
criminal jurisdiction), Fifth report on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/701 (Jun. 14, 2016) ¶189; The Prosecutor v. Taylor, Observations by Professor Philippe
Sands as amicus curiae on the merits of the legal questions presented in the SCSL The Appeals Chamber,
Oct. 23, 2003, CASE SCSL-2003- 01-1, ¶2.
162.

SAF ¶48, 50.

163.

SAF ¶51.

164. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1996) 63; Al-Bashir AC, supra note 147, ¶123; D. Tladi (Special
Rapporteur on peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens)), Third report on peremptory
norms of general international law (jus cogens), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/714 (Feb. 12, 2018), ¶114; The
Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Judgment, I.C.T.Y. The Trial Chamber, Jan. 8, 2000 ¶520; Nuclear
Weapons, supra note 88, ¶79.
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but also rules which prevent its enforcement are overridden,165 including
rules on immunity.166 This is justified by the need to combat impunity for
international crimes.167 Respondent could not argue that the findings in
Germany v. Italy168 are applicable, since that case did not deal with
immunities of public officials.169
Ms. Grey is accused of having committed war crimes.170 The higher
status of the prohibition of such crimes overrides any immunity she may
otherwise enjoy. Accordingly, her arrest was consistent with international
law.
c) IMMUNITIES ARE LIFTED UNDER THE ABUSE OF RIGHTS
PRINCIPLE

The principle of abuse of rights prohibits the exercise of a prerogative
for a purpose it was not intended, such as the obtention of an undue
advantage.171 It is a general principle of law recognized by civil law172 and

165. S. I. Strong, General Principles of Procedural Law and Procedural Jus Cogens, 122 PENN
ST. L. REV. 347 (2018) 394, 404.
166. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14)
(Dissenting opinion of Al-khasawneh), ¶7; K. PARLETT, Immunity in civil proceedings for torture: the
emerging exception, in R. A. Kolodkin (Special Rapporteur on immunity of State officials from foreign
criminal jurisdiction), Second report on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/631 (Jun. 10, 2010), ¶63; Case of Al- Adsani v. The United Kingdom, Joint Dissenting
Opinion of Judges Rozakis And Caflisch Joined by Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto And Vajić,
No. 35763/97 E.Ct.H.R. (Nov. 21, 2001), ¶3; Case of Al-Adsani v. The United Kingdom, Dissenting
Opinion Judge Ferrari Bravo, No. 35763/97 E.Ct.H.R. (Nov. 21, 2001) 33; Case of Al-Adsani v. The United
Kingdom, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Loucaides, No. 35763/97 E.Ct.H.R. (Nov. 21, 2001), 34.
167. R. A. Kolodkin (Special Rapporteur on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal
jurisdiction), Second report on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/631 (Jun. 10, 2010), ¶56; Concepción Escobar Hernández (Special Rapporteur on immunity of
State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction), Fifth report on immunity of State officials from foreign
criminal jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/701 (Jun. 14, 2016) ¶193; G.A. Res. 67, U.N. Doc. A/RES/67/1,
(Nov. 30, 2012), ¶22.
168.

Jurisdictional immunities of the State (Ger. v. Ita.), 2012 I.C.J (Feb. 3).

169.

Jurisdictional immunities of the State (Ger. v. Ita.), 2012 I.C.J (Feb. 3) ¶91.

170.

SAF Correction 1.

171. Case concerning Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Eq. Guinea v. Fr.), Preliminary
Objections of France I.C.J., Mar. 30, 2017 ¶76.
172. Netherlands – Civil Code, Articles 1-2; Switzerland – Code Civil, Article 2, Dec. 10, 1907,
SR 210, RS 210; Argentina – Código Civil y Comercial, Article 10; Germany – Civil Code, § 226, 242;
Israel – Contract Law (General Part), Article 12; Turkey – Civil Code, Article 18; Greece – Civil Code,
Article 281; Japan – Constitution, Article 12.
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common law jurisdictions.173 It is corollary to the principle of good faith and
pacta sunt servanda, enshrined in the VCLT174 and recognized by this
Court.175
Particularly, public officials are vested with immunities to guarantee an
efficient performance of their public prerogatives. However, an abusive
exercise of immunities would allow officials to obtain an undue advantage
by eluding their responsibility.176
The ICC Prosecutor opened an investigation in 2009177 and expressly
cited Ms. Grey as responsible for RRC’s unlawful activities in Garantia.178
Rasasa was aware of this ongoing investigation and the serious allegations
against Ms. Grey179 but nonetheless appointed her as Minister of Foreign
Affairs180 with the purpose of preventing her arrest. Hence, her appointment
constitutes an abuse of rights which cannot be upheld by this Court.
II.

Adawa acted under the aut dedere aut judicare principle.

Under the Geneva Conventions, States are obliged to prosecute or
extradite alleged perpetrators of grave breaches of the Conventions. 181
According to the VCLT, treaties shall be interpreted considering the
173.

M. Byers, Abuse of rights: An old Principle, a new age, 47 MCGILL L.J. 389 (2002) 396-

174.

VCLT, supra note 107, Article 26.

397.
175. Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Pol.), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 6
(Aug. 25) ¶30; Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. (Dec. 18) ¶142; Barcelona Traction, Light
and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962) (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment,
1970 L.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5) ¶56; Nuclear Tests (Austr. V. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. (Dec. 20), ¶46;
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. And
Herz. v. Yug.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1996 I.C.J. (Jul. 11), ¶46.
176. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.) 2002 I.C.J. (Feb. 14)
(Dissenting opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert) ¶21; Case concerning Immunities and Criminal
Proceedings (Eq. Guinea v. Fr.), Preliminary Objections of France, 2017 I.C.J. (Mar. 30) ¶78.
177.

SAF ¶15.

178.

SAF ¶15.

179.

SAF ¶32.

180.

SAF ¶32.

181. Geneva Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed
forces in the field, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, Article 49; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 85, Article 50; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, Article 129; Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in
time of war 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, Article 146; J. M. HENCKAERTS & L. DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW , VOL. I, 608 (2009).
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subsequent practice in their application, as it reflects the agreement of the
parties regarding its interpretation.182 States have applied this provision from
the Geneva Conventions to all serious violations of humanitarian law,
including war crimes committed in NIACs. 183
The obligation to extradite arises when the State in custody of the
alleged offender evades its duty to prosecute184 and it can be discharged by
surrendering the alleged violators to a competent international criminal
court.185
Here, both Adawa and Rasasa are parties to the Geneva Conventions of
1949.186 Ms. Grey is suspected of having committed serious violations of
international humanitarian law, and Rasasa expressed its unwillingness to
prosecute her.187 Hence, her arrest for the purpose of surrendering her to the
ICC was consistent with Adawa’s aut dedere aut judicare obligation.
III.

Alternatively, Adawa had to execute the arrest warrant
notwithstanding conflicting obligations.

Even if this Court considers that Adawa was under an obligation to
respect Ms. Grey’s immunity, Adawa’s obligation to execute the arrest
warrant must prevail. The ICC is the sole authority to decide over its judicial
182.

VCLT, supra note 107, Article 31(3)(b).

183. The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Oct. 2, 1995, (Case No. IT-94-1-T); The Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Submission of the Government of the United States of America Concerning Certain Arguments Made by
Counsel for the Accused in the Case of The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v. Tadic, Jul. 17, 1995, (Case No.
IT-94-1-T) ¶35-36; The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab on the Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Oct. 2, 1995, (Case No. IT-94-1-T); S.C. Res. 978 (Feb. 27, 1995);
S.C. Res. 1193 (Aug. 28, 1998); S.C. Res. 1199 (Sep. 23, 1998); Commission on Human Rights Res.
1991/1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/167 ¶2; A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 88 (2008); J. M.
HENCKAERTS, Customary International Humanitarian Law: a response to US Comments, 89
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 473 (2007) 476; J. M. HENCKAERTS & L. DOSWALD-BECK,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW , VOL. I, 609 (2009); Germany, Humanitarian Law in
Armed Conflicts – Manual, DSK VV207320067 (1992), Section 1209; Belgium, Loi relative à la
répression des violations graves du droit international humanitaire of Jun. 16, 1993, Moniteur Belge,
Official Gazette of Belgium; Switzerland – Code Pénal Militaire, Jun. 13, 1927, RS 321.0, Article 111;
United Nations, 18 U.S. Code § 2441 – War crimes; J. M. HENCKAERTS & L. DOSWALD-BECK,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW , VOL. I, 609 (2009).
184.

K. KITTICHAISAREE, THE OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE , 3 (2018).

185. K. KITTICHAISAREE, THE OBLIGATION TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE, 5 (2018); Int’l Law
Comm’, Rep. of its Sixty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/69/10, (2014), 153-154; J. M. HENCKAERTS & L.
DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW , VOL. I, 610 (2009).
186.

SAF ¶60.

187.

SAF ¶53.
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functions,188 including questions concerning cooperation and assistance.189 It
has exclusive competence to determine whether a request to cooperate could
place a State in a situation of conflicting obligations.190 States do not have
the discretion to dispense with such request nor to refuse to execute an arrest
warrant.191
Respondent may argue that Adawa should have informed the ICC of an
impediment to the execution of the arrest warrant.192
However,
consultations have no suspensive effect193 and arrest warrants remain valid
until they are explicitly withdrawn or suspended by the ICC. 194 Therefore,
States cannot reject its obligation of cooperation on the grounds of a
disagreement with the ICC,195 especially in cases where its execution could
succeed only in a narrow window of time.196
In this case, Adawa was obliged to comply with the arrest warrant issued
by the ICC, especially considering that Ms. Grey was expected to be in
Adawan territory for only two days.197
IV.

In the further alternative, Adawa acted as an agent of the ICC.
International criminal jurisdictions rely on the cooperation of the States

188. The Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of
the Congo Regarding Omar Al Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, I.C.C. The Pre- Trial Chamber
II, April. 9, 2014, ICC-02/05-01/09 ¶16; Al-Bashir Malawi, supra note 159, ¶11.
189. O. TRIFFTERER & K. AMBOS, THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT .
A COMMENTARY 2277 (2015).
190.
(2012).

M. BERGSMO & L. YAN, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 234

191. The Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the noncompliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir,
I.C.C. The Pre-Trial Chamber II, Jul. 6, 2017, ICC-02/05-01/09 ¶104,106; Al-Bashir AC, supra note 147,
¶152.
192. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), Jul. 17, 1998, U.N.
General Assembly [“Rome Statute”], Article 97.
193. The Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the noncompliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir,
I.C.C. The Pre-Trial Chamber II, Jul. 6, 2017, ICC-02/05-01/09 [“Al-Bashir South Africa”] ¶119; The
Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Decision under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by
Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender or Omar Al-Bashir, I.C.C. The Pre-Trial
Chamber II, Dec. 11, 2017, ICC-02/05- 01/09 [“Al-Bashir Jordan”] ¶48.
194.

Al-Bashir South Africa, supra note 193, ¶120.

195.

Al-Bashir South Africa, supra note 193, ¶104.

196.

Al-Bashir Jordan, supra note 193, ¶48.

197.

SAF ¶49.
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to enforce their decisions,198 since States are instruments for the enforcement
of the international community’s jus puniendi.199. Therefore, when the ICC
issues an arrest warrant, the requested States are not exercising its own
jurisdiction over a suspect but acting as a mere agent of the Court.200
Here, Adawa was acting as a mere agent of the ICC complying with an
arrest warrant and not under its own national criminal jurisdiction.
Therefore, no responsibility can be attributed to Adawa over Ms. Grey’s
arrest.
V.

Adawa may proceed to render Ms. Grey to the ICC.

Since the arrest and detention of Ms. Grey was consistent with
international law,201 Adawa may proceed to render her to the ICC.
E.

PRAYER OF RELIEF
Therefore, it may please the Court to adjudge and declare that:

I) It has jurisdiction over Adawa’s claims because Adawa is a party to
the 1929 Treaty of Botega;
II) Rasasa’s development and deployment of the WALL along the
border between Adawa and Rasasa is in violation of international law, and
order that the WALL be dismantled and removed forthwith;
III) It may adjudicate Adawa’s claim that Rasasa’s imposition of
tariffs on Helian products from Adawa violates the CHC Treaty, and that
Adawa is entitled to compensatory damages reflecting the financial harm it
has suffered to date, such amount to be determined in subsequent
proceedings; and
IV) The arrest and detention of Darian Grey were consistent with
Adawa’s obligations under international law, and that Adawa may proceed
to render her to the International Criminal Court.

198.

Claus Kreß, supra note 161, ¶17.

199.

Al-Bashir Malawi, supra note 159, ¶46.

200. The Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Prosecution Response to the Observations of the African
Union and the League of Arab States, I.C.C. The Appeals Chamber, Aug. 14, 2018, ICC- 02/05-01/09
OA2 ¶11,12.
201.

Supra §(IV)(A)-(B)-(C)&(D).
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

_______________________________________________________
By virtue of the Joint Notification and the Statement of Agreed Facts
(“Compromis”,
including
the
Corrections
and
Clarifications
(“Clarifications”), concluded on 9 September 2019, and in accordance with
Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), the
Republic of Rasasa (“Rasasa”) and the State of Adawa (“Adawa”) hereby refer
to this Honourable Court their dispute concerning the Helian Hyacinth. Both
parties have agreed that all claims and counterclaims will be heard together
in a single set of proceedings and that all issues of jurisdiction and
admissibility would be determined alongside the merits. The Compromis
constitutes a statement of agreed facts and is without prejudice to Rasasa's
objection regarding the Court's jurisdiction and the admissibility of Adawa’s
claims.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

_______________________________________________________
I.
Whether the court has jurisdiction over Adawa’s claims because Adawa is
not a party to the 1929 Treaty of Botega.
II.
Whether Rasasa’s development and deployment of the wall along the border
between Adawa and Rasasa is consistent with international law.
III.
Whether Adawa’s claim that Rasasa’s Helian tariffs violate the CHC Treaty
falls outside the court’s jurisdiction or is inadmissible, or in the alternative,
the imposition of the tariffs violates the CHC Treaty.
IV.
Whether Adawa’s arrest and detention of Ms. Grey constitute internationally
wrongful acts, and she must be repatriated immediately to Rasasa.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

_______________________________________________________
BACKGROUND
Adawa and Rasasa are neighbouring countries in the Region of Crosinia
[“the Region”]. They share a border that is 201 kilometers long. There are
four other States in the Region. The Region is the only place on Earth where
Helian hyacinth is cultivated. Helian Hyacinth is used in the production of
the flavoring spice Helian.
THE ADAWA-ZEITOUNIA UNION
Until 1928, all six Crosinian States were provinces of the Kingdom of
Crosinia. When the last king died, the provinces divided over competing
claimants to the throne. Rasasa backed the late monarch’s brother while
Zeitounia and Adawa – his eldest daughter which ultimately led to a civil war.
On 29 October 1929, the belligerents – Adawa, Zeitounia, and Rasasa – met
in Botega to end the bloodshed. Rasasa declared itself independent while the
provinces of Adawa and Zeitounia united to form the Adawa-Zeitounia
Union [“AZU”]. Rasasa and AZU concluded the Treaty of Botega on
Armistice and Pacification [“Botega Treaty”]. During the 1930s, the AZU
encountered significant economic and social stresses. On 1 January 1939,
Adawa and Zeitounia amicably agreed to dissolve their Union, and each
declared its independence as of that date.
HURRICANE MAKAN
On 14 July 2012, Hurricane Makan struck the Region. More than 60%
of the Helian hyacinths in Rasasa were destroyed, which also resulted in
unemployment rising. In the months following the storm, crime rates
skyrocketed throughout the Region. Armed gangs roamed the countryside,
stealing salvageable Helian plants and harvesting and processing equipment
from the devastated farms.
THE ADAWAN GANGS
In September 2016, the Rasasan and Adawan governments established
a high-level task force to consider joint responses to the increase in crossborder crimes. The joint task force met several times but was unable to
formulate a comprehensive plan to suppress the gangs. By February 2017,
the disorganized gangs had become a well-armed and organized militia. The
Adawan nationals had established permanent and well-defended
encampments within Rasasan territory, used as bases for international
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trafficking in illegal drugs. On 1 June 2017, the militia simultaneously
attacked nine Rasasan Border Police stations, killing 21 officers. The militia
was heavily armed with military-grade weapons and equipment, and the
attacks indicated a high level of prior planning and training. On 25 June
2017, the Rasasan President authorized the deployment of the Rasasan Army
against the militia camps within Rasasa.
THE WALL
In October 2012, the President of Rasasa convened a meeting of major
Rasasan corporate executives to elicit ideas on how to address the
increasingly serious crime wave that the Police had been unable to staunch.
Darian Grey, former chief executive officer of Rasasan Robotics Corporation
[“RRC”], offered the development of a “Weaponized Autonomous
Limitation Line” [“WALL”] to suppress the criminal activities in the region.
In January 2013, the President signed a contract with RRC and invited the
other five States in the Region to take part in the development and research of
the WALL. All six States devoted funds and provided leading government
and private sector scientists and engineers, as well as materials, to the research
and development phase of the project. By August 2013, only Rasasa and
Adawa continued to participate in the development of the venture.
The WALL consists of 10-meter-tall towers, each topped with an
advanced surveillance and response unit. With 360-degree motion-sensing,
high-definition, and infrared cameras, each surveillance unit can closely
monitor all ground and aerial activity within a 130,000 square meter area
around the base of its tower. To respond to threats, each unit is equipped
with an array of lethal and non-lethal options, ranging from speakers
broadcasting audible warnings to non-targeted explosions, and machine guns.
Using advanced artificial intelligence, the WALL can instantaneously and
appropriately decide whether and how to respond to any given threat, without
any intervention by human actors. Although it carries lethal potential as a
last resort, the WALL is unimaginably more reliable than human police or
soldiers. During testing whether the WALL might deploy deadly force when
the situation does not warrant such a response, it demonstrated a “false
positives” rate of less than 0.0001%. With embedded rules instructing its
software to favor non-lethal deterrence, the testing indicated that the WALL
would mistakenly use excessive force no more than once in two hundred
million encounters. Following the attacks upon Rasasan Border Police
stations, Rasasa authorized the purchase of the WALL from RRC and its
installation along the Rasasa-Adawa border. Because of the WALL crime
rates have been reduced by 80% and no injuries are known to have occurred
since its deployment.
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THE HELIAN TARIFFS
In 1964, the six Crosinian States concluded the Treaty Establishing the
Crosinian Helian Community [“CHC Treaty”] in order to share their
agronomic, scientific, and economic data on cultivation of Helian Hyacinth.
They agreed to impose no tariffs on Helian spice and the equipment and
materials used to harvest or process the Helian hyacinth. In 1982 and 1985,
respectively, Rasasa and Adawa acceded to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade [“GATT”] and submitted tariff schedules with zero bound
rates on Helian products. In 1995, the two States became parties to the World
Trade Organisation [“WTO”].
In 2017, the President of Rasasa submitted a bill to Parliament for the
introduction of 25% ad valorem tariffs on unprocessed Helian in an effort to
encourage Rasasa’s domestic processors to return to local farms for their
feedstock. The Parliament adopted his proposal in January 2018. Adawa
protested to the decision and requested consultations pursuant to Articles 1
and 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes [“DSU”] of the WTO. The consultations proved
unsuccessful. In February 2019, Adawa requested the establishment of a
panel pursuant to Article 6.2 of the DSU, alleging that Rasasa’s tariffs on
Helian products were an unjustifiable breach of its commitment to maintain
the zero bound rate.
THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF DARIAN GREY
In 1998, Adawa became party to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court [“Rome Statute”]. Rasasa is not a party to the Rome Statute.
In 2009, Garantia, a State party to the Rome Statute, referred a situation that
occurred on its territory to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
[“ICC”]. The referral specifically mentioned RRC as one of the accused
foreign contractors, and cited Ms. Grey as having being personally
responsible for war crimes. The Prosecutor opened an investigation in
August 2009. In 2017, Ms. Grey became the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Rasasa. On 18 June 2019, the CHC welcomed representatives of its Member
States to Novazora, the Adawan capital, for its annual meeting. Minister
Grey, representing Rasasa, arrived on 18 June 2019 for the four-day session.
On 20 June 2019, a Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC issued a warrant of arrest
for Minister Grey. On 22 June 2019, Ms. Grey was arrested while leaving
her hotel by Adawan officers.
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

_______________________________________________________
I.
This Court lacks jurisdiction as Adawa is not a party to the Botega
Treaty. Adawa has not automatically succeeded to the Botega Тreaty. Such
a rule does not exist under customary international law or alternatively, the
intertemporal rule precludes its application. Furthermore, Adawa did not
succeed to the Botega Treaty by virtue of a territorial regime as there is no
such regime between Rasasa and Adawa - Adawa does not succeed to the
Botega Treaty by virtue of Article 1(2) or Article 3(1). Alternatively, Adawa
succeeded only to the treaty provisions which establish territorial regimes
and not to the jurisdiction clause of the Treaty. Additionally, Adawa failed
to obtain Rasasa’s consent to become a party to the Botega Treaty and Rasasa
has not tacitly consented to Adawa’s succession to the Botega Treaty. Thus,
the jurisdiction clause in Article 6 Botega Treaty cannot be invoked as a
ground for jurisdiction.
II.
Rasasa’s deployment of the WALL is consistent with international law.
The WALL’s deployment does not violate the rules of international
humanitarian law applicable during a non-international armed conflict - the
principles of distinction, precaution, proportionality, and the Martens Clause.
Furthermore, Rasasa does not violate human rights law as Adawa does not
have standing to bring a claim regarding the WALL’s deployment.
Alternatively, Rasasa has no extraterritorial obligations towards Adawans.
Alternatively, alleged violations of the right to life are determined by IHL
during an armed conflict. In any case, the WALL does not violate the right
to life. Moreover, there is no requirement for meaningful human control over
the WALL and its deployment does not violate the object and purpose of the
Botega Treaty. Additionally, Adawa is barred to object to the development
of the WALL under the clean hands doctrine.
III.
The ICJ lacks jurisdiction over this dispute as the WTO panels have
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes regarding Helian tariffs. Additionally,
the jurisdiction of the WTO panels is lex specialis and lex posterior to the
jurisdiction of this Court. Alternatively, the ongoing proceedings before
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the WTO panel are a bar for the admissibility of the claim pursuant to the
principle of lis pendens and the principle of comity. Additionally, the
submission of the claim constitutes an abuse of process. In any event, the
tariffs do not breach the CHC Treaty as they are necessary to protect Rasasa’s
essential security interests and, consequently, Adawa is not entitled to
compensation.
IV.
Ms. Grey enjoys personal immunity from arrest and detention under the
CHC Treaty. As a Minister of Foreign Affairs Ms. Grey has immunity under
customary law. Adawa violated Ms. Grey’s immunities by exercising
domestic jurisdiction over her. Adawa cannot arrest Ms. Grey pursuant to
the ICC’s arrest warrant since ICC does not have jurisdiction over nationals of
non-State parties. Alternatively, Ms. Grey’s immunities bar the jurisdiction
of the ICC. In any event, Adawa is bound to respect Ms. Grey’s immunities
even when it cooperates with the ICC. Additionally, there is no customary
rule rendering immunities inapplicable in cases of cooperation with ICC. Ms.
Grey must be immediately repatriated back to Rasasa.
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PLEADINGS

_______________________________________________________
A. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION OVER ADAWA’S
CLAIMS BECAUSE ADAWA IS NOT A PARTY TO THE 1929
TREATY OF BOTEGA
The jurisdiction clause in Article 6 Botega Treaty is invalid as Adawa
is not a party to the Botega Treaty. Adawa has not automatically succeeded
to the Treaty. Moreover, Adawa has not succeeded to the Treaty by virtue of
a territorial regime. Additionally, Adawa failed to obtain Rasasa’s consent to
become a party to the Botega Treaty. Thus, the jurisdiction clause in Article
6 Botega Treaty cannot be invoked as a ground for jurisdiction.
I.

Adawa has not automatically succeeded to the Botega Treaty

Generally, the successor State does not inherit obligations and rights of
the predecessor.1 The Applicant cannot claim that it has automatically
succeeded to the Botega Treaty after the dissolution of the AZU2 since no
such customary rule exists. Alternatively, even if such custom exists
presently, the intertemporal rule precludes its application. In any case, the
automatic succession rule is intended to cover only multilateral human rights
treaties and not bilateral relations such as those between Rasasa and Adawa,3
hence it is inapplicable.
a) AUTOMATIC SUCCESSION IS NOT PART OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW

1.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep ser, p. 595,
[“Bosnian Genocide, Preliminary Objections”], Separate Opinion, Judge Weeramantry, pp. 643-644;
Bosnian Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Dissenting Opinion, Judge Kreća, p. 777; ILC, Fifth report on
succession in respect of treaties, Special Rapporteur, Sir Humphrey Waldock, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission 1972, vol. II, A/CN.4/256 and Add.1-4, p. 44, commentary 1; James
Crawford (ed.), Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (9th ed., Oxford University Press,
2019), [“Brownlie”], p. 423.
2.
Case Concerning the Helian Hyacinth (State of Adawa v. Republic of Rasasa),
[“Compromis”], ¶7.
3.
Bosnian Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Separate Opinion, Judge Weeramantry, p. 645;
Patrick Dumberry, State Succession to Bilateral Treaties: A Few Observations on the Incoherent and
Unjustifiable Solution Adopted for Secession and Dissolution of States under the 1978 Vienna Convention,
28 Leiden Journal of International Law, [“Dumberry”], p. 22.
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As Adawa and Rasasa are not parties to the Vienna Convention on
Succession of States with respect to treaties [“VCSST”],4 Adawa cannot rely
on Article 34 of the Convention which regulates automatic succession to
treaties in cases of union dissolution.5
Adawa might claim that automatic succession is representative of
international custom. However, it is consistently affirmed that this norm is
merely progressive development of law.6 Hence, the Applicant has the
burden to establish that the rule has acquired a customary status.7 The
requirement for emergence of custom from a treaty provision is “extensive
and virtually uniform” State practice and opinio juris.8 The International Law
Commission [“ILC”] regards the State practice for automatic succession as
insufficient since “the precedents [...] are few”9 and “far from conclusive”.10
Furthermore, attempts to codify the rule received disapproval from numerous
States.11 Consequently, the threshold for custom is not met.
b) ALTERNATIVELY, THE INTERTEMPORAL RULE PRECLUDES THE
APPLICATION OF AUTOMATIC SUCCESSION

Even if automatic succession has recently acquired the status of a
customary norm, it cannot be invoked by Adawa due to the intertemporal

4.

Compromis, ¶60; Clarifications, (e.).

5.
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of treaties, 1978, UNTS 1946, p. 3,
[“VCSST”], Art. 34.
6.
Bosnian Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Dissenting Opinion, Judge Kreća, p. 779; UN,
Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Committee of the Whole, 48th Meeting,
A/CONF.80/C.1/SR.48, p. 105, [“Conference on State Succession”], ¶10; Gabčíkovo- Nagymaros Project
(Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Rep 1997, [“Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros”], Memorial of the Republic of Hungary,
p. 323, ¶10.112; Council of Europe, Preliminary Draft Report on the Pilot Project of The Council on
Europe on State Practice Regarding State Succession and Issues of Recognition, 16th Meeting, 1998, p.
43; Christian Tams and James Sloan, The Development of International Law by the International Court
of Justice (1st ed., Oxford University Press, 2013)p. 61; Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (7th ed.,
Cambridge University Press, 2014), [“Shaw”], p. 710; Brownlie, p. 423.
7.

Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment, ICJ Rep 1950, p. 276.

8.
North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v. Denmark, Germany v. Netherlands), Judgment,
ICJ Rep 1969, p. 3, [“North Sea”], ¶74.
9.
ILC, First report on succession of States in respect of treaties, Special Rapporteur, Sir
Francis Vallat, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1974, vol. II(1), A/CN.4/278, Add.1–5,
Add.5/Corr.1 and Add.6, p. 1, [“First report on State Succession”], ¶399.
10.

First report on State Succession, ¶399.

11.

First report on State Succession, ¶391.
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rule. The intertemporal rule, reaffirmed by the ICJ,12 provides that “a
juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with
it”.13 Automatic succession was declared as progressive development of law
in 1978.14 Thus, it could not have been part of customary international law
at the time of the dissolution of the AZU in 1939.15
II.

Adawa did not succeed to the Botega Treaty by virtue of a
territorial regime

Under Article 12 VCSST, which is reflective of customary
law,16territorial regimes and boundaries17 are not affected by State
succession.18 However, Adawa cannot succeed to the Botega Treaty under
this rule as the Treaty does not establish a territorial regime between Adawa
and Rasasa. Alternatively, Adawa succeeds only to the Treaty provisions
which establish the territorial regime.
a) THE BOTEGA TREATY DOES NOT ESTABLISH A TERRITORIAL
REGIME BETWEEN ADAWA AND RASASA

(i) Adawa does not succeed to the Botega Treaty by virtue of
Article 1(2)

Territorial regimes are impressed with a status intended to be
permanent.19 The demarcation lines established by Article 1(2) Botega
12.
Case concerning rights of nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v.
United States of America), Judgement, ICJ Rep 1952, p. 189; South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South
Africa, Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, Judgement, ICJ Rep 1966, ¶16.
13.
Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States of America), Reports of International
Arbitration Awards 1928, vol. II, p. 829, [“Island of Palmas”], p. 845; Taslim Elias, Doctrine of
Intertemporal Law, American Journal of International Law, vol. 74, No. 2, p. 288.
14.
Conference on State Succession, p. 105, ¶10; Bosnian Genocide, Preliminary Objections,
Dissenting Opinion, Judge Kreća, p. 779.
15.

Compromis, ¶7.

16.

Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, ¶123.

17.
ILC, Draft articles on Succession of States in respect of Treaties with commentaries,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1974, vol. II(1), p. 174, [“Draft Articles VCSST”], Art.
12, commentary 2.
18.
VCSST, Art. 12; Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds.), Oppenheim‘s International Law,
(9th ed., vol. 1, Oxford University Press, 2008), [“Oppenheim”], p. 238; Lord McNair, Law of Treaties (1st
ed., Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 590.
19.
Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judgment, ICJ Rep 1994, p. 6,
[“Territorial Dispute”], ¶¶72-73; Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Preliminary
Objections, ICJ Rep 2007, p. 624, [“Territorial and Maritime Dispute”], ¶89; D. P. O’Connell, The Law
On State Succession (1st ed., Cambridge University Press, 2015), [“O’Connell”], p. 49.
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Treaty do not meet the requirement for permanency as they are “without
prejudice to the ultimate settlement”.20 Generally, demarcation lines are not
recognized as establishing permanent regimes.21 Additionally, territorial
regimes must be “independent of the personality of the State”22 and the
political context.23 However, the demarcation lines were tied to the
personalities of the former AZU and Rasasa as they were aimed at
“separating their armed forces”24 to end the conflict.25 Consequently, the
demarcation lines do not establish a territorial regime.

(ii) Adawa does not succeed to the Botega Treaty by virtue of
Article 3(1)

The peace zone established by Article 3(1) Botega Treaty may be
recognized as a territorial regime.26 However, Adawa cannot succeed to it as
the provision refers to a peace zone situated exclusively on the border
between Zeitounia and Rasasa.27
Furthermore, Adawa does not succeed to the right of free passage
enshrined in the provision as it is conferred upon the individuals and not to
the States.28 Under the territorial regime rule, States do not succeed to rights
of individuals.29 Thus, Adawa does not succeed to any rights or obligations
deriving from the peace zone30 and respectively to the Botega Treaty.
b) ALTERNATIVELY, ADAWA SUCCEEDS ONLY TO THE TREATY
PROVISIONS WHICH ESTABLISH TERRITORIAL REGIMES

20.

Botega Treaty, Art. 1(2).

21.
Frauke Lachenmann and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds.), The Law of Armed Conflict and the Use
of Force: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (1st ed., Oxford University Press,
2017), p. 325, ¶¶1, 7.
22.

O’Connell, p. 49.

23.

Shaw, p. 703.

24.

Botega Treaty, Art. 1(2).

25.

Compromis, ¶5.

26.

Draft Articles VCSST, Art. 12, commentary 1.

27.

Botega Treaty, Art. 3(1).

28.

Botega Treaty, Art. 3(1).

29.

Draft Articles VCSST, Art. 12, commentary 29.

30.

VCSST, Art. 12(2).
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In any case, under Article 12 VCSST States succeed only to the
provisions which establish territorial regimes - not to the treaty as a whole.31
Accordingly, the ICJ has declared that only the territorial regime enjoys
permanence and not the entire treaty itself.32 This is the case of succession to
peace treaties where there are other provisions which are not related to the
establishment of the regime.33 Hence, States do not succeed to supplementary
provisions to the regime,34 such as jurisdiction clauses.
In any event, a jurisdiction clause may be invoked only for a dispute
related to the established regimе35 which, however, is not subject to the
present proceedings. Consequently, Adawa cannot rely on the jurisdiction
clause enshrined in Article 6 Botega Treaty to establish the jurisdiction of the
Court.
III.

Adawa failed to obtain Rasasa’s consent to become party to the
Botega Treaty

States have maintained the application of the “clean slate” principle in
cases of dissolution of unions.36 The “clean slate” principle stipulates that a
successor State cannot claim any right or become party to any of its
predecessor’s bilateral treaties.37 For this reason, in cases of bilateral treaties,
not falling under Article 12 VCSST,38 the successor State has to obtain the
consent of the other party in order to become a party to the treaty.39 Consent

31.
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, Reply of the Republic of Hungary, vol. 1, ¶¶3.141, 3.149; Free
Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (France v. Switzerland) (Second Phase) (1930), PCIJ Ser
A No 24, p. 17; Draft Articles VCSST, Arts. 11, 12, commentary 36; Brownlie, p. 425;
Oppenheim, p. 213.
32.

Territorial Dispute, ¶¶72-73; Territorial and Maritime Dispute, ¶89.

33.

First report on State Succession, ¶444.

34.
First report on State Succession, ¶444; UN, Materials on Succession of States, UN Doc
ST/LEG/SER.B/14, p. 187.
35.

Draft Articles VCSST, Art. 12, commentary 7.

36.
Bosnian Genocide, Preliminary Objections of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, p. 126,
¶B.1.4.10; First report on State Succession, ¶98; Dumberry, p. 27.
37.

Draft Articles VCSST, Art. 23, commentary 2; Oppenheim, pp. 238-239.

38.

VCSST, Art. 24.

39.

Draft Articles VCSST, Art. 23, commentary 12.
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should be clearly expressed40by a subsequent notification41 or agreement,42
however no such are present. As a result, Adawa did not succeed to the
Treaty.
a) RASASA HAS NOT TACITLY CONSENTED TO ADAWA’S
SUCCESSION TO THE BOTEGA TREATY
A State may tacitly consent to be bound by a legal situation through its
unilateral conduct under the doctrine of acquiescence.43 The concept of
acquiescence is applicable only when the circumstances require a response
by the consenting State.44 Correspondingly, after the invocation of alleged
violations of the Botega Treaty by Adawa,45 Rasasa explicitly objected the
purported succession of Adawa to the Treaty.46 Thus, Rasasa has not
acquiesced to the succession of Adawa to the Botega Treaty.
IV.

The jurisdiction clause in Article 6 Botega Treaty cannot be
invoked as a ground for jurisdiction

Treaties contain rights only for the contracting parties.47 As Adawa is
not a successor and respectively - not a party to the Botega Treaty,48 the
jurisdiction clause embodied in Article 6 Botega Treaty is not in force
between Adawa and Rasasa. Thus, Adawa cannot invoke Article 6 as a
ground for this Court’s jurisdiction.49

40.

Draft Articles VCSST, Art. 23, commentaries 14, 15.

41.
Bosnian Genocide, Preliminary Objections, ¶18; Nasila Rembe, The Vienna Convention on
State Succession in respect of Treaties: an African perspective on its applicability and limitations,
Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 134-135.
42.
Draft Articles VCSST, Arts. 33, 34, commentary 6; International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia (the Badinter Commission), 16 July 1993, pp. 1495-1496, (e.); European Political
Cooperation, Declaration of the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in
the Soviet Union, European Political Cooperation Documentation Bulletin, vol. 7, 1991, p. 770.
43.
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. United States
of America), Judgement, ICJ Rep 1984, ¶130.
44.
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge
(Malaysiav. Singapore), Judgement, ICJ Rep 2008, ¶121.
45.

Compromis, ¶38.

46.

Compromis, ¶55.

47.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, UNTS 1155, p. 331, [“VCLT”], Arts. 26,

48.

Pleadings, (I.)(A.)-(C.).

49.

Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945, UNTS 1055, [“ICJ Statute”], Art. 37.

34.
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B. RASASA’S DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE
WALL ALONG THE BORDER BETWEEN ADAWA AND RASASA
IS CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW
Rasasa’s deployment of the WALL is consistent with international law.
Furthermore, Adawa is barred from objecting to the development of the
WALL.
I.

The deployment of the WALL is consistent with international law

The WALL’s deployment does not violate international humanitarian
law [“IHL”] and human rights law [“HRL”]. Moreover, there is no
requirement for meaningful human control over the WALL. Additionally,
the deployment does not violate the object and purpose of the Botega Treaty.
a) THE WALL’S DEPLOYMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE IHL

(i) Rasasa has to observe IHL due to the non-international
armed conflict

The Respondent is in a state of non-international armed conflict since
2017.50 Such conflict exists when dissident armed groups capable of carrying
out military operations and having permanent camps within a State's territory
fight military forces of that State.51 The standard is met as Rasasa’s military
force was deployed against the “heavily armed”52 and organized Adawan
militia which had established permanent encampments within Rasasan
territory.53 The conflict is governed by the rules applicable to noninternational conflicts, expressed in the Geneva Conventions54 to which

50.

Compromis, ¶¶ 34-35, 37.

51.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the
protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts, 1977, UNTS 1125, p. 609, Art. 1(1);
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction)
(2 October 1995), IT-94-1-A, ICTY, [“Tadić”], ¶70; Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, 11.137 (1997),
IACHR, Report Nº 55/97, p. 271, [“Abella”], ¶152.
52.

Compromis, ¶36.

53.

Compromis, ¶¶34-35.

54.
Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, 1949, UNTS
75, p. 287, common Art. 3.
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Rasasa is a party,55 and customary IHL.56 Rasasa is bound to respect the IHL
regime until a peaceful settlement is reached.57

(ii) The WALL complies with the rules of IHL
IHL rules govern the use of weapons during an armed conflict.58
Accordingly, Rasasa submits that the WALL complies with the IHL
principles of distinction, precaution, and proportionality. Additionally, the
Martens Clause cannot render the WALL prohibited.

(iii) The WALL complies with the principle of distinction
The principle of distinction requires that a weapon must be able to
distinguish between civilians, hors de combat individuals, and militants.59
The WALL draws such distinction using data, acquired by military and
police officials which included millions of images, video footage, and
computer models.60 Consequently, the WALL can successfully distinguish
between armed threats and hors de combat individuals,61 and the chance of
the WALL targeting civilian individuals is virtually zero.62 Thus, the WALL
complies with the principle of distinction.

(iv) The WALL complies with the principle of precaution
Under the principle of precaution belligerents must take all feasible care
to spare civilian life when using lethal weapons.63 Feasibility is determined

55.

Compromis, ¶60.

56.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. USA), Merits,
ICJ Rep 1986, [“Nicaragua”], p.114, ¶¶218-219; Tadić, ¶¶67-70.
57.
Tadić, ¶70; Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, IT-04-84-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber) (3 April
2008), ICTY, ¶100; Marko Milanovic, End of application of international humanitarian law, International
Review of the Red Cross, 2014, 96 , p. 179.
58.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 1996, p. 226,
[“Nuclear Weapons”], ¶86; CCW, Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area
of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Report of the 2019 session, CCW/GGE.1/2019/3, [“LAWs
Report”], ¶17(a), (c).
59.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
protection of victims of international armed conflicts, UNTS 1125, p. 3, [“Protocol I”], Arts. 48, 51(2),
52(2); Nuclear Weapons, ¶78; Tadić, ¶110.
60.

Compromis, ¶20.

61.

Compromis, ¶20.

62.

Compromis, ¶¶18, 25.

63.
Protocol I, Art. 57(1); Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, IT-95-16-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber) (14
January 2000), ICTY, [“Kupreškić”], ¶535.
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by what is practical in the specific circumstances.64 In particular, the WALL
must verify lawful targets,65 minimise civilian loss of life,66 and cancel
unlawful attacks.67 Respectively, the WALL’s surveillance units ensure
continuous verification of targets through motion-sensing, infrared cameras68
and can instantaneously and appropriately decide whether and how to
respond to any given threat.69 Since the WALL is able to verify targets in the
first place,70 it is equally able to sense changes in a given situation and cancel
an attack if information indicates that it would be unlawful.71 Thus, the WALL
complies with the principle of precaution.

(v) The WALL complies with the principle of proportionality
Under the proportionality principle the WALL cannot deploy an attack
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life which would be excessive in
relation to the direct military advantage.72 Respectively, the WALL has
engaged in approximately 105 operations73 without causing any civilian
injuries.74 Each of these operations provided significant military advantage
by ultimately reducing 80% of the hostilities. 75 Thus, the WALL complies
with the principle of proportionality.

(vi) The Martens Clause cannot render the WALL prohibited
The Martens Clause is a mere guideline regarding the applicability of
weapons not regulated by IHL.76 It entails that the rules of IHL regarding
weapons should be construed in a manner consistent with the dictates of
public conscience and the principles of humanity.77 However, the clause
64.
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related
Claims, Eritrea’s Claim, Partial Award, 19 December 2005, ¶27.
65.

Protocol I, Art. 57(2)(a)(i).

66.

Protocol I, Art. 57(2)(a)(ii).

67.

Protocol I, Art. 57(2)(b).

68.

Compromis, ¶24.

69.

Compromis, ¶24.

70.

Pleadings, (II.)(A.)(2.)(ii.)(a.).

71.
Marco Sassoli, Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages,
Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified, US Naval War College, vol. 90, p. 337.
72.

Protocol I, Arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii); Kupreškić, ¶535.

73.

Clarifications, ¶4.

74.

Compromis, ¶42; Clarifications, ¶4.

75.

Compromis, ¶41.

76.

Nuclear Weapons, ¶78.

77.

Protocol I, Art. 1(2).

348092-ILSA_International_27-1_Text.indd 225

12/11/20 1:36 PM

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 27.1

214

cannot prohibit autonomous systems as it depends on the existence of a
prohibitory rule of customary international law.78 However, such a rule does
not exist presently.
Alternatively, the WALL does not violate the principles of humanity
and the dictates of public conscience. First, the principles of humanity
encompass only IHL rules79 which the WALL observes.80 Second, the public
conscience is to be deduced from authoritative sources such as General
Assembly resolutions and law-making treaties.81 Presently, there are no such
authoritative sources prohibiting lethal autonomous systems, rather States are
in preliminary stages of exploring the capabilities of such systems.82
b) THE WALL DOES NOT VIOLATE HRL

(i) Adawa does not have standing to bring a claim regarding
the WALL’s deployment

Rasasa and Adawa are parties to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights [“ICCPR”]. 83 The ICCPR concerns rights of
individuals84 and does not confer standing on States except in cases of
diplomatic protection. Absent any direct injury, Adawa does not have
standing in respect of the deployment of the WALL as it cannot identify any
victim upon whom it can exercise diplomatic protection.85

(ii) Rasasa does not have extraterritorial obligations towards
Adawans

78.
Nuclear Weapons, Letter dated 16 June 1995 from the Legal Adviser to the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, together with
Written Comments of the United Kingdom, ¶3.58.
79.
Nicaragua, ¶218; Theodor Meron, The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and
Dictates of Public Conscience, American Journal of International Law, vol. 94, No. 1, p. 82.
80.

Pleadings, (II.)(A.)(1.).

81.

Nuclear Weapons, Dissenting Opinion, Judge Shahabuddeen, pp. 410-411.

82.
CCW, Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems, Russian Federation, UN Doc CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.8, ¶6; CCW, Group
of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems, United States of America, UN Doc CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.7,¶¶4-5.
83.

Compromis, ¶60.

84.

HRC, General Comment 24, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, [“GC 24”], ¶17.

85.
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case (Greece v. UK) (Jurisdiction) (1924), PCIJ Ser
A No 2, [“Mavrommatis”], p. 12.

348092-ILSA_International_27-1_Text.indd 226

12/11/20 1:36 PM

Distinguished Brief

2020]

215

The ICCPR limits human rights obligations of States to individuals
within their territory or under their jurisdiction.86 As jurisdiction is primarily
territorial,87 Rasasa has no obligation to protect rights of Adawans as they are
outside its territory. Jurisdiction applies extraterritorially in exceptional
circumstances.88 Such instances occur when the State exercises control89 over
the other State’s territory through administrative organs90 or conduct of its
agents abroad.91 Considering that Rasasa does not exercise such control over
Adawa’s territory, it has no extraterritorial jurisdiction over Adawan citizens.

(iii) Alleged violations of the right to life are determined by IHL
during an armed conflict

Article 6 ICCPR prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life.92 Although this
prohibition continues to exist for Rasasa during armed conflicts,93 what is
“arbitrary” is determined in accordance with IHL which regulates the use of
lethal force in times of armed conflicts.94 Accordingly, as the WALL
complies with IHL,95 there is no violation of Article 6 ICCPR.

(iv) In any case, the WALL does not violate the right to life
The right to life can be violated either by arbitrary depriving life96 or by
putting an individual’s life at stake.97 Presently, neither deprivation of life
nor lethal threat to civilians has taken place.98 Although the WALL possesses

86.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNTS 999, p. 171, [“ICCPR”], Art.
2(1); HRC, General Comment 31, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, [“GC 31”], ¶3.
87.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep 2004, p. 136, [“Wall Advisory”], ¶109.
88.

Banković v. Belgium, No. 52207/99, [2001], ECtHR, ¶61.

89.

Wall Advisory, ¶110; Loizidou v. Turkey, No. 15318/89, [1996], ECtHR, ¶52.

90.

Cyprus v. Turkey, No. 25781/94, [2001], ECtHR, ¶76.

91.

Pad v. Turkey, No. 60167/00, [2007], ECtHR, ¶53.

92.

ICCPR, Art. 6(1).

93.

HRC, General Comment 36, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/36, [“GC 36”], ¶64.

94.
Nuclear Weapons, ¶25; Abella, ¶161; Coard et Al. v. United States, Case 10.951 (1999),
IACHR, Report No. 109/99, ¶42; Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia (Preliminary
objections, merits and reparations) (2012), IACtHR, ¶211; Hassan v. UK, No. 29750/09, [2011], ECtHR,
¶102; ACHPR, General Comment No. 3, ¶32.
95.

Pleadings, (II.)(A.)(1.).

96.

ICCPR, Art. 6(1).

97.

Öneryildiz v. Turkey, No. 48939/99, [2004], ECtHR, ¶71; GC 36, ¶¶6-7.

98.

Compromis, ¶42; Clarifications, ¶4.

348092-ILSA_International_27-1_Text.indd 227

12/11/20 1:36 PM

ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 27.1

216

lethal capacity,99 there are no binding rules regarding preemptive regulation
of lethal force, rather existing guidelines are considered as soft-law.100
Alternatively, the WALL complies with the requirements for lawful use of
lethal force - the principles of strict necessity and proportionality.101
First, strict necessity entails that the use of lethal force is only
permissible as a last resort in the face of a grave threat to another person’s
life.102 Presently, even Adawa declared that the WALL would not deploy
lethal force when the situation does not warrant such response.103
Accordingly, the WALL has issued only verbal signals and non lethal
warning shots.104 Thus, the WALL complies with the principle of strict
necessity.
Second, proportionality stipulates that the force employed shall
correspond to the threat posed.105 Hence, measures ensuring graduation of
force must be implemented.106 Respectively, the WALL has an array of nonlethal options for incapacitation107 and favours non-lethal deterrence.108
Thus, the WALL complies with the principles of proportionality.
c) THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT FOR MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL
OVER THE WALL
Although the WALL acts independently of human control,109 this is not
a violation since further research of the human element in LAWs is
required.110 As technology has only recently reached a level where some

99.

Compromis, ¶¶24-25.

100. UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
Christof Heyns 2014, UN Doc A/HRC/26/36, [“Christof Heyns”], ¶43.
101. GC 31, ¶6; Christof Heyns, Human Rights and the use of Autonomous Weapons Systems
(AWS) During Domestic Law Enforcement, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 38, no. 2, pp. 363-364.
102. GC 36, ¶12; McCann v. the United Kingdom, No. 18984/91, [1995], ECtHR, ¶149; Nachova
v. Bulgaria, No 43577/98, [2005], ECtHR, ¶95; Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by
Law Enforcement Officials, UN Doc A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1, pp. 113-114, [“Basic Principles”], principle
9.
103.

Compromis, ¶25.

104.

Clarifications, ¶4.

105.

Basic Principles, principle 5(a).

106.

Basic Principles, principle 4; Christof Heyns, ¶66.

107.

Compromis, ¶¶24, 37.

108.

Compromis, ¶25.

109,

Compromis, ¶24.

110.

LAWs Report, ¶22(a).
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systems could be considered fully autonomous,111 neither settled State
practice, nor opinio juris have been expressed.112 Although NGOs have
raised ethical considerations for such a requirement,113 such considerations
do not render a general obligation for States,114 and cannot be considered
reflective of State practice. Thus, there is no requirement for meaningful
human control over the WALL. In any case, such requirement would exist
in order to ensure compliance of autonomous systems with IHL. 115 Presently,
the WALL complies with the rules of IHL without human control.116
d) THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE BOTEGA TREATY ARE NOT
VIOLATED

The Botega Treaty must be interpreted from its text, including its
preamble,117 and in light of its object and purpose.118 The Botega Treaty is
an armistice agreement which aims at restoration of regional peace and
security.119 Such agreements establish temporal suspension of hostilities
between States and do not entail demilitarization if that is not explicitly
provided.120 Thus, the militarization of the border through the WALL121 does
not violate the object and purpose of the Botega Treaty. Additionally, as the
regional peace was threatened by the Adawan militia,122 the WALL preserved

111. UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions,
Christof Heyns, 2013, UN Doc A/HRC/23/47, ¶45.
112.

North Sea, ¶77.

113. CCW, Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal
Autonomous Weapons Systems, Statement of Human Rights Watch, Bonnie Docherty, 2018.
114. South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Second Phase, ICJ
Rep 1966, ¶¶49-50.
115.

LAWs Report, ¶17(e).

116.

Pleadings, (II.)(A.)(2.).

117.

VCLT, Art. 31(2).

118. VCLT, Art. 31(1); LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgement, ICJ Rep
2001, ¶99; Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections,
ICJ Rep 2004, p. 429, [“Legality of Use of Force”], ¶98.
119.

Botega Treaty, Preamble, ¶¶3, 5-6.

120. Suzanne Bastid, The Cease-Fire, General Report of the International Society of Military
Law and the Law of War, 1973, pp. 37-38; Convention with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, 36 STAT. 2277, Treaty Series 539, p. 631, Art. 36.
121.

Compromis, ¶37.

122.

Compromis, ¶¶34-36.
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the object and purpose of the Botega Treaty by reducing 80% of the
hostilities.123
II.

Adawa is barred from objecting to the development of the WALL
under the clean hands doctrine

Under the clean hands doctrine, consistently reaffirmed by judges on the
PCIJ and ICJ,125 a State engaged in non-performance of obligations lacks
standing to challenge non-performance of corresponding obligations by
another State.126 Adawa was involved throughout the whole development of
the WALL127 by devoting funding, scientists, engineers,128 and military
experts.129 Thus, under the clean hands doctrine Adawa is barred from
objecting to the development of the WALL.
124

C. ADAWA’S CLAIM THAT HELIAN TARIFFS IMPOSED BY
RASASA VIOLATED THE CHC TREATY FALLS OUTSIDE THE
COURT’S JURISDICTION OR IS INADMISSIBLE. IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, THE IMPOSITION OF TARIFFS DID NOT
VIOLATE THE CHC TREATY
Rasasa submits that the Court does not have jurisdiction over this claim.
Аlternatively, the claim is inadmissible. In any event, the imposition of
tariffs does not breach the CHC Treaty.
I.

The Court does not have jurisdiction to examine this claim

The ICJ lacks jurisdiction over this dispute as the WTO panels have
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes regarding Helian tariffs. Additionally,
the jurisdiction of the WTO panels is lex specialis and lex posterior to the
jurisdiction of this Court.

123.

Compromis, ¶41.

124. Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Netherlands v Belgium) (1937), PCIJ Ser A/B No 17,
Individual Opinion, Judge Hudson, p. 77.
125. Nicaragua, Dissenting Opinion, Judge Schwebel, ¶268; Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, ICJ Rep 2002, p. 3, [“Arrest Warrant”],
Dissenting Opinion, Judge Van den Wyngaert, ¶35.
126. Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland) (Jurisdiction) (1927), PCIJ Ser A No 9,
[“Chorzów Factory”], p. 31; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, ¶110; ILC, Report of the International Law
Commission, 57th Session, UN Doc A/60/10, ¶236.
127.

Compromis, ¶22.

128.

Compromis, ¶21.

129.

Compromis, ¶20.
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a) THE WTO PANELS HAVE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER
DISPUTES REGARDING HELIAN TARIFFS
The dispute between the parties concerns the imposition of tariffs - a
matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of WTO panels.130 The PCIJ131and
the ICJ132 have declared that the Court does not have jurisdiction where
another body has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.133 Adawa and
Rasasa have identical obligations to impose no tariffs on Helian products
under both the WTO regime134 and CHC Treaty.135 To distinguish two
disputes arising under the same obligations “would be artificial”.136 Thus,
violation of identical obligations constitutes “a single dispute”.137
Consequently, the WTO panels have exclusive jurisdiction over the
present dispute.
b) THE WTO PANELS’ JURISDICTION IS LEX SPECIALIS TO THE ICJ’S
JURISDICTION

The Botega Treaty138 and the WTO Agreement139 confer jurisdiction
over this dispute to two separate forums which creates a jurisdictional

130. WTO Agreement, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2, 1994, UNTS 1869, p. 401, [“DSU”], Art. 23; Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1994, UNTS 1867, p. 154, [“WTO Agreement”],
Art. 2(4); General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Annex 1A, 1994, UNTS 64, p. 187, [“GATT”], Art.
2.
131. Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland) (1928), PCIJ Ser A No 15,
[“Upper Silesia”], p. 23.
132. Alleged violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Order of 3 October 2018, ¶39.
133. Karin Oellers-Frahm, Multiplication of International Courts and Tribunals and Conflicting
Jurisdiction - Problems and possible solutions, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 5, p. 88.
134.

Compromis, ¶12.

135.

CHC Treaty, Art. 3.

136. Southern Bluefïn Tuna case (New Zealand-Japan, Australia-Japan), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Reports of International Arbitral Awards 2000, vol. XXIII, pp. 1-57, [“p Tuna”], ¶54; MOX
Plant case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Order No. 3, PCA, 2003, [“MOX Plant”], ¶26.
137. Southern Bluefïn Tuna, ¶54; Yuval Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International
Courts and Tribunals (Oxford University Press, 2004), [“Shany”], p. 8, 154.
138.

Botega Treaty, Art. 6.

139.

DSU, Art. 23.
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conflict.140 Such conflict is resolved through the principle of lex specialis.141
This principle, affirmed by the ICJ,142 PCIJ,143 and international tribunals144
provides that special jurisdiction prevails over the general.145 The
jurisdiction of the WTO panels covers specifically trade disputes146 while the
jurisdiction of the ICJ is general.147 Thus, the WTO panels’ jurisdiction
prevails over this Court’s jurisdiction.
c) THE WTO AGREEMENT IS LEX POSTERIOR TO THE BOTEGA
TREATY
A treaty establishing jurisdiction applies only to the extent it is not
superseded by a later treaty which provides different jurisdiction over the
matter.148 Even if initially the ICJ had jurisdiction over disputes regarding
Helian tariffs,149 when the two States concluded the WTO Agreement in
1995150 they excluded this Court’s jurisdiction.151 Therefore, the WTO
panel’s jurisdiction prevails over this Court’s jurisdiction.

140. ILC, Conclusions of the work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International
Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, 2006, (A/61/10,
¶251), [“Report on Fragmentation”], ¶¶2, 26; Vaughan Lowe, Overlapping Jurisdiction in International
Tribunals, 20 Australian Yearbook of International Law 191, [“Lowe”], p. 194; Tim Graewert, Conflicting
laws and jurisdictions in the dispute settlement process of Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO,
Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal, vol. 1(2), [“Graewert”], p. 290.
141.

Report on Fragmentation, ¶¶6, 9.

142. Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India), Judgement, ICJ
Rep 1960, p. 40; Ambatielos case (Greece v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 1952, p.
44.
143. Mavrommatis, pp. 31-32; Chorzów Factory, p. 30; Jurisdiction of European Commission of
Danube Between Galatz and Braila (Advisory Opinion) (1927), PCIJ Ser B No 14, p. 64.
144. Southern Bluefïn Tuna, ¶¶64-65; European Communities - Regime for The Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO, Appellate Body Report, 1997, WT/DS27/AB/R, ¶204.
145. Songling Yang, WTO and RTAs: The Forum Choice Clause, Michigan State International
Law Review, vol. 23.1, p. 135.
146.

DSU, Art. 23.

147. Botega Treaty, Art. 6; Report of the ICJ 1 August 2017–31 July 2018 GA Official Records
Seventy-third Session, Supplement No. 4 A/73/4, ¶7; ICJ, Press Release, No. 2019/9, 25 February 2019, p.
6; Jacob Cogan (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Organizations, (Oxford University Press,
2016), p. 885.
148.

Mavrommatis, p. 31; VCLT, Art. 30(3); Brownliе, p. 364.

149.

Botega Treaty, Art. 6.

150.

Compromis, ¶12.

151.

WTO Agreement, Art. 3(3); DSU, Art. 23.
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Alternatively, Adawa’s claim is inadmissible

The ongoing proceedings before the WTO panel152 are a bar for the
admissibility of the claim due to the principle of lis pendens and the principle
of comity. Additionally, the submission of the claim constitutes an abuse of
process.
a) THE CLAIM IS INADMISSIBLE DUE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF LIS
PENDENS

Lis pendens is a general principle of law forbidding parallel
proceedings,153 which prevents conflicting judgements.154 This principle is
universally accepted by States,155 enshrined in international conventions,156
and has been applied by international tribunals.157 Lis pendens can be invoked
when identical disputes are adjudicated before bodies of the same
character.158

152.

Compromis, ¶47.

153. Shany, p. 22; Lowe, pp. 202-203; North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S-CanadaMexico, 1994, 32 ILM 289, Art. 2005(6); Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, Christoph Schreuer (eds.),
The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 1021.
154. Upper Silesia, p. 20; MOX Plant, ¶28; Gabrielle Marceau, The primacy of the WTO dispute
settlement system, Questions of International Law, vol. 2, p. 10.
155. GC 24, ¶14; Shany, pp. 155, 162; France, New Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 100; Italy,
Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 39(2); Germany, Code of Civil Procedure, Section 261(3)(1); Reservations to
the Optional protocol to the ICCPR, 1966, UNTS 999, p. 171, made by Croatia, Denmark, El Salvador,
Iceland, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Uganda.
156. Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial
matters, 1968, Art. 21; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950,
UNTS 213, p. 221, Art. 35(2)(b); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 1984, UNTS vol. 1465, p. 85, Art. 22(5).
157. Pey Casado and Foundation President Allende v. Chile, ICSID, ARB/98/2, IIC 1347,
Decision on the request for the stay of enforcement of the award, 15 March 2018, ¶79; Certain Criminal
Proceedings in France (Republic of the Congo v. France), Provisional Measures, ICJ Rep 2003, p. 102,
Dissenting Opinion, Judge de Cara, p. 121.
158. Upper Silesia, p. 20; Busta and Busta v. Czech Republic, Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Final Award, V 2015/014, IIC 928, 2017, ¶210.
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First, the disputes before the WTO panels and the ICJ are identical as they
concern the same factual basis159 and complained injury160 - the imposition
of tariffs which impede free trade of Helian products. Lis pendens is
applicable even if parties rely on different treaties161 or part of the claim is
not the same.162 Thus, the fact that Adawa invokes the CHC Treaty before
the ICJ and requests relief163 which is not identical to the one in the WTO
proceedings, does not preclude the application of lis pendens.
Second, the WTO panel and the ICJ are of the same character regardless
of the quasi-judicial character of the WTO panels.164 Both forums regard
inter-state disputes,165 their decisions are binding on the parties,166 and both
the ICJ167 and WTO168 adjudicate on forms of compensation. Therefore, the
Court should dismiss the claim as inadmissible.
b) THE CLAIM IS INADMISSIBLE DUE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF COMITY
The ICJ has declared that it has the discretion to refrain from giving a
judgement in order to preserve “judicial integrity”.169 Accordingly, under
the principle of comity a tribunal can decline to adjudge a dispute where that

159. HRC, Trébutien v. France, Application 421/1990, ¶¶6.3-6.4; Baena Ricardo and others v.
Panama, IACHR, Series C 61, IHRL 1444, 1999. [“Ricardo v. Panama”], ¶55; Mexico - Tax Measures
on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WTO, Amicus Curiae Brief by Camara Nacional de las Industrias
Azucarera y Alcoholera-Mexico, 2006, ¶12.
160. Pauger v. Austria, European Commission of Human Rights, Application 16717/90, 1995,
p. 7; Ricardo v. Panama, ¶56.
161.

Southern Bluefin Tuna, ¶54.

162. Application of the International Convention on the elimination of all forms of racial
discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Order of 14 June 2019, ICJ Rep 2019, [“Qatar v. United
Arab Emirates”], Dissenting Opinion, Judge Cot, ¶7; Robert Kolb, The International Court of Justice
(A&C Black, 2014), [“Kolb”], p. 1202.
163.

Compromis, ¶57.

164.

Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, Dissenting Opinion, Judge Cot, ¶¶9-11.

165.

DSU, Art. 1(1).

166. DSU, Arts. 21-22, ICJ Statute, Art. 59; Peter-Tobias Stoll, World Trade Organization,
Dispute Settlement, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2014, ¶67.
167.

Corfu Channel case (United Kingdom v. Albania), Judgment, ICJ Rep 1949, p. 23.

168. DSU, Art. 22(2); United States - Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale
of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO, Decision by the Arbitrator, 2017, WT/DS381/ARB, ¶7.1; Dispute
Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, 22 May 2017, WT/DSB/M/397, ¶7.24.
169. Case concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, ICJ Rep 1963, p. 15, [“Northern Cameroons”], p. 29.
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would be unreasonable170 or inappropriate.171 Parallel proceedings before
two forums is contrary to judicial propriety,172 since it might result in
contradictory judgements,173 unreasonable cost of proceedings,174 and the
finality of the judgements being questioned.175 The WTO panel currently
examines the dispute between the parties,176 thus the Court should declare the
claim inadmissible.
c) THE CLAIM IS INADMISSIBLE DUE TO AN ABUSE OF PROCESS
Adawa’s claim before the Court constitutes an abuse of process. Abuse
of process arises in situations where a State initiates proceedings in an
arbitrary manner.177
The rule could be applied in exceptional
circumstances,178 such as parallel proceedings before two international
tribunals.179
The Applicant initially commenced proceedings before the WTO.180 By
the subsequent submission to the ICJ the Applicant seeks to obtain an “illicit
advantage”181 through a favourable judgement from either fora. Therefore,
170.

Northern Cameroons, p. 37; Legality of Use of Force, Separate opinion of Judge Higgins,

¶12.
171. Caroline Henckels, Overcoming Jurisdictional Isolationism at the WTO – FTA Nexus: A
Potential Approach for the WTO, European Journal of International Law, vol. 19, no. 3, p. 584; MOX
Plant, ¶28.
172. Andreas Zimmermann and Christian J. Tams (eds.), The Statute of the International Court
of Justice: A Commentary (3rd ed., Oxford University Press, 2019), [“ICJ Statute Commentary”], p. 656.
173.

MOX Plant, ¶28; ICJ Statute Commentary, p. 654.

174.

Graewert, p. 311.

175. Judge Gilbert Guillaume, Speech to the Sixth Committee of the UNGA, 27 October 2000, p.
3; Kolb, pp. 946-947.
176.

Compromis, ¶47.

177. United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO, Appellate
Body Report, 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, ¶160; Kyung Kwak and Gabrielle Marceau, Overlaps and Conflicts
of Jurisdiction between the World Trade Organization and Regional Trade Agreements, Canadian
Yearbook of International Law 2003, p. 100.
178. Immunities and criminal proceedings (Equatorial Guinea v. France), Preliminary
Objections, ICJ Rep 2018, ¶150; Certain Iranian Assets (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of
America), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Rep 2019, ¶113.
179. Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, Request for the indication of provisional measures by the
United Arab Emirates, ¶34; Graewert, p. 324; Joost Pauwelyn and Luiz Eduardo Salles, Forum Shopping
before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible Solutions, Cornell International Law
Journal, vol. 42, p. 105.
180.

Compromis, ¶47.

181.

Upper Silesia, pp. 37-38.
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the Court should declare the claim inadmissible due to abuse of process.
III.

The imposition of tariffs does not breach the CHC Treaty
a) THE TARIFFS ARE JUSTIFIED AS NECESSARY TO PROTECT
RASASA’S ESSENTIAL SECURITY INTERESTS

Article 22(b) CHC Treaty allows Rasasa to adopt measures necessary
to protect its essential security interests.182 Essential security interests of the
State encompass armed attack,183 public disorder,184 and economic crisis.185
After hurricane Makan destroyed 60% of Rasasa’s Helian industry crime
rates and unemployment in Rasasa skyrocketed.186 Rasasa’s devastated
Helian industry187as a significant sector of its economy,188 constitutes an
essential security interest.
Furthermore, the tariffs are justified as there was a nexus of necessity
between the threat and the measures imposed.189 Rassasa’s Helian industry
was facing a threat of total collapse due to the fact that Rasasan processors of
Helian hyacinth increasingly began to purchase materials from Adawan
farmers.190 The Respondent imposed the tariffs in order to stabilize its
economy.191 Thus, the tariffs are consistent with the CHC Treaty.
b) CONSEQUENTLY, ADAWA IS NOT ENTITLED TO COMPENSATION

182.

CHC Treaty, Art. 22(b).

183.

Nicaragua, ¶224.

184. Russia - measures concerning traffic in transit case (Ukraine v. Russia), WTO, Panel
Report, 2019, ¶7.130; Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets, L. P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID,
ARB/01/3, Award, 2007, ¶331.
185. LG&E Energy Corp., L&E Capital Corp., LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID, ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, ¶238; CMS Gas Transmission Company v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID, ARB/01/8, Award 12 May 2005, ¶359; Sempra Energy International &
Camuzzi International, S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID, ARB/03/02, Opinion of Anne- Marie Slaughter and
William Burke-White, ¶30.
186.

Compromis, ¶¶16-17, 27-28.

187.

Compromis, ¶30.

188.

Compromis, ¶2.

189. Nicaragua, ¶¶224, 282; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of
America), Judgment, ICJ Rep 2003, ¶43.
190.

Compromis, ¶30.

191.

Compromis, ¶¶33, 44.
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A State would be bound to pay compensation only as a consequence of
an internationally wrongful act.192 As Rasasa’s tariffs were in compliance
with its obligations under the CHC Treaty, Adawa is not entitled to
compensation.193
D. ADAWA’S ARREST AND DETENTION OF DARIAN GREY
CONSTITUTE INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, AND
SHE MUST BE IMMEDIATELY REPATRIATED TO RASASA.
Rasasa submits that Adawa’s arrest and detention of Ms. Grey violate
her immunities. Furthermore, this conduct cannot be justified by Adawa’s
obligations to cooperate with the ICC. Thus, Darian Grey must be repatriated
to Rasasa.
I.

Adawa violated Ms. Grey’s immunities by arresting and detaining
her
a) MS. GREY ENJOYS PERSONAL IMMUNITY FROM ARREST AND
DETENTION UNDER THE CHC TREATY AND CUSTOMARY LAW

(i) Ms. Grey enjoys immunity under the CHC Treaty
Ms. Darian Grey enjoys immunity from enforcement actions, such as
arrest and detention,194 while exercising her functions195 as a State
representative to CHC meetings.196 Representatives to international
organisations enjoy personal immunity,197 which safeguards the independent
exercise of their functions.198 Personal immunity covers both official and
192. ILC, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001, Supplement No. 10,
UN Doc A/56/10, [“ARSIWA”], Arts. 12, 31, 36.
193.

ARSIWA, Arts. 35, 36(2).

194.

CHC Treaty, Art. 32.

195.

CHC Treaty, Art. 32.

196.

Compromis, ¶49.

197. ILC, Seventh report on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction,
Special Rapporteur Concepción Escobar Hernández, Yearbook of the International Law Commission
2019, A/CN.4/729, ¶45; Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal
Court, American Journal of International Law, vol. 98, No. 3, [“Akande”], p. 412; Roger O’Keefe,
International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2015), [“O’Keefe”], p. 416.
198. Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1, UNTS XVI, Art. 105(2); Applicability of Article VI,
Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion,
ICJ Rep 1989, ¶50; Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations with International
Organizations of a Universal Character, 1975, A/CONF.67/16, [“VCRS”], Preamble, ¶6; Convention on
the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 1946, UNTC 1, p. 15, and 90, p. 327, [“CPIUN”],
Art. 4, Section 14.
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private acts,199 committed prior and during the officials’ mandate.200
Furthermore, Ms. Grey’s immunity applies during journeys to and from the
places of meeting,201 hence, it covers “the entire period of presence in the
State”.202 Therefore, Adawa is barred from arresting and detaining Ms. Grey
during her official visit in Adawa.

(ii) Ms. Grey has immunity under customary law
Under customary law sitting Ministers of Foreign Affairs enjoy personal
immunity203 granted to them to ensure the proper functioning of inter-state
relations.204 By virtue of her official capacity,205 Ms. Grey enjoys immunity
from foreign criminal jurisdiction,206 equal to that of diplomatic agents,207
which covers both private and official acts,208 committed prior and during her
time in office.209 This immunity extends to enforcement actions undertaken

199. Brownlie, p. 393; Hazel Fox and Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity (3rd ed.,
Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 585; ILC, Draft Articles on Special Missions with commentaries,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1967, vol. II, A/6709/Rev.l and Rev.l/Corr.l, p. 361.
200. ILC, Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission 2013, vol. II, A/68/10, p. 49, commentary 6.
201.

CHC Treaty, Art. 32.

202. ILC, The practice of the UN, the specialized agencies and the IAEA concerning their status,
privileges and immunities, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1967, vol. II,
A/CN.4/SER.A/1967/Add.l, p. 176, ¶87; Tachiona v. United States, United States, Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit, 2004, 386 F.3d 205, ¶60.
203
.
Arrest Warrant, ¶58; ILC, Sixth report on immunity of State officials from foreign criminal
jurisdiction, Special Rapporteur Concepción Escobar Hernández, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission 2018, A/CN.4/722, [“Sixth report on immunity”], Draft Article 3; Dapo Akande and
Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts, EJIL
vol. 21, 2011, [“Shah”], p. 818; Pinochet case, United Kingdom, House of Lords, Appeal, 1999,
[“Pinochet”], ¶44.

204.

Arrest Warrant, Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Buergenthal, ¶75; Shah,

205.

Compromis, ¶32.

p. 818.
206. Arrest Warrant, ¶54; Sharon & Yaron case, Belgium, Court of Cessation, 12 February 2003,
P.02.1139.F, p. 7; Pinochet, ¶75.
207. Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France),
Judgment, ICJ Rep 2008, p. 177, [“Criminal Matters”], ¶174; Arrest Warrant, ¶51.
208. Arrest Warrant, ¶55; Sixth report on immunity, Draft Article 4(2); Ramona Pedretti,
Immunity of Heads of State and State Officials for International Crimes, Developments in International
Law, vol. 69, Brill Nijhoff, 2015, [“Pedretti”], p. 25.
209.

Arrest Warrant, ¶55.
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by another State, such as arrest and detention.210 Thus, Adawa cannot arrest
and detain Ms. Grey.
b) ADAWA VIOLATED MS. GREY’S IMMUNITIES BY EXERCISING
DOMESTIC JURISDICTION OVER HER

Ms. Grey’s personal immunities as a Minister of Foreign Affairs211 and
a State representative,212 bar Adawa from exercising domestic criminal
jurisdiction over her including in cases of war crimes.213 Thus, Adawa cannot
exercise any “constraining act of authority”214 such as arrest and detention215
over Ms. Grey. Consequently, the Adawan authorities violated Ms. Grey’s
immunities by arresting and detaining her.
II.

Adawa’s violation of Ms. Grey’s immunities cannot be justified
with its cooperation with the ICC

Adawa cannot arrest Mr. Grey pursuant to the ICC’s arrest warrant since
ICC does not have jurisdiction over her. In any event, Adawa is bound to
respect Ms. Grey’s immunities even when it cooperates with the ICC.
Additionally, there is no customary rule rendering immunities inapplicable in
cases of cooperation with ICC.
a) THE ICC DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER MS. GREY

(i) The ICC does not have jurisdiction over nationals of nonparties

Adawa cannot arrest Mr. Grey pursuant to the ICC’s arrest warrant as
ICC lacks jurisdiction over her. ICC's jurisdiction does not extend to

210. ILC, Immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission on the work of its seventieth session, 2018, A/73/10, [“Report 2018”],
¶¶307, 309; Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, UNTS 500, p. 91, Art. 29.
211. Arrest Warrant, ¶¶51, 58; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, South Africa Decision, 2017, ICC-02/0501/09-302, [“South Africa Decision”], ¶68.
212.

CHC Treaty, Art. 32; VCRS, Arts. 28, 30; CPIUN, Art. 6, Section 11(a).

213. Chamber, 13 March 2001, ILR, vol. 125, p. 508, ¶10; Institut de Droit International, Third
Commission, Resolution on the Immunity from Jurisdiction of the State and of Persons Who Act on Behalf
of the State in case of International Crimes, 2009, Art. 3(1); O’Keefe, p. 422.
214.

Criminal Matters, ¶174; Arrest Warrant, ¶54.

215. South Africa Decision, ¶68; Application for Arrest Warrant Against General Shaul Mofaz,
First instance, UK, Bow Street Magistrates’ Court, 2004, ¶15.
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nationals of non-parties to the Rome Statute,216 such as Rasasa.217 Treaties
cannot establish218 or modify219 rights or obligations of non-State parties
without their consent. Furthermore, all international criminal tribunals
operate on the basis of consent.220 Hence, absent Rasasa’s consent, its
sovereign right to exercise jurisdiction over its nationals cannot be abrogated
by the ICC.221 Thus, the ICC does not have jurisdiction to request the arrest
and detention of Ms. Grey’s.

(ii) Alternatively, Ms. Grey’s immunities are a bar for the
jurisdiction of the ICC

State officials may be deprived of their immunity by the ICC, 222 when
this is established by the Rome Statute223 or Security Council [“SC”]
resolutions.224 However, neither Rasasa is a party to the Rome Statute,225 nor
has a SC resolution been issued. Furthermore, there is no rule under
customary law which deprives State officials of their personal immunity
before international criminal tribunals.226 Consequently, Ms. Grey’s
immunities bar criminal proceedings before the ICC and arrest by Adawa.

216. Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, Law
and Contemporary Problems, Duke Law Journal, vol. 61, No. 1, [“Morris”], pp. 26-27, 45, 58; David
Scheffer, International Criminal Court: The Challenge of Jurisdiction, Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law, 1999, [“Scheffer”], p. 8; UN, Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Establishment of an ICC, 1998, A/CONF.183/13, vol. 2, [“Rome Conference”], Seventh meeting,
¶60; Rome Conference, Eight meeting, ¶¶21, 48; Rome Conference, Ninth meeting, ¶¶23-24, 40; Rome
Conference, Twenty ninth meeting, ¶42; Rome Conference, Thirty third meeting, ¶41.
217.

Compromis, ¶13.

218.

VCLT, Art. 34.

219. ILC, Draft articles on the law of treaties with commentaries, Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, 1966, vol. II, A/6309/Rev.l, p. 226; Island of Palmas, p. 870; Status of Eastern Carelia
(Advisory Opinion) (1923), PCIJ Ser B No 5, pp. 27-28.
220.

Brownlie, p. 431; Morris, p. 37; Scheffer, p. 7.

221.

Rome Statute, Preamble, ¶10, Art. 1; Brownlie, p. 432.

222.

Arrest warrant, ¶61.

223.

Rome Statute, Art. 27(2).

224. SC Resolution 1970, 2011, S/RES/1970, [“SC Resolution on Libya”], ¶¶4-6; SC Resolution
1953, 2005, S/RES/1953, [“SC Resolution on Sudan”], ¶¶2, 6.
225.

Compromis, ¶13.

226. Pedretti, p. 436; Joanne Foakes, The Position of Heads of State and Senior Officials in
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2014), [“Foakes”], pp. 197-198; William Schabas, The
International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2016),
[“Schabas”], p. 600; Akande, p. 421.
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b) ADAWA IS BOUND TO RESPECT MS. GREY’S IMMUNITIES EVEN
WHEN IT COOPERATES WITH THE ICC
Even if Ms. Grey’s immunities are not a bar for the jurisdiction of the
ICC, they remain opposable to Adawa.227 Adawa’s obligation to cooperate
with the ICC does not exempt it from the obligation to respect Ms. Grey’s
immunity.228 When cooperating with the ICC, States use domestic
enforcement mechanisms.229 Thus, by executing the international arrest
warrant,230 Adawa exercised its domestic jurisdiction231 which is strictly
prohibited.232
Moreover, Article 98(1) Rome Statute provides that in cases of conflict
between the obligations to cooperate with the ICC and to respect immunity
of foreign officials, the obligation to respect immunity shall prevail.233
Numerous States234 and scholars235 recognized that pursuant to this rule a
State party cannot arrest officials of non-State parties. Thus, Adawa was
under an obligation to respect Ms. Grey’s immunity.
Additionally, Adawa was under an obligation to consult with the ICC
regarding its conflicting obligations.236 This would have relieved the

227. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Request by Professor Paola Gaeta to submit observations on the
merits of the legal questions presented in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s appeal against the Jordan
Decision, 2018, ICC-02/05-01/09-349, ¶5.
228. South Africa Decision, ¶68; Guénaël Mettraux, John Dugard and Max du Plessis, Heads of
State Immunities, International Crimes and President Bashir’s Visit to South Africa, International
Criminal Law Review, vol. 18, [“Mettraux, Dugard and Plessis”], p. 603.
229. Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act, South Africa,
2002, Section 9(3); Valerie Oosterveld, Mike Perry and John McManus, The Cooperation of States With the
International Criminal Court, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 25, issue 3, 2001, pp. 770, 772;
Mettraux, Dugard and Plessis, p. 607.
230.

Compromis, ¶¶50-51.

231.

Report 2018, ¶¶287, 309.

232.

Pleadings, (IV.)(A.)(2.).

233.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UNTS 2187, p. 3, [“Rome Statute”], Art.

98(1).
234. United Kingdom, International Criminal Court Act, 2001, Chapter 17, Part 2 - Arrest and
Detention, Section 23(2); Republic of Malta, Extradition Act, 1978, Art. 26S(2); Independent State of
Samoa, Act No. 26 on the International Criminal Court, 2007, Аrt. 32(2); Attorney General et al. v. The
Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists, Kenya, Court of Appeal at Nairobi, 2018, pp.
17-18.
235. Mettraux, Dugard and Plessis, pp. 611-612; Pedretti, pp. 123-124; Foakes, pp. 200, 202;
Schabas, p. 604.
236.

Rome Statute, Art. 86; Schabas, p. 1340.
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Applicant from its duty to cooperate with the ICC. 237 However, no such
consultation was requested from Adawa.
c) THERE IS NO CUSTOMARY RULE RENDERING IMMUNITY
INAPPLICABLE IN CASES OF COOPERATION WITH ICC
A State can cooperate with the ICC in the arrest of foreign State officials
only when both States have waived the immunity of their officials by
ratifying the Rome Statute238 or are bound by SC resolutions.239 Neither of
these conditions are present.240 Thus, a rule rendering Ms. Grey’s immunity
inapplicable in cases of cooperation can become binding upon Rasasa only
under customary law.241 Although the ICC declared the existence of such
customary rule in its 2019 Al Bashir judgment,242 the State practice and
opinio juris are insufficient to support this assertion. Both States parties243
and non-parties244 to the Rome Statute have rejected that such customary rule
exists. Accordingly, States parties have always refused to arrest indictees of
non-State parties regardless of requests for cooperation.245 Therefore, Ms.
Grey’s immunities are applicable to Adawa, rendering her arrest and
detention unlawful.
III.

Therefore, Ms. Grey must be immediately repatriated back to
Rasasa

237. Rome Statute, Art. 97; Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, Official
Records of the Assembly, First session, Part II.A, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/1/3 and
Corr.1, 2002, Rule 195.
238.

Rome Statute, Art. 27(1).

239.

SC Resolution on Libya, ¶¶4-6; SC Resolution on Sudan, ¶¶2, 6.

240.

Compromis, ¶13.

241.

VCLT, Art. 38.

242.

Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Jordan Appeal, 2019, ICC-02/05-01/09-397, [“Jordan Appeal”],

¶2.
243. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Jordan's Response to observations, ICC-02/05-01/09-368,
¶9; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, DRC Observations, Annex 2, 2014, ICC-02/05-01/09-190-AnxII-tENG, p.
7.
244. AU, Assembly, Decision on the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Tribunal, 2009, Assembly/AU/Dec.245(XIII), ¶10.
245. Jordan Appeal, ¶4; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Djibouti Decision, 2016, ICC-02/05-01/09266, ¶6; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Malawi Decision, 2011, ICC-02/05-01/09-139-Corr, ¶8.
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By detaining Ms. Grey,246 Adawa is in a continuous violation of
international law.247 Thus, Adawa is under an obligation to cease its
wrongful conduct248 and to make reparation.249 Presently, the reparation
sought is in the form of restitution, which requires the re-establishment of the
situation which existed before occurrence of the wrongful act.250
Accordingly, Adawa is under an obligation to immediately repatriate Ms.
Grey back to Rasasa.
E.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Rasasa respectfully requests this Court to adjudge and declare that:

I. The Court lacks jurisdiction over Adawa’s claims because Adawa is
not a party to the 1929 Treaty of Botega;
II. Rasasa’s development and deployment of the WALL along the
border between Adawa and Rasasa is consistent with international law;
III. Adawa’s claim that Rasasa’s Helian tariffs violate the CHC Treaty
falls outside the Court’s jurisdiction or is inadmissible; in the alternative, the
imposition of the tariffs did not violate the CHC Treaty; and
IV. Adawa’s arrest and detention of Darian Grey constitute
internationally wrongful acts, and that she must be immediately repatriated
to Rasasa.

246.

Compromis, ¶¶51-52.

247.

ARSIWA, Art. 30.

248. Wall Advisory, ¶151; Nicaragua, ¶292(12); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (Iran v. United States of America), Judgement, ICJ Rep 1980, ¶95(3)(A); Case concerning the
Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand v. France), Report of International Arbitration Awards 1990, vol. XX
(Sales No. E/F.93.V.3), p. 266.
249.

ARSIWA, Art. 31(1); Nicaragua, ¶149.

250. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Rep 2010, ¶273;
ARSIWA, Art. 35.
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SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/
The ABA Section of International Law and Practice assists in international
policy development, promoting the rule of law, and educating legal
practitioners. Since 1933, it has been involved in a wide range of legal
activities and international legal issues.
Committees within the Section of International Law and Practice include the
following:
Business Transactions & Disputes Division
Business Regulation Division
Comparative Law Division
Public International Law Division
General Division
Along with the International Law Association American Branch, the ABA
Section of International Law and Practice co-sponsors the annual ILA
Weekend in New York, New York, United States.
Selected ILA Weekend speeches, panel remarks, and other proceedings are
published each year in the International Practitioners' Notebook, which is the
annual spring issue of the ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law.
Further information about the International Law Association and ILA
Weekend is available at http://www.ambranch.org/.
Both law students and professionals in the field are welcome in the ABA
Section of International Law and Practice. For membership information, visit
http://www.abanet.org/about/membership.html.
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INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION
AMERICAN BRANCH
http://www.ambranch.org
The International Law Association (ILA), founded 1873 in Brussels, is a
private international organization. It is a non-governmental association with
United Nations consultative status. The ILA's biennial conference debates
and proceedings have in many cases influenced the decisions of the United
Nations General Assembly.
ILA members may belong to one of more than forty national ILA branches.
The ILA's Secretary General of the Association maintains an office in
London, England, and individual ILA members whose countries do not yet
have ILA branches are members of the London "Headquarters." The ILA
conducts international law study through committees. Committee members
are specialists and prepare biennial conference reports under the supervision
of the ILA's Director of Studies.
United States of America ILA Members enter the ILA by joining the
Association's American Branch. American Branch members' ILA world
conference reports appear in Proceedings of the American Branch.
The International Law Association American Branch sponsors the annual ILA
Weekend in New York, New York, United States. Selected speeches, panel
remarks, and other proceedings from the ILA Weekend are published each
year in the International Practitioners' Notebook, the spring issue of the ILSA
Journal of International & Comparative Law.
More information and an online application for membership in the ILA
American Branch are available on the ILA Website at
http://www.ambranch.org/fee.htm.
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3305 COLLEGE AVE, FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 33314
https://www.law.nova.edu/current-students/orgs/nhro/index.html

The NSU Human Rights Organization is a response to the profound need in South Florida for an
organization that is committed to furthering the civil and human rights of our diverse communities and
people. Our main goal is advocating for the fair and equal treatment of all citizens and against any such
human rights violations in the Tri-County region of South Florida as well as offering NSU law students
pro-bono opportunities with supervising attorneys locally, nationally, and globally. Recent projects are
included on the website.
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